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ABSTRACT 
 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE 
MIDDLE EAST SINCE 2002 
 
 
 
Turkish foreign policy has experienced a significant transformation since the AK 
Party came to power in 2002. The pro-status quo, passive and reactive foreign policy with 
a limited regional perspective transformed into an active foreign policy that aims to change 
international relations in the region as a whole. This change was analyzed in many 
different studies in recent years, and scholars from different fields of political science have 
tried to make sense of this major shift and understand its causes and outcomes. In this 
study, this foreign policy change will be explained as a gradual development that came as a 
result of the transformation of Turkey’s state identity. The process of change was started 
with the Neighboring Countries of Iraq Conference in 2003. The Conference was the first 
of such an attempt to engage the countries of the region in order to resolve problems in a 
neighboring nation.  
This study attempts to challenge this dominant discourse by providing a new 
narrative of Turkish politics and evolving foreign policy of Turkey. The study argues that 
the change in Turkish foreign policy was gradual and based on different dynamics that 
took place in the country over the last ten years. Although it is difficult to explain this 
change to the academic world, this challenge is due in part to the failure of classical 
theories of international relations, such as realism and liberalism, to explain the reasons for 
shifts in nations’ foreign policy. The structural explanation sometimes fails to explain 
transformations that took place in a more complicated mixed impact of domestic and 
external dynamics. However, another major approach in international relations, 
 2 
 
constructivism, provides solutions for both of these challenges. It has an important strength 
in explaining foreign policy changes in countries, especially in Turkish foreign policy, 
which has important ramifications in regards to the impact of the shift on the state’s 
identity. The three cases under study demonstrate the changing identity of Turkish foreign 
policy, from a pro-Western, status quo-oriented and passive foreign policy towards a more 
independent, pro-active foreign policy.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Turkish foreign policy has experienced a significant transformation since the AK 
Party came to power in 2002. The pro-status quo, passive and reactive foreign policy with 
a limited regional perspective transformed into an active foreign policy that aims to change 
international relations in the region as a whole. This change was analyzed in many 
different studies in recent years, and scholars from different fields of political science have 
tried to make sense of this major shift and understand its causes and outcomes.  
In this study, this foreign policy change will be explained as a gradual development 
that came as a result of the transformation of Turkey’s state identity. The previous identity 
of state was challenged by both external and domestic forces and led to the emergence of a 
new identity in a gradual manner. This study will respond to the question of how these 
domestic and external forces impacted the transformation of state identity. It will 
demonstrate the transformation by using multiple methods and multiple different sets of 
data, including the secondary sources, the primary official documents and the interview 
with policy makers.  
The secondary sources, including monographs, articles and books written on 
Turkish foreign policy in recent years were the most easily accessible documents in this 
research. There is a growing literature in the field of foreign policy analysis focusing on 
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the changes in the Turkish foreign policy in the last decade.1 In addition to these secondary 
sources, the study will also use the primary sources, that includes the decisions of the 
international summits and meetings and interview with the foreign policy decision makers 
who played a prominent role in the making of foreign policy during the last twelve years of 
Ak Party government. The methodology of process tracing will be utilized together with 
discourse analysis in order to explain the foreign policy changes.  
 
Rationale for Research: 
Three case studies were selected to explain these changes. All of these three case 
studies are instances of emerging autonomy in Turkish foreign policy. In the first case of 
Neighboring Countries of Iraq Conference, Turkish foreign policy makers acted in a 
relative autonomy and launched an initiative together with other regional actors. In the 
second case study, Hamas’s visit to Turkey, Turkish foreign policy makers took a position 
after the parliamentary elections in Palestine that contradicts with the position of the 
Western countries and in particular the US. Finally in the third case study of this 
dissertation, the Tahran Declaration and during the UN Security Council voting on Iranian 
sanctions, Turkish foreign policy makers voted against the resolution brought by the US 
and other Western countries. All of these three cases were considered as serious crises of 
Turkish foreign policy with its Western allies and in all three cases the orientation of 
Turkish foreign policy were questioned by the Western scholars. However, the three case 
studies demonstrate that there is a gradual transformation of Turkish foreign policy. Each 
                                                
1 Examples of these works include, Kemal Kirisci. “The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise 
of the Trading State” New Perspectives on Turkey No.40: 29-57. 2009; Mesut O ̈zcan, Harmonizing Foreign 
Policy: Turkey, the EU and the Middle East Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008;  Mustafa Aydın, “Twenty Years 
Before, Twenty Years After: Turkish Foreign Policy at the Threshold of the 21st Century,” in Turkey’s 
Foreign Policy in the 21st Century: A Changing Role in World Politics, ed. Tareq Ismael and Mustafa Aydın 
Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003; Akc ̧apar, Burak. Turkey’s New European Era: Foreign Policy on the Road to EU 
Membership. Lanham: Row- man & Little, 2007; Bilgin, Pınar. “Turkey’s Changing Security Discourse: The 
Challenges of Globalization.” European Journal of Political Research 4, no. 1 (2005): 175-201 
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case will demonstrate that Turkey was gradually having a more independent and 
autonomous foreign policy.  
The dissertation will show that the process of change in Turkish foreign policy 
began with the immediate aftermath of Ak Party’s electoral victory. was started with the 
Neighboring Countries of Iraq Conference in 2003.. The Conference was the first of such 
an attempt to engage the countries of the region in order to resolve problems in a 
neighboring nation. For the first time, Turkish foreign policy makers launched such an 
initiative and abandoned their long-held “non-involvement” and “non-interference” policy 
towards the politics of the Middle East. In this initiative, the regional countries created a 
forum in order to solve the problems that could have emerged after the invasion of Iraq by 
U.S. forces. The primary goal was to contain a potential civil war in the country and 
prevent the spread of such instability. It was not a position that intended to challenge 
Western policies in the region. However, after the March 1, 2003 vote in the Turkish 
National Assembly that resulted in the refusal to allow the U.S. to launch its troops from 
Turkish soil, it was perceived as a challenge to Western policies and an attempt to turn 
away from the West.  Especially during the crisis ridden days of the post-March 1st period, 
some observers in Western capitals started to publish essays criticizing Turkish politics 
came up with different titles to their pieces, such as “who lost Turkey?” and “sick man of 
Europe, again.” During these years, Turkey did not have sufficient instruments to react to 
these criticisms and to reach some of these observers to provide a thorough analysis of the 
changes in Turkish foreign policy. However, even when Ankara used its limited 
capabilities, its attempts were ignored by some observers in these capitals.   
The changing Turkish foreign policy challenged the traditional approach in Turkey, 
but it also challenged the perception and expectation of Turkish foreign policy in Western 
capitals. Many observers of Turkish foreign policy described the shift by emphasizing the 
change in leadership and neglected a more significant transformation that was taking place 
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at the level of public opinion and society. This change in Turkish foreign policy later 
projected itself in other developments, such as the visit of senior Hamas leaders to Turkey. 
During this visit, foreign policy analysts once again argued that it was another shift from a 
pro-Western foreign policy to an almost anti-Western one. Turkey’s position on the Iranian 
nuclear crisis, the Tehran declaration and its attitude during the voting at the UN Security 
Council also created similar reactions in the Western world. After each and every one of 
these major events, Turkish foreign policy makers expressed their intention to have an 
independent foreign policy; however, the statements of these policymakers were always 
ignored and these developments were interpreted as a major break from Turkey’s Western 
orientation. This situation made the shift in Turkish foreign policy difficult to understand, 
leading to misinterpretation. Despite several studies in the field that demonstrates the 
different dimensions of Turkey’s transformed foreign policy, the dominant discourse in the 
Western world focused on the view that Turkish foreign policy is becoming anti-Western 
and increasingly “Islamic or Middle Eastern.” 
This study attempts to challenge this dominant discourse by providing a new 
narrative of Turkish politics and evolving foreign policy of Turkey. The study argues that 
the change in Turkish foreign policy was gradual and based on different dynamics that 
took place in the country over the last ten years. Although it is difficult to explain this 
change to the academic world, this challenge is due in part to the failure of classical 
theories of international relations, such as realism and liberalism, to explain the reasons for 
shifts in nations’ foreign policy. The structural explanation sometimes fails to explain 
transformations that took place in a more complicated mixed impact of domestic and 
external dynamics. However, another major approach in international relations, 
constructivism, provides solutions for both of these challenges. It has an important strength 
in explaining foreign policy changes in countries, especially in Turkish foreign policy, 
which has important ramifications in regards to the impact of the shift on the state’s 
 11 
 
identity. The three cases under study demonstrate the changing identity of Turkish foreign 
policy, from a pro-Western, status quo-oriented and passive foreign policy towards a more 
independent, pro-active foreign policy. This change took place as a result of the emergence 
of a new set of actors and circumstances in foreign policy making. On the one hand, the 
new leadership brought a novel perspective to foreign policy making. Both Erdoğan and 
Davutoğlu had very ambitious goals in regards to Turkey’s place and role in the world 
arena. Secondly, the change was also impacted by the perception of the region by policy 
makers and public opinion. Once considered a quagmire, the Middle East started to be 
viewed as one of the hinterlands of Turkish foreign policy. Turkey’s non-involvement 
policy towards Middle Eastern politics started to change rapidly as Turkey started to be 
more actively involved in the region. This transformation in Turkey’s foreign policy 
identity also influenced the perception of its role in the region. Its soft power increased 
rapidly which in turn also provided the opportunity to alter its foreign policy. Thus, 
domestic public opinion, leadership and external factors influenced Turkey’s role and 
foreign policy identity.  
This dissertation is divided into five chapters. The first chapter provides an overall 
analysis of Turkish foreign policy since the foundation of the Republic in 1923. Turkish 
foreign policy has been consistent for more than eight decades. Its pro-Western orientation 
started with the foundation of the Republic, but strengthened later in the 1950s with the 
rise of the Cold War. Turkey decided to bandwagon its policies to the Western bloc for 
most of the Cold War. Other than a crisis over Cyprus, Turkish foreign policy was in line 
with U.S. policies in the region during those years. Moreover, Turkish foreign policy’s 
reluctance to engage in the conflicts and politics of the Middle East started at the state’s 
very inception. Turkish foreign policy makers considered any move towards the Eastern 
world in general and to the Middle East in particular as a betrayal of this pro-Western 
orientation. Thus, despite the significance of its geographical location, Turkish foreign 
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policy did not take advantage of its location or contribute to the resolution of disputes in 
the Middle East.  
This situation also led to a passive and reactive foreign policy. Being the frontline 
state against the spread of communism and enlargement of the Soviet Union became the 
main identity of Turkish foreign policy. However, with the end of the Cold War, Turkish 
foreign policy faced an identity crisis. The loss of its frontline status was a major problem 
for Turkish foreign policy makers. According to these officials, Turkey had lost its 
privileged status among Western democracies, resulting in Turkey’s rejection of from the 
European Community and inability to buy weapons from European and the U.S. The 
independence of Central Asian nations and the Gulf War did not help Turkey to recover 
from this anxiety. Foreign policy makers therefore decided to launch a rapprochement with 
Israel to resolve the identity crisis. The military and security cooperation agreements with 
Israel provided an anchor to the West for foreign policy makers. First of all, Israel was 
considered a Western nation; thus, improved relations with Tel Aviv was considered a 
confirmation of Turkey’s pro-Western orientation. Secondly, the power of the Israeli lobby 
in different Western countries provided access in these capitals. By doing so, Turkish 
policy makers hoped to recover their privileged status. However, this rapid rapprochement 
with Israel took place at the expense of Turkey’s already crisis-driven relations with the 
Middle East. During this period, Turkey was excluded not only from its region, but also 
from the Islamic world. This situation continued until the end of the 1990s. The first signs 
of this change took place at the turn of century with the rapprochement with Syria and 
Turkey’s newly instated candidate status by the European Union. However, what 
accelerated this process was the electoral victory of the AK Party in 2002 and the foreign 
policy developments that occurred afterwards.  
The second chapter of the dissertation utilizes a theoretical approach to understand 
the changes in Turkish foreign policy after 2002. The chapter discusses the limitations of 
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the mainstream IR approaches to explain foreign policy changes and argues that the 
theoretical and methodological tools of constructivism are most relevant in order to 
understand this shift. Especially the literature on state identity provides important insights 
about the emergence and transformation of foreign policy behavior of states. The chapter 
provides a synopsis of the major debates within the concept of state identity. Many names 
within the constructivist tradition, including Alexander Wendt, established that states have 
an identity and this identity informs foreign policy of countries. However, the more 
challenging part was how states acquire their identities. According to Wendt, the identities 
of states are formed by external factors, such as the interactions of states with other nations 
in the international system. This idea dominated “state identity” scholarship in 
international relations for years, until the emergence of a challenging concept in 
constructivism. According to this more recent notion, scholars, such as Ted Hopf, argue 
that states’ identities are not externally shaped, but rather formed by internal factors, such 
as public opinion and popular culture. This study argues that the identity of the Turkish 
state informed its foreign policy and a shift in its identity is reflected in its foreign policy. 
However, instead of endorsing one of these arguments, this dissertation argues that both 
external and domestic factors play a role in shaping the identity and thus the foreign policy 
of Turkey. Ahmet Davutoğlu and his approach to international relations greatly shaped this 
new identity. The doctrine of “zero-problems with neighbors”  as well as his role in 
conceptualizing Turkey’s place in the world shaped the Republic’s new foreign policy 
outlook. The domestic transformation in Turkey, such as the changing nature of civil-
military relations and increasing public attention of public on foreign policy issues, also 
played a role in the emergence of this new identity. However, Turkey’s changing relations 
with neighboring countries also consolidated this more autonomous and pro-active foreign 
policy line. However, the gradual evolution of Turkey’s state identity and thus foreign 
policy was missed by the experts in Washington and other capitals. Thus, every 
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autonomous foreign policy decision was interpreted as an attempt to turn away from the 
West by these experts.  
The next three chapters of dissertation focus on three case studies that demonstrate 
the change in Turkish foreign policy. These three cases, namely the Neighboring Countries 
of Iraq Meetings, the visit of the Hamas delegation in 2006, and the Tehran Declaration 
and Turkey’s ‘no’ vote in the UN Security Council regarding sanctions on Iran  are 
selected because of several commonalities. First of all, they are all cases that created some 
form of tension between Turkey and the Western governments, particularly the U.S. All of 
them also represented serious ruptures in Turkey’s policy towards the region. After all of 
these events, Turkey faced considerable criticism in regards to its foreign policy 
orientation; however, these actions were regarded as an attempt to contribute to the 
resolution of conflicts in the region by Turkish foreign policy makers. These three cases 
also represent turning points in the emergence of a new foreign policy identity in Turkey.  
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TURKEY’S FOREIGN POLICY: A CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH 
 
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
War is the most important instrument of change in International Relations (IR). 
Most conceptual developments in IR theory coincide with historical milestones that mark 
the end of systematic wars. In fact, liberalism emerged out of the first theoretical 
discussions in the post First World War era, which also provided the ground for the advent 
of the discipline of International Relations. Similarly, after the Second World War, a new 
school of thought, Realism, found its grounding in the intellectual developments of the 
crisis period between the two wars. Although many different strands of critical theory were 
developed in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, hence the polarized 
international structure, Constructivism prevailed as one of the most significant and 
preferred schools of thought in IR theory. 
 The term constructivism was introduced to the theories of international relations by 
Nicholas Onuf1 but was later developed and represented by scholars including Alexander 
                                                
1 Nicholas G. Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International 
Relations. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1989. 
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Wendt,2 Peter Katzenstein,3 Ted Hopf,4 Martha Finnemore5 and John Ruggie6. 
Constructivism especially challenged the predominance of neorealist and neoliberal debate 
in international relations. It offered an alternative approach and discussion within the 
scholarly community on the nature of the international system. Different versions of 
constructivism in this period emerged, challenging the main rationalist tenets of liberalism 
and realism. Constructivism focused on issues previously ignored in international relations 
theory, including the content and sources of states interests and the social fabric of world 
politics.7 However, what makes constructivism different to analyze and classify within 
mainstream IR theories is the variation on substantive issues within the constructivist 
theory. The extent of these variations make it difficult for scholars to come up with some 
basic tenets of constructivism.  
Several crucial developments provided the ground for the rise and prevalence of the 
constructivist approach in the post-Cold War era. First, the failure of mainstream IR 
theories to predict the end of the Cold War and dramatic changes in the international 
system shook the reliability and credibility of these theoretical approaches. Especially 
realist theory, when its neorealist variant assumed that the bipolar nature of international 
system would continue for many years, which turned out to be wrong as a result of rapid 
changes in the international system.  Although these two theories maintained its relevance, 
                                                
2 Alexander E. Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power 
Politics,” International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2, 1992, 391-425. 
3 Peter J. Katzenstein, ed. The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1996. 
4 Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” International 
Security, Vol. 23, No. 1, 1998, 171–200. 
5 Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1996. 
6 John Gerard Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social 
Constructivist Challenge.” International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4, 1998, 855-885. 
7 Jeffrey T.  Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory.” World Politics, 
Vol. 50, 1998, 324. 
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with the rapid changes in international system and new types of conflict, theories such as 
constructivism gained more ground and increased its impact within the IR literature and 
debates.  
Some of the projected alliance patterns that were formed by realist and liberal 
scholars during the Cold War years did not totally fit with the circumstances after the end 
of the Cold War. Especially realist scholars who theorized the balance of power theories in 
order to explain the alliance patterns in world politics projected a new world with various 
different balancing scenarios. For example, in the last days of the Cold War, John 
Mearsheimer, a prominent neorealist scholar claimed that after the end of the Cold War, 
Europe would be more prone to international conflicts as a result of the emergence of a 
new multipolar international order.8 Another realist scholar, Christopher Payne, asserted 
that Germany and Japan would not continue to prefer economic power in favor of military 
power and begin investing in their military capabilities; in the long run he believed that 
they would try to balance the United States. This would create a new period of 
confrontation between US and these regional powers.9 In a short period of time these 
explanations proved to be wrong, demonstrating mainstream IR theory’s inability to 
provide credible explanations.  
The problems of mainstream theorists are not the only reason for the rise of 
constructivist IR scholarship. The event driven nature of theoretical changes and 
transformations also played a critical role. In fact, the events that started to take place 
necessitated different forms of explanations for world politics. Although some issues that 
were prevalent during the Cold War years such as nuclear proliferation, continued to be an 
important dimension of debates on international politics, some other variables started to 
                                                
8 John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future.” International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1990, 5-6. 
9 Layne, Christopher. “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise.” The Perils of 
Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security, ed. Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, 
and Steven E. Miller, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995, 130-176. 
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impact the nature of international system. For example, the post-Cold War world was 
starting to be impacted by new types of conflicts, such as the ethnic conflicts in Balkans 
and Russia. Although these conflicts played a very destabilizing role in the regions and in 
some instances, the international system, mainstream theories of IR were not developed 
sufficiently to provide explanation for these new phenomena. Concepts such as identity, a 
field of study of Comparative Politics during the Cold War years, started to be pronounced 
more frequently by IR scholars. These ethnic, religious and tribal conflicts paved the way 
for more frequent debates on different forms of behavior, such as humanitarian 
intervention. These norms constituted an important pillar—at least discursively—of 
international politics. The emergence, spread and impact of these norms started a new 
debate in the discipline of international relations. It also launched a more meaningful 
discussion on the impact of non-state actors in the international system. Especially the role 
of NGOs, how these NGOs can promote norms in the international system and how they 
can contribute to world politics, started to be analyzed by constructivist scholars. The 
inefficacy of mainstream/conventional IR theories such as neo-realism and neo-liberalism 
to offer an understanding of these developments carved the necessary conceptual space for 
new approaches to emerge.  
In addition to these events, some theoretical challenges and innovations also 
provided a fertile ground for the development of constructivist scholarship in this period. 
In particular, developments and inspirations from other fields of social sciences such as 
sociology and philosophy, provided a new ground for the emergence of new approaches in 
international relations. One of the most influential of these interventions was the one by 
Anthony Giddens, and his conceptualizations of “structuration”.10 The theory challenges 
the structure and agency debate, which was very prevalent in international relations 
                                                
10 Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society, Outline of the Theory of Structuration. Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1984. 
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scholarship. According to this theory “the relationship between structures and actors 
involves intersubjective understanding and meanings. Structures do constrain actors, but 
actors can also transform structures by thinking about them and acting on them in new 
ways.”11 This allows a more dynamic understanding of international relations in which 
actors and structures shape one another. IR scholars picked up this idea of structuration in a 
very short period of time. Wendt especially utilized the new formulation of a mutually 
constitutive nature of agents and structures in his studies on international relations.12  
These developments came at a very critical time period, when the basic premises of 
realism and liberalism started to be challenged due to their empirical and theoretical 
shortcomings. In this new era, critical theory became especially illustrative with its critique 
of some fundamental assumptions and rationalism. Constructivism lead the way among the 
approaches developed in this period. Constructivist theorists rejected the realist concepts of 
power and anarchy and claimed that state structures were the result of state-society 
dialectic, hence not dependent variables. 
Different schools of constructivism in this period started to contribute to the basic 
understanding and explanations of international relations; the rational premises of realism 
and liberalism came under attack. Constructivist scholars particularly called the discipline 
of international relations to “take into account the transformation of identities and interests, 
that is, of entities which are, because of their shared commitment to rationalism, taken as 
exogenously given by both Realists and liberals.” 13 This idea also challenged one of the 
tenets of neorealism and neoliberalism, which stated that the international structure shapes 
and informs foreign policies of countries. Constructivism, with its focus on the social 
                                                
11 Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen, The Constitution of Society, Outline of the Theory of Structuration. 
Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984. 163. 
12 Alexander E. Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory.” International 
Organization, Vol. 41, No. 3, 1987, 335-370. 
13 Maja Zehfuss, Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002 ,13. 
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dynamics between actors in the international arena/politics, holds that states’ foreign 
policies are determined by their state (national) identities and values and that other states’ 
behaviors shape these identities and values.14 In this respect, constructivism is not a recent 
innovation, but rather a part of an older methodological tradition, which according to some, 
can even be traced to the eighteenth century writings of Italian philosopher Giambattista 
Vico. According to him, history itself is not something external to human affairs and 
socially constructed by the intersubjective relationship. In this construct, states are also 
artificial creations and the system that they interact within is also part of this artificial 
creation process. Thus, human beings can change the system if they want to.15 
In their review of constructivism, Fearon and Wendt stated four important 
characteristics of the constructivist IR approach. First, constructivism is specifically 
focused on the role of ideas in constructing social life, challenging the materialistic 
conceptualization of social life. In order for these ideas to have relevance, they need to be 
shared by many people and instantiated in practices. However, the emphasis of 
constructivism on ideas does not mean that material conditions have no role in social life. 
Instead it means that the impact of material conditions on social life is mediated by the 
ideas that give them their meaning.16 This differs from idealism in the sense that it does not 
deny any role to material conditions. According to constructivism, material factors matter, 
but how they matter depends on the ideas.17 However, a more critical brand of 
constructivism is more skeptical about the autonomy of ideas. Critical constructivists 
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believe that the social constructions “reflect, enact and reify relations of power.”18 They 
also believe that certain groups have more influence and impact on the process of social 
construction. As stated by Finnemore and Sikkink, “the task of critical scholar is both to 
unmask these ideational structures of domination and to facilitate the imagining of 
alternative worlds. Critical constructivists thus see a weaker autonomous role for ideas 
than do other constructivists because ideas are viewed as more tightly linked to relations of 
material power.”19 
Secondly, constructivism focuses on the socially constructed nature of agents and 
subjects. For constructivists, the agents are not givens as rationalists believe. They can be 
dependent variables. According Fearon and Wendt, this nature of constructivism 
demonstrates itself in two different ways. First of all, social construction of agents means 
that there is a process of socialization through which agents acquire their identities and 
interests. Constructivists focus on the causal processes behind this socialization and try to 
figure out how and under what conditions socialization took place. Secondly, on a broader 
and deeper level, constructivists focus on the constitutive conditions of certain modes of 
subjectivity. As stated by Fearon and Wendt, “some of these conditions are historical in the 
sense that understanding of what it means to be an agent may change over time and this is 
culturally relative rather than reducible to universal features of human beings’ biological 
constitution.”20  
The third aspect of constructivism is related to its methodological difference from 
rationalism. According to Fearon and Wendt, “constructivism is based on a research 
strategy of methodological holism rather than methodological individualism.”21 
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Methodological holism entails that we need to make social wholes and internal relations 
rather than individuals central to explain our social world.22 According to rationalism, 
macro-level phenomena, such as balance of power, can be explained through a more micro 
level phenomenon such as state motivations and capacities. However, for methodological 
holism, this methodology may not lead to the best form of explanation of different 
phenomena. Constructivism argues that macro level phenomena, like the international 
system, need to be utilized in order to explain the parts of this macro level structure, such 
as states.23 For Fearon and Wendt:  
Another way of expressing this opposition is by contrasting causal and 
constitutive forms of explanation. Causal explanations, which refer to the 
action of pre-existing, temporally prior causes that produce effects to be 
explained, would seem to have an affinity with the micro-to-macro program 
of rationalism. Constitutive explanations, which characterize systems of 
beliefs and practices that in effect create or define social objects and actors- 
such as mater and slave, or states, for instance- would seem to illustrate 
holism in action.24  
Finally, constructivists believe in the importance of constitutive explanations rather 
than causal explanations. Causal theorizing focuses on the cause effect relationship, and in 
its assumption, cause and effect exist independently from each other. Constitutive 
theorizing on the other hand, focuses on establishing “conditions of possibility for objects 
or events by showing what they are made of and how they are organized.”25 In fact, it is the 
event in question and effect of the conditions that make it possible. Fearon and Wendt give 
the example of the relation between master and slave in order to explain the nature of the 
constitutive relationship. According to them, the nature and meaning of master and slave is 
constituted in relation to each other. They do not exist independently. They cannot be 
masters or slaves in the absence of this relationship. Although constructivist analysts also 
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pay attention to the causal relations between two variables, the constitutive dimension is 
still prioritized.26 
 
 
Constructivism as a Social Theory 
Similar to other strands of critical theory, the intellectual roots of constructivism are 
planted in the field of sociology; thus is characterized as social constructivism. In the 
social sense, constructivism focuses on the social construction of reality. As stated above, 
the social world is not an external reality; it is not a given, but is part of the thoughts and 
ideas of the people involved in it.27 Constructivism, in this context, also having benefited 
from discursive and historical analysis methods, gained a strong foothold among IR 
theories. In tandem with the critical theory tradition, constructivism understands 
knowledge as a product of historical and material conditions. It cannot be separated from 
the subject and serves a societal function. In this conception, knowledge, as a historical and 
cultural product, is born out of the power relations between actors. Thus, in constructivism, 
theory is perceived to develop out of contextual power relations between subjects that hold 
particular identities in a specific spatio-temporality.  
In constructivism, fundamental theoretical concepts such as the interactions 
between collective unities such as nations, states, civilizations, classes, ethnicities and 
tribes; international structures; diplomacy; security; sovereignty and interest are shaped by 
communicable and dialectical actions. Constructivism questions concepts such as national 
interest, sovereignty and national unity, which were taken as the fundamental concepts and 
assumptions of the modern nation-state structure and realism. In the constructivist 
approach, international politics, cultures and institutions are constructed by the actors that 
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live in them.28 The meanings of factual events are dependent on the concepts that frame 
them, in other words, they are contextual. On the international level, friends and foes are 
friends or foes because of criteria assigned and meanings loaded on to them by the actors. 
State identities and interests are constituted relationally. The international political 
structure shapes the states’ conception of their own identity and national interests.29 For 
example, for the Western states the nuclear armament of Israel or Iran does not carry the 
same connotations. While the nuclear armament of Israel is not conceived as a threat, 
production of nuclear arms in Iran is perceived as a serious threat to international peace 
and security. Thus, according to constructivists, the billiard ball model offered by realists 
does not reflect the reality on the ground, since it ignores the thoughts, ideas and identities 
of actors as well as corporate bodies. Constructivists want to see what variables make up 
the billiard balls.30 Through this idea, they challenge one of the basic tenets of the realist 
and liberal approach to international relations, namely the assumption that states are 
unitary actors. However, this is not the end of the story; according to constructivists, in a 
more macro level even the international system can be a result of social construction. If 
states want and work together, they can also play an important role in shaping the structure 
of international system. In fact, anarchy is actually what states construct. Thus it is a 
mutually constitutive and intersubjective understanding of the state-system relationship.  
In short, constructivist theory asserts that some notions that seem natural and 
instinctive are in fact the product of social construction.31 Therefore, the prevalent belief in 
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IR theory that anarchy and security dilemma are the fundamental conditions of the 
international system is not inherent to the international system but rather it is a construct of 
the states in the system. International relations are neither based on inherent conflicts 
between states like the realist theory asserts, nor are they based on the cooperation and 
interdependence of states like the liberal theory holds. International relations are shaped by 
states’ differing perceptions of each other—conflicting or cooperative.32  
The constructivist theory maintains that the relationship between social and 
political institutions, the meanings that are loaded onto such institutions, and the 
relationship between these institutions and their actors are relationally and socially 
constructed. While, on the one hand, social institutions define the actors through the 
cultural identity they create, on the other hand, the actors through their actions vitalize the 
dynamic structure of these institutions. As stated by Checkel, the ontology is one of mutual 
constitution, “where neither unit of analysis—agents or structures—is reduced to the other 
and made ‘ontologically primitive.’”33 The concept of anarchy in international relations is 
a social construction born out of the distrust among states. Ideas and perceptions states 
hold or speculate about each other is an important factor in determining the international 
political structure.  
In constructivist theory—in which material resources are evaluated through the 
lenses of socially constructed meanings—what the material resources held by one state 
means to the other is determined by state identities and subjective perceptions. For 
example, weapons held by an enemy state do not mean the same thing as the weapons held 
by a state that is a friend. Social and political institutions’ practices play a determining role 
in the production and reproduction of subjective meanings. The theory also challenges the 
logic of consequentialism, which argues that states’ actions are the consequence of rational 
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calculation based on actors’ preferences and interests. Constructivist international relations 
thought instead advocates a logic of appropriateness which considers human behavior to be 
influenced and/or prescribed by norms that regulate the social environment.34 For Fearon 
and Wendt, this is a basic distinction between homo economicus and homo sociologicus. 
Homo economicus works like a calculating machine. It assesses different courses of 
actions, evaluates possible outcomes and among those outcomes, chooses the most 
efficient means to its goals. It takes every possible step to achieve the best outcome. On the 
other hand, homo sociologicus is a form of rule- follower. It sometimes acts out of habit 
and when a decision is going to be taken, homo sociologicus poses the question, “how is a 
person in the same position supposed to act under those circumstances?”35 The distinction 
between homo economicus and homo sociologicus becomes most obvious in the debate 
over norms. The answer that they give to the question of “Why do people follow norms?” 
reflects the basic dividing line between two approaches. For homo economicus, norms can 
be followed when there is a clear interest to do so. On the other hand, for homo 
sociologicus, it does not need to be a material interest to motivate people to follow norms. 
Instead, they believe that people can follow norms because they think it is right to do so. 
Although some scholars believe that there should not be a zero sum game in the approach 
towards the norms, and the homo economicus and homo sociologicus can be 
complementary under certain circumstances, this situation creates an important division 
between rationalism and constructivism.36  
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Varieties of Constructivism 
Constructivism is not a single approach with some set standards and principles. 
There are differences among the scholars who are considered as constructivists in their use 
of methodologies and in their approach to the subject matter. This diversity of 
constructivism made it difficult to compare its relevance and its explanatory power with 
other more mainstream theories of international relations. As stated by Finnemore and 
Sikkink, constructivism operates at a different level of abstraction. It is not a substantive 
theory of politics but it makes claims about social life and social change. However, while 
doing this it does not make any particular suggestion regarding the content of social 
structures or about the nature of agents. In fact, it does not generate predictions on political 
outcomes that one could test in social science research.37  
In the literature of IR, scholars provided different forms of classifications for 
categorizing constructivism in international relations. According to one of these 
classifications, there are three principal strands of constructivism in international relations: 
the middle ground strand; the self-reflexive strand and the discursive strand. Alexander 
Wendt is the most notable constructivist of the middle ground strand in international 
relations theory whose efforts focused on bringing rationalism and constructivism together 
within a systematic framework. This variant mostly underlines the role of identities and 
norms in constructing international relations and determining the outcomes of foreign 
policy. Wendt’s strand of constructivism is most common among scholars in the United 
States. The other brands of constructivism are more frequently emphasized by European 
scholars. Among these, self-reflexive or interpretive variant mostly focuses on the role of 
language, linguistic constructions and discourse on construction of social reality. The most 
                                                
37 Finnemore and Sikkink, 393. 
 29 
 
important constructivist of the self-reflexive approach is Friedrich Kratochwil. The third 
strand involves the application of Habermas’s communicative action theory to world 
politics.38 One of the prominent names in this genre of constructivism, Thomas Risse uses 
Habermasian communicative action to create a change in world politics. Risse suggests 
that actors in international relations have another mode of social action while functioning 
within the international system. They argue and deliberate. To argue, deliberate and debate 
presuppose that “actors no longer hold fixed interests during their communicative 
interaction but are open to persuasion, challenges and counterchallenges geared toward 
reaching consensus.”39 In fact, when actors engage in argument, they are usually ready to 
change their views, their interests and even their identities. 
In an alternative way of classifying different forms of constructivism, the 
approaches in this theory were distinguished as being normative, identity based and 
linguistic. According to this classification, normative constructivists focus on the role and 
impact of norms in international relations. These scholars “make norms defined as share 
expectations about appropriate behavior central to their argument.”40 This brand of 
constructivism is particularly significant in the development of constructivist scholarship in 
IR. Many early constructivist IR scholarship paid attention to norms and tried to answer 
the question of why norms matter.  For example, Martha Finnemore in her studies shows 
how international organizations make states accept new international norms and social 
values in ways that have a lasting impact on the conduct of war, the workings of the 
international political economy, and the structure of states themselves.41 Audie Klotz also 
focuses on norms and demonstrates how the global norm of racial equality made a large 
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number of international organizations and states adopt sanctions against the Apartheid 
regime in South Africa despite strategic and economic interests in relation to the country.42  
Other studies of norms in IR also demonstrated that norms can also an effective 
medium to understand international security. In Peter Katzenstein’s edited volume on The 
Culture of National Security, contributing authors explained how norms can be effective in 
shaping national security interests of states.43 These works demonstrate how these norms 
can challenge and undermine conventional conceptions of state interests. For instance, the 
victory of human rights norms over powerful states and the triumph of environmental 
norms over multinational corporations were demonstrated in different studies to show the 
impact of norms.44 In this very extensive and exhaustive discussion of norms, 
constructivists pay a close attention to the formation and spread of norms. In particular, 
norm entrepreneurs constitute an important part of this debate. The role of individuals in 
purposefully trying to change social understanding and norms, and the formation of these 
norms are studied extensively by constructivists, since the mainstream approaches in 
international relations fail to provide an explanation. 
Another strand of constructivism pays close attention to the concept of state 
identity. In this brand, constructivists focus on the relationship between identity and 
interest and how identity informs and shapes the national interest and foreign policies of 
states. The most significant representatives of this identity-based constructivism include 
prominent scholars like Alexander Wendt45 and Ted Hopf46. As discussed below, there are 
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variations within this brand of constructivism regarding external and domestic 
determinants of the state identity. Finally, the representatives of the last strand in this 
categorization, such as Fierke,47 focus on the role of rhetoric and linguistic constructions 
on the formation and construction of social reality.  
 
 
Formation and Role of State Identity in Constructivism 
An important contribution of constructivists to international relations was the 
concept of state identity.  Although identity and nationalism had been an important 
dimension of international politics, they were not effectively utilized by the scholars of 
international relations.  First of all, nationalism scholarship was missing the idea that in 
addition to people, groups and nations,  organizations, corporations, institutions  and even 
states may also have their identities. The nationalistic understanding of the state as the 
embodiment of the national principles, ideas and identity was not an accurate description. 
Nationalism scholarship almost always ignored this division between the nation and the 
state. States in this sense were perceived as only neutral entities and empty vessels that will 
reflect the nationalistic feelings in the international realm.48 
A related failure of nationalism literature was its concentration on the domestic 
society. Since states are shaped by the national culture and character of the people, state 
identity (if it has one) is not very different than the national identity and largely shaped by 
domestic society. This domestically produced nationalism then influenced the foreign 
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policy of the countries and international relations.49 Of course, this was an extremely 
reductionist explanation of the role of identity to international relations. Nationalism 
scholarship ignored the interaction of the state with other states and international 
organizations in international realms. It also ignored the fact that the identity of the state 
may change or may be transformed by the social international interaction of the states.  
Constructivist scholarship attempted to provide the missing link between identity 
politics and international relations. According to this scholarship, states just like the firms 
and other corporal enterprises have their own corporate identity and this identity may be 
different from the national identity of them. While trying to understand this phenomenon, 
constructivist school of thought, provided three different forms: systemic, unit-level and 
holistic constructivism.50 The evolution of state identity can be informed by developments 
and changes on both the national and international levels. For example, Iran’s state 
identity, which was secular and nationalist during the Shah’s rule, evolved into a religious 
state identity as a result of the Islamic revolution born out of developments on the national 
level. These national changes reshaped Iran’s foreign policy tendencies; Western concepts 
were abandoned and an anti-Western discourse was developed. In Turkey, in the second 
half of the 80s and first half of the 90s, on the other hand, the restructuring of foreign 
policy was the combined effect of global changes at the end of the Cold War and the 
change in the country’s leadership.51 In multiple different studies since the end of the Cold 
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War, scholars tried to understand the role that the state identity played in the formulation 
and implementation of foreign policy.52  
Systemic constructivism focuses solely on interactions between unitary state actors, 
in other words, inter-national interactions and ignores events that occur within the 
domestic political realm. In this approach, the social, and not the corporate, identity of the 
state informs its interests and in turn its actions. The social identity of a state—its status, 
role, or personality that international society ascribes to a state—is an important factor in 
establishing the international connections of actors. Structural contexts, systemic processes 
and strategic practices produce and reproduce different sorts of state identity. New state 
identities and new roles, in turn, reshape the state’s interests and its actions. Especially, 
some scholars within constructivist school, such as Wendt53 and Barnett54, emphasized the 
significance of the role and role identities while discussing the state identity. For actors 
who cannot adopt to changing roles and identities, identity crisis become imminent and 
they fail in realizing their interests.  
Systemic constructivism understands state identity to be constituted by the 
normative and ideational structures of international society, and emphasizes that states 
become distinct structures as a result of a process of interacting with other states. The most 
important manifestation of this interaction is war. In fact, war has been instrumental, for 
most states established in the 20th century, in declaring independence and producing 
national identities. It is important to mention that this assumption does not hold true for all 
states. For example, although war has been the determinative factor for Turkey in 
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establishing its independence, friend-enemy distinction in the international level has not 
played an important role in the shaping of Turkish national identity. The independence 
war, motivated by anti-imperialist, anti-western and religions/Islamic sensitivities, could 
not serve as the creation myth of Turkish national identity. Even though, the independence 
war was fought against the West, Turkey exerted a lot of effort in becoming a member of 
the Western family. In the attempts to establish close relationships and interactions with 
the West, relationship and interactions with the East and the Muslim World were severed. 
In this context, it can be said that systemic constructivism’s conception of state identity as 
constituted by international interactions and its neglect of domestic events and political 
elite also serves as a deficiency. If, as Wendt claims, state’s social identity is the product of 
international interactions, then the first contact between actors should determine the quality 
of their relationship. However, this understanding excludes from the analysis the states’ 
perceptions and ideas of each other prior to first contact.55 This deficiency can be corrected 
with the help of concepts borrowed from the pluralism approach which rejects assumptions 
such as the separation of domestic and foreign policy and rationality of the state.  
Wendt defines his own constructivist approach as follows: “Constructivism is a 
structural theory of the international system that makes the following core claims: (1) 
states are the principal units of analysis for international political theory; (2) the key 
structures in the states system are intersubjective, rather than material; and (3) state 
identities and interests are in important part constructed by these social structures, rather 
than given exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic politics”56 Wendt’s 
approach to state identity mainly shaped the nature of the debate in constructivist 
international relations theory. In his account of constructivism Wendt considered identity 
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as a central component of international relations. In his seminal article that resulted in a 
renaissance of constructivism in international relations, Wendt argued that states have an 
identity which informs and shapes the interests of states. Thus the identities play a 
constitutive role over the foreign policy interest and thus on foreign policy actions of the 
states.  
Wendt also emphasized the social dimension of the construction of this identity in 
international relations. According to him “[A]ctors do not have a ‘portfolio’ of interests 
that they carry around independent of social context; instead they define interests in the 
process of defining situations. Sometimes situations are unprecedented in our experience, 
and in these cases we have to construct their meaning and thus our interests, by analogy or 
de novo. More often they have routine qualities in which we assign meanings on the basis 
of institutionally defined roles. When we say that professors have an interest in teaching, 
research or going on leave, we are saying that to function in the role of identity of 
professor, they have to define certain situations as calling for certain actions.”57 In addition 
to social dimension of identity, Wendt also emphasized that identities are inherently 
relational. Therefore, a state may have multiple identities based on institutional roles and 
relationships to other states. In fact, Wendt completely rejected the idea that states have a 
universal identity as power-maximizers, which was considered as the basic tenant of 
neorealism in international relations.58 However, this does not mean that states can have an 
infinite number of possible identities. According to Wendt, states can have multiple but 
limited number of identities, and “identity formation is always limited by the array of 
possible identities in the international system at any historical moment.”59  
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In a following article he clarifies his conceptualization of state identity further and 
distinguished between a state’s corporate identity (its internal human, material, and 
ideological characteristics) and its social identity (the meaning an actor attributes to itself 
while taking the perspective of others).60 However he mainly focused on the constitutive 
role of international social actions. Wendt synthesized and extended his earlier 
conceptualization of the relationship between identity and foreign policy in his highly 
acclaimed “Social Theory of International Politics”.61 In his final version of 
conceptualization of state identity, he again reiterated that although domestic factors may 
be initial sources of identity, social interaction among states explains identity diffusion and 
change.62 
Unit level constructivism developed as the antithesis of systemic constructivism. 
This approach, while not entirely disregarding the external, international domain and the 
role of international norms in conditioning identities and interests of states, emphasizes 
that the relationship between domestic social and legal norms has more determinative role 
in conditioning state identity. This approach draws attention to the internal and domestic 
determinants of national policy as an explanation of variations of identity, interest and 
action across states with similar conditions and common experiences. States’ status, 
interest and definition of friend or enemy are shaped by their state identities, which is 
actually shaped prior to their systemic interactions with other states. Relations with states 
designated as friends take place in a system of collective security and open diplomacy, 
while relations with states designated as enemies develop in anarchy.63  
                                                
60 Alexander E. Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State.” American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 2, 1994, 384-396. 
61 Wendt, Social Theory. 
62 Hopf, Social Construction. 
63 Bozdağlıoğlu, “Türkiye’nin Batılılaşma”, 397-398. 
 37 
 
Ted Hopf is one of the most significant constructivists in this genre of constructivist 
international relations. He challenged Wendt’s conceptualization of a social and relational 
state identity and instead developed one which focuses on domestic variables. Hopf has 
tried to domesticize the social constructivist approach to international politics, to bring 
society back into social constructivism- the society within states rather than the society 
between them. According to him, domestic society is much more important and 
determinative than international society in terms of shaping identities.64 In his book on 
construction of world politics, Hopf argues that “a state understands others according to 
the identity it attributes to them, while simultaneously reproducing its own identity through 
daily social practices.”65 In order to bring back the society,  in his study Hopf tries to find a 
collection of identities existed in Moscow during the period of his study. He analyzed the 
dominant discourses in popular culture (pulp fiction) in Moscow and how these discourses 
shape the state identity, and in return, how the identity of the state informs the national 
interest and foreign policy of Soviet Union in 1955 and Russian Federation in 1999. 
Scholars like Neuman contributed to this debate and discussed the unthinking, 
unintentional, automatic, everyday reproduction of self and other through a collection of 
discursive practices that relies neither on the need for the denial and suppression of the 
Other, nor on the conscious selection of behavior based on a particular norm.66 Also, some 
contributors to Katzenstein’s edited volume stated that identity is mostly a domestic 
attribute, which in turn shapes state’s perception of interest and foreign policy.67  
Holistic constructivism seeks to bridge the two domains of systemic and unit-level 
constructivism by propounding that both internal and external factors are determinant. 
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Concerned primarily with the dynamics of global change, holistic constructivists by 
focusing on the mutually constitutive relationship between the international system and the 
state accommodate the entire range of factors conditioning he identities and interests of 
states. For example, Kratochwil, who emphasized changes and developments both in 
international and domestic level in his writings on the role of changing ideas of 
international order and security at the end of the Cold War, utilized the holistic 
constructivism approach. According to Kratochwil, actors who are constitutive of the 
social reality determine political actions and state practices.68 In another study Yucel 
Bozdağlıoğlu tries to explain the transformation of the state identity of Turkish Republic 
by focusing on the interplay of domestic and external determinants of identity formation.69 
In his study he develops a more interactive form of identity construction. For 
Bozdağlıoğlu, a state’s identity is constructed as a result of a struggle among different 
groups within that state. The foreign policy is also shaped in accordance with their identity 
conception.  But in the aftermath of the construction of this identity a new interaction takes 
place.70 According to Bozdağlıoğlu:  
Once an identity is constructed, states institutionalize that identity at both 
domestic and international levels. Domestically while states develop their 
identities “they also develop myths and institutions to protect them. 
Internationally, “states seek to enact their identities potentially shifting or 
multiple ones) in interstate normative structures, including regimes and 
security communities.” While states try to institutionalize their identity at 
both domestic and international levels, domestic and international 
environments, especially cultural and institutional ones, shape their 
identities. International institutions, where the density and frequency of 
systemic interaction are the greatest, “shape identities that inform 
interest…”71 
 This approach replaces the state-centric approach with an understanding based on a 
complex web of relations woven with both domestic and international factors and stresses 
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the importance of accounting for economic, political and other domestic developments in 
analyses. However this does not solve the problem in regards to which comes first in the 
construction of state identity. In some instances it even turn into a chicken-egg problem 
between domestic and external variables.  Ernst Haas, who claims that the main factor that 
influences the actions and practices of actors in the name of the state is knowledge, stresses 
the importance of a historical understanding and scientific knowledge in line with the 
holistic constructivism approach.72 Competency in historical analysis is of particular 
importance because history plays an important role in the constitution of state identity, 
which defines the process of decision making on foreign policy.  
In line with holistic constructivism’s emphasis on the total effect of domestic and 
international developments, many scholars suggest that a state’s status, place in the 
international system, its perception of its own interests and security are often defined by 
the political elite’s constructed view of time and space. The political elite’s interpretation 
of their social worlds is governed by a processual mode of historical knowledge 
accumulated through psychological, cultural, ideological and religious values and by the 
geographical place in which this historical knowledge is accumulated. Abstract concepts 
such as time and place can turn into an ideological conflict among the political elites of a 
country. There may indeed be differences in how opposing sides in this ideological conflict 
define friends or enemies of the state. Each side may attempt to consolidate its preferences 
as the state identity through myths and institutions. The consolidation of state identity in 
the international level, on the other hand, is effectuated through its membership in the 
“international normative structures such as international regimes and collective securities” 
which is also the most important factor of its legitimacy.73 
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In fact, the debates above demonstrate that the constructivist school of thought, a 
state’s foreign policy or national power cannot be solely based on its material conditions. 
For instance, Davutoğlu complements the concept of power, which is the cardinal concept 
of the traditional realist approach, with social factors in addition to material resources. 
According to Davutoğlu, in addition to concrete factors such as geography, history, 
population and culture and potential factors such as economics, technological and military 
capacity, strategic planning and capacity and political will are constitutive of the national 
power.74 It can be said that concepts of power and interest are emphasized in the 
constructivist school of thought similar to the realist tradition. However, the constructivist 
school of thought suggests that the meaning and impact of these concepts are dependent 
more on the interpretations of the actors rather than objective independent definitions. For 
example in a study on the constructivist analysis of Turkish foreign policy, Bahar Rumelili 
rejects essentialist arguments about the prospects of Turkey’s EU membership from 
identity dimension and argues that “European and Turkish identities can be reconstructed 
in such a way as to make the justification of Turkish membership possible and desirable 
from an identity viewpoint.”75  This means that the interests of the countries can change 
through reconstruction of identities. According to her this is possible, because: 
First, because identities are socially constructed, negotiated and contested, 
EU-Turkey relations provide a site where the identities of Europe, the Turk, 
Asia and Islam are continuously negotiated….Second, identities cannot be 
divorced from interests. Rather identities are constitutive of interests, 
meaning that the question of whether or not Turkish membership is in the 
EU’s or in Turkey’s interests is defined by how European and Turkish 
identities are constituted in relation to one another. 76 
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The constructivist school of thought, which seeks to explain how the world is and 
not how it should be, is not optimistic in its explanations of the existent system. While 
constructivism stands close to realism in terms of its emphasis on the concepts of power 
and interest, in terms of the constitutive role it assigns to international institutions in 
organizing state practices and defining national interests it stands close to the liberal 
institutionalist approach.77 Despite the similarities, constructivism differs immensely both 
from the liberal and the realist traditions. Constructivism defends the constitutive role of 
norms in structuring the interests of states as well as the thesis of adjustment of actions 
according to normative institutions while rejecting the rational action thesis of the 
rationalist school of thought.  
Security in constructivism is understood within the framework of dichotomies such 
as self and the other and friend and enemy, which are themselves the products of common 
identity and culture constituted through interaction between individuals and states. Political 
actors determine national interests from within a contextual set of meanings that are 
defined with reference to the state’s strategic planning capacity and the state identity. The 
concept of security in constructivism is shaped by values, norms, expectations and 
knowledge states can access about each other. In this context, states construct their own 
perception of potential threats. For example, while the production of nuclear weapons in a 
Western nation does not create a security risk for the US, any activity within the nuclear 
field in Iran is discerned as a serious threat.  This becomes clearer when we compare the 
US attitude towards nuclear weapon production during the Shah’s rule—the very same 
nuclear weapon activities encouraged during the Shah’s rule came to be perceived as 
serious threat after the regime change. As it can be deduced from the above example, 
material calculations such as military power are not the only motives behind a state’s 
perception of threat its security policies. Ideational factors such as social construction of 
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that state’s identity and the constitution of the relationship between the states are also 
instrumental as guides to international action.  
Constructivism asserts that systemic qualities such as anarchy, security dilemma 
and self-sufficiency are not pre-defined stagnant concepts but rather are products of social 
construction.78 Therefore, in constructivist theory, being identified as a friend or enemy, 
supporting peace or war are not the ineluctable consequences of the international system, 
but are rather parameters established by whether the states’ legitimacy are acknowledged, 
whether states are identified as friends or foe, and whether the political ideologies of states 
are democratic. In conjunction with the fundamental assumption of the democratic peace 
theory, in constructivism, a democratic state seeks to use war as an instrument only against 
those defined as enemy. In this context, the constructivist school seeks states’ strategic 
preferences in their strategic culture.79 Strategic culture identifies the ideational 
foundations of international behavior and refers to modes of thought and action with 
respect to force, which derives from perception of the national historical experience, from 
aspirations for responsible behavior in national terms. Thus, strategic culture “provides the 
milieu within which strategy is debated” and serves as an independent determinate of 
strategic policy patterns80. For example, the continued existence and even expansion of the 
NATO, which was relieved of a serious threat with the collapse of the Soviet Union, can 
only be explained through a constructivist approach to security. To begin with, the 
perception of the Soviet Union as a threat was not objective. Rather it was an effect of the 
process of the construction of the state identities of NATO’s member states. Moreover, 
what holds coalitions of states together are not only perceived common threats, but also 
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their common values and norms. Therefore, it can be argued that NATO was the 
institutionalized manifestation of the common values the West held against the Soviet 
threat. As shown by the above example, national security emerges as a barrier to perceived 
threats to state identity and the cultural structures of the international system in which the 
state is a member.  
In this study, the construction of state identity and its impact on the changes of 
foreign policy will be analyzed through an integrative framework. Instead of engaging into 
a debate over whether the state identity is constructed through domestic or external factors, 
it will be argued that the state identity is more frequently shaped by the joint impact of 
external and domestic factors. The change in the identity of the state then influences the 
foreign policy of the country. This new foreign policy further impacts the state identity and 
shapes it through actor socialization and emergence of new norms. In fact it is an ongoing 
and continuous process.   
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TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY UNTIL THE JUSTICE AND 
DEVELOPMENT PARTY’S RISE TO POWER 
 
 
The foreign policy of the Turkish Republic since its foundation until the early 2000s 
followed a pattern of cautious non-interference and a pro-Western alignment. After the 
foundation of the Republic, concerns over Turkey’s territorial integrity and international 
recognition constituted the most significant priorities of the new state. While the Turkish 
government was trying to restore its diplomatic ties with Western states, which it fought 
against during World War I, the impact of the war and the Western allies’ earlier plans to 
divide Turkey through secret agreements, like Sykes Picot, continued to be a source of 
skepticism towards the West. This created a paradoxical situation for Turkish foreign 
policy makers from the very early years of the Republic. Meanwhile, unresolved territorial 
disputes, which are remnants of WWI, created tension between the nascent Turkish 
Republic and its neighbors. In particular, Turkish foreign policy focused on issues that 
were not resolved in the Lausanne Treaty, including the Mosul question, the issue of the 
Straits and the question of Hatay. Moreover, there were some disputes during this period 
with Greece in regards to the interpretation of the agreement signed on the situation of 
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minorities in both countries. Until the 1930s, when Ataturk and Venizelos launched the 
rapprochement between the two countries, they remained highly crisis driven. 1 
In the 1930s, Turkey launched a limited engagement with different actors and 
organizations in the international arena. For instance, in 1932, Turkey became a member of 
the League of Nations.  Meanwhile, Turkey also started some initiatives in regards to its 
region. For example, with its Eastern neighbors (Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan), Turkey 
established the Sadabad Pact in 1937.2 Before that, Turkey took part in the Balkan Entente 
with the countries in the Balkans. During this period, just before the Second World War, 
Turkey also took an important step in the resolution of one of the most significant 
problems that it could have encountered. In 1936, Bulgaria, France, Britain, Japan, 
Romania, Turkey and the Soviet Union signed the Montreux Convention Regarding the 
Regime of Straits. This agreement gave the control of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles 
Straits to Turkey and established regulations in regards to the movement of naval ships 
through these straits.3  
With WWII and the Cold War, Turkey’s foreign policy started to be influenced by 
systemic factors and great power rivalry. During these years, the fear of a possible Soviet 
invasion and ideological concerns consolidated the security focus of Turkish foreign 
policy. Turkey took part in the Western camp during the Cold War and tried to become a 
member of the organizations that were formed in the Western bloc, such as NATO, the 
OSCE and the EC. Other than a few major disruptions, such as the Cyprus Crisis, Turkey 
followed policies that mirrored the U.S. and its European allies. It viewed its role as a 
frontline state in the war against the spread of communism and aggression of the Soviet 
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Union. While receiving strategic assurances and economic support from the Western 
world, Turkey lost most of its autonomy in its foreign and security policy. The threat 
perception during the Cold War became firmer after the empowerment of leftist groups in 
the country and ideological clashes in domestic politics.  
The end of the Cold War created a strategic dilemma for Turkey. With the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, Turkey lost its frontline status. Turkish 
foreign and security policy, which was structured in accordance with the threat perception 
of the Cold War, had difficulty adapting to the changing circumstances. However, the end 
of the Cold War did not diminish Turkey’s strategic relevance. During significant crises, 
such as the Gulf War, Turkey demonstrated its strategic significance to the Western bloc. 
Furthermore, the independence of Central Asian Republics during this period and Turkey’s 
potential geopolitical leverage on these nations strengthened its strategic relevance. 
However, Turkey’s relationship with the West experienced major problems during this 
period. In addition to the increasing anti-Turkish sentiment in the U.S. Congress, Turkey’s 
exclusion from the European integration process generated an increasing degree of 
skepticism.  
The most significant development in Turkish foreign policy during this time was 
the country’s rapprochement with Israel. Turkish foreign policy makers during these years 
believed that improving relations with Israel was the best way to anchor Turkey to the 
West. Despite the negative reactions of its neighbors in the Middle East and the Islamic 
world, Turkey signed significant defense and economic cooperation agreements with 
Israel. However, the dawn of a new millennium led Turkey to restructure its foreign policy. 
However, most of these policies could not be adopted due to the deeply imbedded role that 
the state establishment played in the formulation and implementation of Turkish foreign 
policy. Just before AK Party took power in Turkey in November 2002, several important 
developments, such as the restoration of ties with Syria, rapprochement with Greece and 
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the EU’s Helsinki Summit, signaled the emergence of a fertile ground for a foreign policy 
transformation.  
 
 
THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE ONE-PARTY STATE 
After the World War I, the founders of the Turkish Republic preferred to follow an 
aggressive westernization policy despite domestic skepticism of the West and its recent 
enmity and wars with Western powers. Domestically, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk worked to 
westernize Turkish society through radical reforms.4 Nevertheless, he followed a much 
more cautious – and at times isolationist – foreign policy while also trying to maintain 
cordial relations with the Western powers. The goal of the founders of the Turkish republic 
could be described as “getting its house in order.” Turkey’s leaders strived to build the 
country’s capacity, to form a nation-state after a series wars – including the Balkan Wars, 
WWI and the Turkish War of Independence – and to westernize society through radical 
social engineering. The Turkish public suffered from war fatigue after these long conflicts, 
the infrastructure was in ruins, and the economy was devastated by constant war 
mobilization and a huge loss of lands. Moreover, the implementation of the Western 
reforms in Turkey necessitated a strong focus on domestic politics and public affairs. 
Turkish foreign policy during this period focused on negotiating peace agreements with the 
Allied powers and attempting to solve the remaining territorial disputes with the neighbors 
and European powers. One of the main goals of the newly established Turkish state was to 
earn international legitimacy and isolate its foreign policy from conflict.  
For the Turkish government, the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, which ended the conflict 
between Turkey and the West, demonstrated a significant achievement in the country’s 
foreign policy. The treaty not only shaped the borders of the new Turkish Republic, but it 
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also was the only post-war agreement that depended on mutual negotiations.5 The 
agreement and international recognition that the Republic of Turkey received during the 
negotiations was considered to be a major development in Turkish foreign policy. 
In the formative years of the Republic, Turkish politics and foreign policy were 
mostly determined by Mustafa Kemal and a few of his close associates. The one-party rule 
of Atatürk’s Republican People’s Party (CHP) singlehandedly managed the majority of 
significant policy initiatives for the next three decades. During this period, the Turkish 
leadership avoided engaging in conflicts and disputes with other major powers. Atatürk’s 
principle of “Peace at Home and Peace in the World” is said to be the most significant 
principle of the early Republic. The country’s founders were aware of Turkey’s 
capabilities and its economic and military potential; thus, they spent more time and effort 
securing the borders and gaining international recognition of the state’s boundaries. At the 
same time, the nascent Republic was trying to gain legitimacy by engaging in international 
organizations and coalitions. Multilateral diplomacy, such as the Balkan Entente and 
Sadabad Pact, and membership in international organizations were considered the best way 
to ensure the security and legitimacy of the Republic. However, this period was not 
without any foreign policy disputes. In particular, territorial issues such as the status of the 
Hatay and Mosul provinces created tension between Turkey and neighboring countries. 
The Hatay province was incorporated into Turkish territories in the late 1930s, whereas the 
pursuit of the Mosul province was abandoned due to the combined effect of British 
pressure and internal unrest. Turkey also gained full control of the Bosporus and 
Dardanelles Straits during this time as a result of the Montreux Convention. After this 
agreement, Turkish-British relations, which deteriorated after the Mosul crisis, largely 
recovered and the two countries started to follow a more cooperative foreign policy. In 
addition, Turkey and Greece reached an agreement during these years in regards to the 
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exchange of Greek and Turkish minorities living in their countries. However, this period 
left a lot of questions unresolved between Turkey and Greece.  
 
 
TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING WWII 
Although Turkey avoided international and regional conflicts in the immediate 
aftermath of World War I, political developments in Europe, especially the rise of fascism, 
had an influence on Turkish politics. On one hand, the Turkish government was concerned 
about the rise of fascist rulers in Germany and Italy and the aggressive foreign policies that 
these countries pursued in the region. In fact, when the Germans invaded Austria in March 
1938, Turkey’s chief concerns were the rising economic and military capabilities of 
Hitler’s Germany. The Turkish government tried to initiate different policies in order to 
provide greater security. At the same time, Turkey’s relationships with Britain and France 
started to recover from the WWI conflict. As mentioned above, Turkey restored its 
relations with Britain after the Montreux Convention and opened a new page in its 
relations with France after the resolution of the Hatay issue in 1937.6  
Upon repairing its relations with Britain and France, Turkey started to receive loans 
and financial assistance. For example, in order to strengthen its naval forces, Turkey 
obtained a loan from Britain for 6 million pounds in May 1938 and another 25 million 
pounds in October 1939. This instigated a competition between Germany and Britain, who 
tried to offer Turkey more aid than the other in order to secure their support in the war. 
When Germany matched a British tax credit of 10 million pounds, Turkey rejected a 
tentative neutrality treaty with Berlin and did not purchase any more arms from Germany 
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in 1939.7 On the other hand, while trying to protect itself from the aggression of fascist 
regimes in Europe, Turkey’s domestic political practices were influenced by these regimes. 
Especially during the presidency of İsmet İnönü, the government enacted certain policies 
that were reminiscent of those of with the fascist parties in Germany and Italy.   
When World War II started, Turkey aimed to avoid armed confrontation with any 
blocs and protect its borders. The Turkish government adopted very strict economic 
regulations in order to increase defense spending and prepare itself for a wartime economy. 
Turkey kept this position during most of the war despite pressure from both sides to join 
the fighting. However, this position began to shift in early 1943, when allied victories 
against Germany occurred on multiple fronts, including the defeat of Germany at al-
Alamein in the fall of 1942. When Allied powers launched their landing operations in 
Algeria and Morocco in February 1943, the threat from the Axis in the Middle East was 
ended.  In addition, the German’s surrender in February at Stalingrad assured the failure of 
Germany’s occupation of the Soviet Union.8 According to William Hale, Turkey’s 
preferred scenario was a peaceful agreement between Germany and the Western Allies 
before Stalin could exert his power over Eastern Europe, leaving Germany with some 
influence in order to balance that of Russia. However, it soon became clear that Hitler 
would not go quietly and that the only acceptable resolution would be the total destruction 
of Hitler’s Third Reich, which led to instability in the region and threatened Turkey’s 
security. 9 As such, Turkey preferred to follow a balanced policy towards the UK, the 
Soviet Union and Germany during WWII.10 
Throughout most of World War II, the fear of Soviet aggression overshadowed 
most other threats for Turkey. Once such fear was that if Turkey was to join the Allied 
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forces with inadequate support, the country would become vulnerable to Germany and that 
Stalin might use Turkish involvement in the war as an excuse for the Soviet Union to 
invade Turkey.11 Turkey’s eventual involvement in the war was chiefly due to Winston 
Churchill. One of the most remarkable moments of diplomacy in World War II was the 
meeting between Winston Churchill and İsmet İnönü in Adana on January 30, 1943. 
During this meeting, Churchill tried to convince Turkey to actively join the war in order to 
protect the Allies in the Mediterranean Sea. However, İsmet İnönü was reluctant to accept 
this proposal; hence, they placed extremely challenging conditions on Turkey’s 
involvement in the war on the side of the Allies. The meetings continued for two days and 
both sides announced that their demands were met. However, Turkey continued to follow 
its impartial and non-involvement policy throughout the war.12  Churchill’s plan to gain 
Turkey’s support was also endorsed by the U.S. administration.  For Hale, Churchill had a 
comprehensive plan to bring military aid to Turkey and gain Turkish support for the Allied 
war effort. However, during this period, Inönü’s main objectives were to avoid committing 
to a war against the Axis and to maximize the amount of military aid that Turkey received 
from the Allied powers. İnönü was also extremely skeptical about the Soviet Union and 
wanted to let Churchill know about Stalin’s hidden post-war objectives. During the 
historical meeting, Churchill was not able to convince Inönü to support the war due to his 
inability to quell concerns that Turkey’s inclusion was intended to soften the blow of a 
future invasion by the Soviet Union.13  
Throughout the rest of the war, the Allied powers consistently pressured Turkey to 
join the war, while Germany tried to convince Turkey to stay neutral in the conflict by 
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providing financial assistance to the Turkish government.14 This external pressure also 
impacted domestic politics and the debate about the war in Turkey. For instance, this 
pressure strengthened the ongoing domestic discussion regarding joining the war. In 
several instances, these external and domestic debates caused tensions between Turkey and 
Allied forces as well as between different groups in Turkey. It even led to the resignation 
of some foreign policy makers, such as Minister of Foreign Affairs Numan 
Menemencioğlu, who was forced to resign after various complaints made by Britain about 
his pro-German statements. Menemencioğlu was one of the most prominent pro-German 
voices in Turkey. The Allied forces also pressured Turkey to break diplomatic and 
commercial relations with Germany during the Spring and Summer of 1944. 
In the last year of the war, Turkish concerns over Stalin’s increasing ambition and 
the post-war international order pressured Turkey to take a position. Meanwhile the 
British, American and Soviet leaders met in Yalta to decide how to shape a new world 
order. One of the most significant dimensions of this meeting was the decision about the 
UN system. According to Hale, this development was the chief reason that Turkey 
reconsidered its involvement in the war on the Allied side. In Yalta, the “Big Three” 
decided to offer only membership in the newly established United Nations to individuals 
who joined the side of the Allies prior to the end of February 1945.15 With this new 
incentive, Turkey formally declared war on Japan and Germany on February 23, 1945.  
However, by that time, combat had already ended and Turkey did not actively engage with 
the Axis powers. The ability to avoid armed conflict in WWII, despite the economic 
hardships that Turkey endured, was considered one of the most significant successes of 
Turkish diplomacy for many years. 
 
                                                
14 Özçelik. 
15 Hale, 101. 
 54 
 
 
 
 
TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE COLD WAR 
The end of World War II created a new international order in which two 
superpowers launched an unprecedented rivalry. The use of the first atomic bomb in 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the start of the nuclear age were the most significant 
determinants of this period. During the Cold War, Turkey allied with the Western bloc. 
Turkey’s fear of the spread of communism and Soviet aggression during World War II 
played a significant role in this decision. These concerns were aggravated by the Soviet 
Union’s demands regarding the use of straits. It was a major concern for Turkish policy 
makers even before the Montreux Convention. As the level of these threats increased, 
Turkey felt a greater urge to become part of the West’s defense and security formations.16  
However, Turkey’s integration into the Western security architecture was not a smooth 
process.  Although Turkey joined the Western bloc at the very last minute during World 
War II, the active neutrality policy that it followed throughout the war created 
estrangement and mutual skepticism between Turkey and the Western allied forces.17  
In terms of Turkey’s relations with the Western world, the post-WWII period 
created a problematic dynamic. As mentioned above, many among the Allied powers felt 
that Turkey did not meet their expectations during WWII and did not support the war effort 
against Germany. However, Turkey’s geopolitical significance made it a country that could 
not be ignored or neglected in a global rivalry with the Soviet Union. Moreover, the 
domino theory, which started to shape the security perception of the U.S. and Western 
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Europe, made these Western countries consider the consequences if Turkey feel to 
communism and became a member of the Eastern bloc. In such a scenario, communism 
could have spread to other Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries, expanding the 
Soviet zone of influence to Southern Europe.  
For the strategists of the post-WWII order, Turkey was a significant buffer zone, 
which could ideologically block the spread of communism and militarily hinder possible 
Soviet aggression towards the West. It could also prevent the USSR from attaining its goal 
of reaching to the Mediterranean Sea. In fact, as stated by Kayaoğlu, in the case of a Soviet 
move towards the Southwest, the Turkish military’s resistance could have been 
instrumental in impeding a Soviet advance into the Middle East and defending Allied bases 
near the Suez Canal. Moreover, Turkey could play an important role in the U.S.’s desire to 
protect oil reserves in the Middle East. These reserves were particularly important for the 
global economy as well as the post-war reconstruction of Europe. 18  Geopolitically, 
Turkey was a country that could not be ignored in the Cold War years. For these 
considerations, it was critical that the United Stated and its allies involve Turkey in the 
formation of the emerging security structure. The first step of this process was the 
inclusion of Turkey in the reconstruction efforts in post-War Europe. Although Turkey did 
not participate in combat operations in WWII, its economy was equally influenced by the 
war in Europe. In order to alleviate the negative impacts of the war and help reconstruct 
the basic sectors of the economy, Turkey was included in the European economic 
reconstruction and development effort. During this period, Turkey received economic aid 
under both the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan.19  
The next step in the construction of the Western bloc was building a security 
framework which would protect the member or signatory countries against Soviet 
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aggression. This collective security framework was intended to be a major source of 
deterrence against a possible attack from the Soviet bloc. However, during the formation of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the founding countries excluded Turkey. 
Under the increasing threat from the Soviet Union and growing militarization of the rivalry 
between the Western and Eastern blocs, Turkey was particularly concerned about its 
exclusion from the process. In order to solve this security problem, Turkey tried to broker a 
bilateral security agreement with the United States. However, this was not a viable option 
for the U.S., which rejected Turkey’s request. Meanwhile, the NATO framework began to 
take shape. In 1949, when the NATO agreement was signed by 12 countries, Turkey was 
not invited to attend. According to Avcı, there were various reasons for Turkey’s 
exclusion. For example, from the British perspective, it was believed that admitting Turkey 
would be detrimental to the shared Atlantic Community identity. For others, Turkey’s 
inclusion would expand the organization’s military risks, which would be unfavorable to 
current members who would not welcome an increase in their defense obligations, 
especially during such a sensitive time. An attack on Turkey by the Soviet Union would 
necessitate a joint reaction from the Western camp, which would pull war-fatigue 
European countries into another major conflict. For the U.S., there were other concerns 
regarding possible Turkish membership. Most significantly, accepting Turkey into NATO 
too soon would fuel Soviet fears of Western aggression and the Soviets would view 
Turkey’s admission as a Western attempt to encircle and contain the USSR. This could 
result in further aggression and pre-emptive actions from the Soviet Union that could spiral 
out of control and lead to a major confrontation between the two superpowers. 20  
However, excluding Turkey from the alliance could have also had significant costs. 
Although many in the West did not view Turkey’s membership favorably, without a strong 
anchorage to the Western world, a nonaligned Turkey could lead to more significant 
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threats for NATO. In fact, a neutral Turkey meant that the country would be susceptible to 
ideological and political threats from the communist bloc and could play the role of a 
springboard for Soviet influence in the future.  In addition, as mentioned above, Turkey’s 
geopolitical significance made it almost impossible to ignore. Its geopolitical position 
made its airfields valuable for NATO members both for defense and surveillance purposes. 
In peacetime, it could play an important role in deterring Soviet attacks and intelligence 
and information gathering; in the case of an armed confrontation, Turkish territories would 
be extremely critical for the success of NATO operations. Moreover, in a period when the 
competition and rivalry between the East and the West was spreading, the security of the 
Middle East was particularly critical for the U.S. As explained by Yeşilbursa, for some 
within the U.S. administration, Turkey was instrumental in providing security in the 
Middle East and could become a link between NATO and the region. This would also help 
the U.S. to lower its direct commitment to the security of these countries.21 This debate 
about Turkey’s membership within NATO had repercussions in Turkish politics and 
foreign policy as well. A very significant dimension of these debates was that Turkey was 
just a passive actor, expecting the West to make a decision. This pattern continued 
throughout the Cold War and actually became one of the defining characteristics of 
Turkish foreign policy.22 During this period, while concerned about the reluctance of the 
Western countries to let Turkey join the alliance, Turkey attempted to show its solidarity 
with the NATO member and their defense and security policies. For example, Turkey 
joined the Allied forces war efforts in Korea in order to demonstrate its support for the 
U.S. Eventually, after long debates and deliberations, Turkey was accepted as a member of 
NATO in 1952.  
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Turkey’s membership in NATO can be seen as an anchor to the Western security 
platform during the Cold War. After gaining NATO membership, although Turkey still 
feared of an attack from the East, it was less eminent than before. Until the end of the Cold 
War and even afterwards, NATO significantly impacted the way that Turkey conducted its 
foreign policy. Some in Turkey started to approach NATO as not only a security alliance, 
but also a component and occasionally determinant of its foreign policy identity. In later 
years, despite Turkey’s geopolitical significance, its large army and NATO’s decision-
making structure, Turkish foreign policy makers did not try to utilize an autonomous 
perspective while dealing with security challenges. In most instances, during different 
crises in world politics, Turkish foreign policy makers followed the decisions of NATO, 
without much deliberation and without taking into account public opinion and domestic 
politics.  
 
 
THE MIDDLE EAST QUESTION IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY 
Turkey minimized its relations with countries in the Eastern bloc during the Cold 
War and tried to follow a policy of non-involvement in regional politics and non-
interference in conflicts in the Middle East. Especially during periods of increasing crisis 
and armed confrontation between the Arab states and Israel, Turkey avoided taking a 
position or becoming involved directly to the conflicts. While conducting foreign policy in 
the region, Turkish foreign policy makers described their stance regarding disputes as “a 
balanced approach” between Israel and Arab countries, meaning that Turkey did not favor 
either of the parties.23 This approach was an amalgamation of the principle of non-
involvement in the Middle Easter, the emerging norm of adopting the Western stance on 
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international conflicts, and its paradoxical relationship with the countries of the Middle 
East. As a result of these dynamics, Turkish foreign policy sometimes pursued 
contradictory policies towards states in the Middle East. For example, although Turkey 
acted with Arab countries in adopting resolutions against Israeli policies and actions in 
international organizations,  the Turkish government secretly met with Israeli officials in 
order to form a “peripheral alliance” in the late 1950s. In these meetings, Turkish 
diplomats assured Israel about restoring full diplomatic relations, but these promises never 
materialized. In part, this reluctance has to do with the strong public reaction in Turkey 
against Israel during the Arab-Israeli conflict. In spite of the emerging Western-centric 
orientation of Turkish foreign policy, the public did not favor cordial relations with the 
state of Israel before the conflict was resolved. Although Turkish foreign and security 
policy was mostly considered as an issue of the state establishment, the public had a very 
forceful attitude towards this conflict and was able to influence decision makers.  
Turkish foreign policy makers’ unwillingness to publicly engage in diplomatic 
relations with Israel also had to do with the possible reactions of the Arab states, which 
could play an important role in UN General Assembly votes due to their sheer number. 
Turkey needed the support of these countries especially in regards to the conflict in 
Cyprus.24 Moreover, the modernization of the Turkish economy necessitated access to 
Middle Eastern oil. Thus, the Turkish state establishment preferred to take a cautious 
approach. Despite strong pressure from the Israeli side and although Turkey was one of the 
first Muslim countries to recognize the state of Israel, Turkish diplomats kept this relation 
extremely confidential. This situation irritated Israeli decision makers, who accused 
Turkey of treating Israel as its “mistress” rather than a legitimate and strategic partner.   
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Other than the short-lived peripheral alliance between Turkey and Israel, 
throughout the remainder of the Cold War, Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle 
Easter was mostly influenced by regional conflicts and other international developments. 
The Cold War led Turkey to become involved in different alliances with other countries. 
For example, Turkey became a member of the Baghdad Pact, which was formed by 
Turkey, the UK, Pakistan, Iraq and Iran. Though less successful than expected, the 
Baghdad Pact was a significant attempt to create a pro-Western pact in the Middle East. 
The United States only joined the military committee of this organization. The Pact was 
eventually dissolved in 1979.  
There were other issues apart from the Palestinian conflict that influenced Turkey’s 
relations with the Middle East. For example, the war in the Suez Canal had particularly 
significant consequences, especially in regards to Turkish foreign policy towards Israel. 
During, and in the immediate aftermath of the war, the Turkish government denounced 
Israel’s actions. During the meetings of the Baghdad Pact, Turkey, along with other 
member countries, accused the Israeli government of threatening stability and peace in the 
region. The Turkish public’s reaction to Israeli policy further strained relations between the 
two countries and played a significant role in shaping Turkish policy towards the Arab-
Israeli conflict during the Cold War. Due to the public sensitivity and pressure from 
neighboring countries, Turkey recalled its Israeli ambassador in November 1956. Later, 
Turkey announced that its ambassador would not return to Tel Aviv until the end of the 
Israeli- Palestinian conflict and diplomatic relations were lowered to the level of charge 
d’affaires.25 
Later, the continuation of the conflict between Israel and the Arab countries forced 
Turkey to take a firmer position. For example, after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Turkey, 
along with other Arab nations, denounced Israeli aggression. In several instances, Turkish 
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foreign ministry officials made it clear that Turkey was against Israeli occupation of Arab 
lands through the use of force. However, at the same time, Turkey tried to follow a 
cautious approach. While expressing its discontent, Turkey rejected a proposal by the 
Organization of Islamic Conference to suspend all diplomatic relations with Israel.26  
Turkey also followed this policy after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. The Turkish government 
once again denounced Israel and voted with the Arab countries in a resolution calling 
Zionism a form of racism in 1975. Ankara also joined other countries in the region in 
recognizing the Palestinian Liberation Organization as the representative of the Palestinian 
people. 27 However, this did not lead Turkey to suspend all diplomatic relations with Israel. 
Turkish foreign policy makers kept a minimum amount of interaction between the two 
countries.28  
As stated above, scholars point to several reasons that made Turkey take this 
position in the Arab-Israeli conflict. First of all, public opinion in Turkey was very 
sensitive over the issue of Palestine, especially after the wars in the 1960s and 1970s, when 
mass demonstrations took place in Turkey in support of the Arab countries. Secondly, 
Turkey’s dependence on foreign oil also played an important role. As an energy dependent 
country, it was risky to alienate countries which provided the majority of Turkey’s energy 
needs. Finally, the number of Arab countries in international organizations played an 
important role in Turkey’s position regarding Arab-Israeli conflict.29 The votes of Arab 
states were key at the UN regarding sensitive issues for Turkish foreign policy. The Cyprus 
issue played a particularly important role in Turkey’s foreign policy decisions during this 
period. The isolation that Turkey experienced in international organizations as a result of 
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the country’s position on Cyprus led Turkish leaders to follow a more multidimensional 
foreign policy. However, at the same time, continuing minimal relations with Israel was 
considered a show of Turkey’s attachment to its Western orientation. In some instances, 
this ideational concern diverged greatly from the public’s attitude. Nevertheless, one of the 
defining features of Turkish policy towards the Middle East during this period was extreme 
avoidance of taking a pro-active stance in the resolution of regional disputes. Other than a 
few messages of goodwill and symbolic expressions of readiness to contribute to peace in 
the region, Turkish foreign policy makers were not involved in the conflict resolution 
process or de-escalation between Israel and the Arab states. The same way true in regards 
to the Palestinian question. Despite a huge public reaction and mobilization about the 
conflict in Palestine, Turkish foreign policy makers, other than some diplomatic gestures, 
did not try to initiate any resolution process or actively take a stand about the conflict. 
Turkish foreign policy making followed this passive stance for most of the Cold War. 
 
 
THE CYPRUS QUESTION 
During the Cold War, relations with Greece constituted an important dimension of 
Turkish foreign policy.  Turkey and Greece fought multiple battles during the Turkish War 
of Independence and unresolved problems had lingered. In the immediate aftermath of the 
war, the leaders of these two countries, Mustafa Kemal and Eleftherios Venizelos, 
attempted to resolve some of the residual problems and form friendly diplomatic and 
economic relations. During a period referred to as the interwar years, the two countries 
even joined the Balkan Pact along with Yugoslavia and Romania. However, the attempt to 
repair relations did not resolve some of the issues that would become the foundation for the 
emergence of significant crises between the two countries in the coming years. At the 
beginning of the Cold War, due to the structure of the international system, the crisis 
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dissolved. Turkey and Greece became members of NATO and took their places in the 
Western camp against a common enemy, the Soviet Union. However, despite this situation, 
the crisis in Cyprus began to impact bilateral relations in the mid-1950s. 
Nevertheless, tensions between the countries became inflamed in the 1950s over the 
British-administered island of Cyprus. The first signs of a crisis emerged as a result of 
increasing nationalism in the domestic politics of both Turkey and Greece. Due to the 
prevalent and ever-growing nationalist ideologies, an armed struggle began in Cyprus with 
the goal of enosis—formal union with Greece—by the National Organization of Cypriot 
Fighters (EOKA). The group was supported by Makarios and led by a retired Greek 
officer, George Grivas. Under Grivas’ leadership, the group attacked numerous British 
targets in an attempt to wrest the island out of the hands of international powers. Turkish-
Cypriots, strongly opposed to the thought of Greek enosis, created a parallel organization 
called the Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT). In return, anti-Greek nationalism flared 
up in Turkey, resulting in demonstrations and, in some cases, violence to members of the 
Greek minority in Istanbul.30 As a result of these attacks, Greece withdrew from the Balkan 
Pact, forcing its collapse. 
The crisis temporarily ended in 1960 as a result of an agreement that created an 
independent republic of Cyprus and named Greece, Turkey and Britain as guarantors of its 
independence under the Treaty of Guarantee. The treaty was not fully accepted by all 
parties, however. Problems among different groups on the island soon arose regarding 
Cyprus’ legal constitution, which was created to “accommodate intercommunal differences 
by sharing power between the communities and institutionalizing ethnic differentiation 
within the political system.”31 When communal tensions arose between Turkish and Greek 
Cypriots in 1963, the crisis began to take on an international dimension. Both Greece and 
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Turkey inflamed tensions and delayed the resolution of the conflict through diplomatic 
means. The mounting tension on the island led to the deterioration of U.S.-Turkish 
relations.  
The Turkish government’s response escalated as Turkish casualties in Cyprus 
increase, and public opinion grew increasingly favorable for a military intervention. As the 
Turkish government was drafting plans for intervention, however, President Johnson sent 
an abrasive letter to Prime Minister Inönü in the summer of 1964 making clear that if 
Turkey intervened in Cyprus, particularly if it used American weapons to do so, the United 
States would not defend Turkey against possible Soviet aggression.32 The letter marked 
one of the lowest points in the U.S.-Turkish bilateral relationship. The Turkish public 
already felt a sense of abandonment and distrust after the U.S. withdrew its Jupiter missiles 
from Turkey during the Cuban Missile Crisis; the Johnson letter only added insult to injury 
and is considered one of the most humiliating moments of Turkish foreign policy.33 
The crisis on the island continued throughout the1960s and flared up once again in 
the mid-1970s as a result of domestic changes in Greek Cyprus. On July 15, 1974, the 
Greek Cypriot group, EOKA, forcefully stripped Makarios of power and instated the leader 
of the military junta, Nikos Sampson, as the president of Cyprus. Concerned about the 
security and safety of the Turks on the island, Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit called 
on the British to intervene to protect the Turkish population. 34 However, Britain rejected 
this request, which led Turkey to launch a unilateral operation on the island. Both Britain 
and the U.S. were against the Turkish military’s intervention, but failed to persuade Prime 
Minister Ecevit to choose another path. Within two days, Turkish forces had seized control 
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of a portion of land in the northern part of the island, and a ceasefire was implemented 
under United Nations Security Council Resolution 353. 
After the ceasefire, complicated and drawn out diplomatic negotiations began 
between the parties of the conflict. Under strong American pressure, Turkey first agreed to 
a federal structure for the island. However, due to Greece’s decision not to accept it, 
Turkey made another advance on the island, which led the Greek side to leave the 
negotiating table. Amidst failed negotiations, the Turkish military remained on the island. 
The international reaction to Turkey’s actions was swift, creating another source of tension 
on the island. The U.S. implemented an arms and military aid embargo in February 1975; 
other institutions such as the IMF soon followed suit.35 The crisis later became a very 
significant source of tension between Turkey and Greece, as well as between Turkey and 
the EC. After this period, Turkey pursues a status quo policy on the island. Despite 
international pressure, the Turkish state establishment failed to take steps to resolve the 
conflict on the island. It almost became a traditional Turkish foreign policy position to 
stand against the resolution of the conflict. Turkish foreign policy makers were usually 
reactive agents of the problem and never sought to take more proactive steps to make their 
case or launch initiatives to solve the issue. During this period, some officials even argued 
that Turkey would benefit most from an unresolved status on the island. This firm position 
made it almost impossible to develop alternative approaches to resolve the conflict and 
gain relevance. The Turkish military and foreign policy bureaucracy in particular 
prevented the emergence of any initiatives outside of their control. This passive position 
not only affected the image of Turkey in the international arena, but also hurt Turkey’s 
relations with Western countries, including the EC. Under these circumstances, the Turkish 
side on the island was considered as the major impediment towards the resolution of the 
conflict.  
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TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
During the Cold War years, another foreign policy issue that began to have a 
significant impact on Turkish foreign policy was the economic and political integration of 
European nations through the EC. After the formation of the EC and the institutionalization 
of the European integration process, Turkey started to openly express its intention to join 
this newly forming entity. Becoming part of this process was not only important for 
economic reasons; Turkish foreign policy makers believed that membership could also 
serve as another anchor to the Western political and military framework. More importantly, 
being part of a union in Europe, without any strategy or policy stance, was seen as a 
requirement if Greece joined. This perception was clear in a statement given by a former 
Turkish Foreign Minister, who stated, “If Greece jumps into an empty pool, we will do it 
as well.” Consequently, Turkey applied for associate membership of the European 
Economic Community (EEC) in July 1959, a month after Greece’s application was 
submitted. 36  
Following its application, Turkey and the EEC signed the “Agreement Creating an 
Association between the Republic of Turkey and the European Economic Community.” 
This agreement provided a roadmap for Turkey to join a Customs Union with the EEC and 
opened the possibility for Turkey to become a full member. Under the agreement, which 
was later updated by the Additional Protocol in 1970, the process would have three phases. 
The first phase lasted from 1964 to 1973, during which Turkey benefitted from preferential 
trading conditions and direct financial aid from the EEC. The second phase involved the 
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removal of trade barriers and thus established the Customs Union. Only after the 
completion of this phase would Turkey’s accession to the EEC be considered.37  
As mentioned above, despite the Association Agreement’s economic focus, 
Turkey’s primary reasons for applying to the EEC were politically motivated. Already a 
NATO member, Turkey wanted additional recognition for its place within the Western 
community during the Cold War. Turkey followed the same policy by becoming a member 
in Western European organizations. It became a member of the Council of Europe in 1949, 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1961, and the 
OSCE in 1973. To be sure, Turkey’s relations with Greece, especially over the crisis in 
Cyprus and territorial waters in the Aegean Sea, impacted Turkey’s decision to participate 
in Western European institutions. The Turkish government did not want to be excluded 
from any organization that Greece was a part of. 38 
However, despite Turkey’s willingness to be a party of the EEC, the community’s 
perception of Turkey was complex. Thus, throughout the 1970s, the relationship between 
Turkey and the EEC faced multiple challenges. For example, Turkey complained about 
restricted access to the agricultural market of the EEC, but the EEC failed to take 
meaningful steps to ameliorate the situation. Additionally, the EEC dropped its 
commitment to allow the free movement of workers between Turkey and the EEC under 
the Additional Protocol in 1976. Instead, the EEC vowed to give Turkey priority if it 
needed additional workers and promised to address the freedom of movement issue for 
Turkish workers already located within the EEC. In 1978, the EEC began to implement 
trade barriers on some of Turkey’s main exports, notably cotton, yarns and textiles. Under 
these circumstances, Turkey considered changing its relations with the EEC several times. 
The EEC’s discriminatory and exclusionary policies disappointed many in Turkey, who 
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considered EEC membership to be an essential project of civilization. The state 
establishment, which traditionally carried out modernization and Western reforms in the 
country, were puzzled by the European’s resistance to include Turkey in their economic 
union, especially after Turkey took part in NATO and Western military operations. 
Relations between Turkey and the EEC went through constant up and downs as a result of 
the EEC’s ambivalent attitude towards Turkey. For instance, Turkey broke off its Protocol 
commitments in 1978 under the Ecevit government, reinstated them in 1979, and froze 
them again after the military coup in 1980.39 Turkish foreign policy during this period had 
a passive attitude towards the EEC membership process. As Turkey had turned away from 
the Middle East and had ideological rifts with the Soviet Union, the EEC became the most 
important goal for foreign policy makers. However, Turkey did not take major steps to 
achieve membership and instead tried to market its own strategic significance to the EC. 
The lack of proactivity to meet the standards and criteria of the EEC left Turkey in the 
“waiting room” of the EC for decades. 
 
 
TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE 1980 COUP 
The 1980 military coup was a significant turning point for both domestic and 
foreign policy in Turkey. In terms of domestic politics, the junta banned all political 
parties, created a new constitution and ruled the country for three years, which was unusual 
compared to previous coups in Turkey. During this period, the military tried to eradicate all 
existing political structures in Turkey, resulting in many serious human rights violations. 
Thousands of political activists and party members were imprisoned. Furthermore, the 
junta regime drafted a new constitution, which gave the military extensive rights and 
power over almost all state institutions. In addition, the military coup altered Turkey’s 
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foreign policy. For instance, European countries froze Turkey’s membership in certain 
regional organizations, while Turkey’s relationship with the U.S. remained constant. A 
significant development in Turkish foreign policy took place in regard to the Cyprus issue. 
During this period, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was established. However, 
the new state could not garner enough diplomatic support from the international 
community and – apart from a few states – no nation recognized it as an independent and 
sovereign entity.  
During the 1983 elections, civilian rule was reinstated with the election of Turgut 
Özal and the Motherland Party. Özal came to power with the goal of liberalizing the 
Turkish economy, but he also intended to make Turkish foreign policy more 
multidimensional. Özal first tried to change Turkey’s non-intervention policy towards the 
Middle East by increasing its economic and political interaction with the region.40 In 
addition to following a neutral policy during the Iran-Iraq war, Özal improved Turkey’s 
relations with Arab countries. Özal’s initiatives led to an increased level of skepticism 
among the state establishment. However, the investment in the Middle East that came as a 
result of improved relations provided an important source of economic strength to the 
Turkish economy. This was the first time that Turkey and Middle Eastern countries were 
interacting successfully following a period of isolation.41  
Prime Minister Özal also tried to develop Turkey’s relations with Europe. In 1987, 
Turkey applied for full membership to the EC.42 The Commission rejected the application 
due to Turkey’s lack of economic development in comparison to the EC member countries, 
Turkey’s troubled relationship with Greece and the dispute over the Aegean Sea, Cyprus, 
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and concerns related to human rights and democratization within the country.  Instead, the 
Commission suggested that plans for a Customs Union be implemented according to the 
Additional Protocol.43 This created a serious crisis between Turkey and the EC. Turkey 
believed that the Commission had applied a double standard and many interpreted the 
decision as discriminatory against Turkey’s Muslim population. Finally, an important 
aspect of the new multidimensionality was Turkey’s increasing economic relations with 
the Soviet Union after Gorbachev came to power. In most instances, the Özal 
administration tried to increase its economic relations with multiple partners from different 
regions, which resulted in improved economic ties with the Soviet Union.  
During the late 1980s, two specific issues started to dominate the agenda of Turkish 
foreign policy. First, relations with Greece were strained over numerous issues, including 
territorial disputes in the Aegean Sea and Cyprus. The low intensity crisis between the two 
countries, which throughout the Cold War was contained by the nature of the international 
system and membership to international organizations, began to flare up in the 1980s. 
Tension peaked between the two countries in 1987, when a Canadian oil company planned 
to drill in waters claimed by Turkey in the Aegean Sea. Turkey sent a survey ship, which 
was countered by a reported preparation of Greek warships. Özal stated that the survey 
ship would not enter disputed territory as long as Greece refrained from drilling new wells, 
temporarily de-escalating hostilities. However, on both sides of the border, the crisis led to 
a rise of nationalism and a more belligerent public opinion against the other. Strained 
relations between Turkey and Greece have also impeded the creation of a solution to the 
Cyprus problem. Although the personal diplomacy between Turgut Özal and Andreas 
Papandreou helped improve relations, the main issues between the two countries could not 
be resolved. Later, this tension led to diplomatic disputes in bilateral relations and 
international forums. The tension also created problems in Turkey’s relations with the 
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European Community, especially in the context of Turkey’s relations with the EC and the 
U.S. In particular, the increased activity of the Greek lobby in Washington, DC impacted 
Turkish-American relations during this time. 
An additional rift occurred in Turkish-U.S. relations due to the Armenian lobby’s 
increased efforts in Washington to pass a resolution that recognizes the events of 1915 as 
genocide. During the 1970s, Turkey dealt with Armenian armed groups, such as ASALA, 
which organized violent attacks on Turkish targets both in Turkey and abroad. In the 
1980s, the relative power of the Armenian lobby in the U.S. increased and led to minor 
tensions in Turkish-U.S. relations. For instance, in 1987, pro-Armenian Congressmen 
pressed for April 24th to be declared an official day of mourning for victims of the 1915 
Armenian massacre, which led to the cancellation of President Evren’s previously planned 
trip to Washington. In addition, the Turkish government imposed temporary restrictions on 
the U.S.’s usage of the Inciriik base. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, tension became 
routine every April. Efforts by the Greek and Armenian lobbies and problems with Greece 
heavily influenced Turkey’s relations with the U.S. and other Western countries and 
Turkey oriented its foreign policy accordingly. 
Another significant issue that impacted Turkish foreign policy during the 1980s 
was the rise of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) as a major factor in domestic and 
regional politics. The increasing activity of the PKK in Turkey’s southeast region during 
these years increased the role of the defense establishment in Turkish foreign policy. In 
terms of regional politics, the PKK impacted Turkey’s relations with its southern neighbors 
for most of the 1980s and 1990s. First of all, the fact that PKK militants were being trained 
in Syrian-controlled Lebanese territories, particularly the Bekaa Valley, widened the rift 
between Turkey and Syria. The two countries already had significant policy differences 
regarding the city of Hatay and Syria’s support for terrorist organizations that fought 
against Turkey during the 1960s and 1970s. Later in 1980s, two additional problems arose 
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in bilateral relations. On the one hand, Syria accused Turkey of cutting off the water from 
the Euphrates River. Turkey’s ambitious Southeastern Anatolian Project aimed to create 
multiple dams along the river and hydroelectric terminals that would meet Turkey’s energy 
needs. However, the project limited the amount of water that could flow into Syria. The 
Syrian government opposed the project, considering it as a major threat for its survival, and 
called for a “fair share” of water from the river. 44 
On the other hand, the rise of PKK activity started to poison the relations between 
these two countries. Syria was not only hosting the leaders of the PKK in Damascus; it also 
permitted the PKK to train in Syrian-controlled Lebanese territory. As the number of 
attacks grew, Turkish public opinion and the security establishment became increasingly 
angry with the Syrian government and perceived Damascus to be conducting proxy 
warfare against Turkey. Although there were several attempts to solve these issues, 
relations between the two countries did not improve. For example, Turkish Prime Minister 
Özal signed an agreement with Syrian President al-Assad after construction began on the 
Atatürk dam on the Euphrates, granting a minimum average flow of 500 cusecs in 
exchange a promise that neither country would back violent opposition groups. However, 
Syria continued to support the PKK and later decided that it was unsatisfied with the 500 
cusec minimum. The PKK problem also influenced Turkey’s relations with other 
neighboring countries including Iran, Iraq and Greece. Turkey constantly blamed Iran and 
Greece for supporting or harboring members of the PKK. 45 In several instances, Turkey 
and Iraq signed agreements to handle the issue, as both countries had concerns about 
Kurdish activity on their peripheries. For instance, Özal signed an agreement with Baghdad 
in the mid-1990s that allowed Turkish forces to pursue PKK targets in Iraqi territory due to 
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concerns over the power vacuum in Iraqi Kurdistan.46 During these years, the PKK 
question also poised Turkey’s relations with European countries, as criticisms from the EU 
and European nations regarding the rights of Kurdish groups were viewed in Turkey as a 
sign of support for the PKK.47 
 
 
TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 1990S 
The sudden end of the Cold War and the transformation of global politics created a 
major change in Turkish and regional politics.48 The end of the fifty-year-old confrontation 
between the East and West was that Turkey was left in a strategic dilemma after losing its 
frontline status. The Turkish security establishment often depended on the Western bloc 
for its security and the loss of this privileged status was seen as an existential threat to its 
strategic relevance.49 Two developments helped to temporarily alleviate of this problem. 
First of all, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the critical role that Turkey played in an 
international effort to oust Iraqi forces led many Turks to believe that the strategic and 
geopolitical relevance of their country was revived. After Saddam Hussein’s invasion of 
Kuwait, Turkey played a prominent role due to its border with northern Iraq.50 Turkish 
territory was significant: first, in efforts to open a northern front in the war by allowing the 
international coalition’s troops to use Turkish land and airspace; and second, to 
                                                
46 Murat Somer. ““Resurgence and Remaking of Identity: Civil beliefs, Domestic and External 
Dynamics and the Turkish Mainstream Discourse on Kurds.” Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 38, No. 6, 
2005. 
47Aslan Gündüz. “Human Rights and Turkey’s Future in Europe.” Orbis. Vol. 45, No. 1, 2001, 
15.30. 
48 Nasuh Uslu. Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Period. New York: Nova Science 
Publishers, 2004. 
49 See. Graham Fuller and Ian O. Lesser, Turkey’s New Geopolitics From the Balkans to Western 
China. Boulder, CO: Westview-Rand Publications, 1993. 
50 See Mahmut Bali Aykan, “Turkey’s Policy in Northern Iraq 1991-1995.” Middle Eastern Studies, 
Vol. 32, No. 4, 1996, 343-366. 
 74 
 
successfully implement international sanctions, especially by stopping the flow of oil 
through the Kerkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline. In both instances, despite strong domestic 
opposition, the Turkish government played an accommodative role and fulfilled the 
demands of the international coalition. During the war, the rapport that was developed 
between U.S. President George Bush and Turgut Özal led many in Turkey to expect a 
heightened international stature in Washington, DC and in other Western capitals. 
However, the promises that Western powers made to Turkey about economic loses and 
repatriation were not fulfilled. Moreover, Turkey had to deal with the flow of refugees 
after the end of the war and the security risks of the power vacuum, which emerged in 
northern Iraq as a result of international sanctions.  
The second development that resulted in a heightening of Turkey’s strategic 
relevance during the immediate post-Cold War years was the independence of Turkic 
republics in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The emergence of states, such as Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, and Turkey’s cultural, ethnic and 
religious affinity with these republics increased the strategic and geopolitical value of 
Turkey for the West.51 In particular, the geopolitical location and natural resources of these 
countries attracted the attention of the U.S. and Europe. During this period, Turkey was 
depicted as a model country and a big brother for these newly established states due to its 
secular and democratic nature. However, the expectations of many actors were more than 
Turkey could afford to deliver.  
The Turkish economy was not well equipped to provide infrastructural and 
development aid to these countries. Moreover, due to the one-dimensional nature of 
Turkish foreign policy during the Cold War, which makes to form relations with Soviet 
Bloc countries difficult, Turkey was unable to form close diplomatic relations with the 
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Central Asian republics. Despite all of their affinities, Turkey did not have adequate 
information regarding the current nature of political, economic and social life in these 
countries. The only people with information about the region in Turkey were former or 
current nationalists, who had more ambitious and unrealistic goals about the future of the 
region. These expectations irked many high-level officials in these countries who were 
actually former regime elements. Turkey did not have enough experienced staff in its 
foreign policy bureaucracy that could manage the formation of strong diplomatic ties. The 
attempts of the ultra-secular Turkish bureaucrats to market secularism to these societies 
backfired. In later years, relations with some of these countries, such as Uzbekistan, were 
soured due to attempts by certain groups in Turkey to meddle in internal affairs of state. 
Moreover, other regional powers, such as China and Germany, began to exert more 
influence in the region throughout the 1990s due to their economic strength and 
relationships with the Central Asia republics. Although Turkey and these republics 
developed functioning diplomatic relations and strong economic ties, Turkish foreign 
policy could not take advantage of the new window of opportunity in the early 1990s as 
many had expected.  
In the mid-1990s, Turkey’s focus turned mostly inwards due to the increasing 
number of terror attacks by the PKK52 and the discourse of the “Islamic threat.” In 
conjunction with this new threat perception, Turkish foreign policy focused primarily on 
nations that were considered the source of these imminent domestic threats. The Turkish 
government accused its southern neighbors, including Iraq, Syria and Iran, of harboring 
terrorist groups and European countries of allowing these groups to function, fundraise and 
organize in those nations.  After every terror attack, public grievances against these 
countries and diplomatic tensions in bilateral relations increased dramatically. In addition, 
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the Turkish state’s “Islamic threat” discourse prevented the normalization of relations 
between Turkey and Middle Eastern countries. In particular, Turkish-Iranian relations were 
constantly strained due to regime differences. Turkey accused Iran of trying to export the 
Islamic revolution to Turkey. In particular, this perception gained strength among the state 
establishment with the rise of the Welfare Party in Turkey. The Welfare Party’s critical 
approach to Turkey’s relations with Western countries and its Euro-centric foreign policy 
irked many in the foreign policy bureaucracy and military.  
During the 1990s, one of the most significant developments in Turkish foreign 
policy was the rising entente between Turkey and Israel.53 Although the two countries 
severed ambassador-level diplomatic relations in 1980, the Gulf War and the beginning of 
the peace process between Israel and Arab nations with the Madrid Peace Conference in 
December 1992 led Turkey to decide to advance diplomatic relations. However, Turkey 
wanted to keep the balanced approach that it pursued throughout most of the Cold War by 
upgrading the status of the Palestinian representative in Turkey simultaneously. 
Nevertheless, the restoration of diplomatic relations with Israel had more significant 
repercussions than was originally intended. While the majority of the Turkish government 
did not expect a rapid improvement in relations, bilateral ties were quickly transformed 
into a strategic and military entente in the Middle East, mainly as a result of the increasing 
role of the Turkish military in foreign and security policy in the mid-1990s.  
Turkey had multiple goals in forming such a rapprochement with the state of Israel. 
Some within the Turkish foreign policy establishment considered the improvement of 
relations as a panacea to end Turkey’s political isolation from the West in the immediate 
aftermath of the Cold War. In the absence of a frontal state notion, Turkey needed strong 
allies that would anchor it to the Western world. The strength of its lobby in Washington 
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and other major capitals around the world provided Israel with strong relationships with 
each of these countries. Turkish leaders saw that Israel could provide essential access to 
these capitals. Through these connections, Turkey could also balance the power of the 
Greek and Armenian lobbies in Western capitals, particularly in regard to the very 
sensitive issues of Cyprus and the Armenian genocide claims. In addition, the Israeli 
defense industry could also meet certain needs and demands of the Turkish military. In the 
early 1990s, mainly due to Turkey’s human rights records, some Western countries 
stopped selling arms to Turkey that were extremely vital for the modernization of the 
Turkish military during its war on terror. Under the pressure of the Greek and Armenian 
lobbies, the U.S. Congress blocked several arms purchases to Turkey, which increased the 
security crisis that the Turkish state found itself in after the end of the Cold War. Israel’s 
high-tech defense industry and its willingness to sell weapons unconditionally to Turkey 
made the country a feasible partner. Furthermore, with the deepening crisis between 
Turkey and Syria, Israel was viewed as a perfect partner to contain the threat of Syria. The 
Greek-Syrian rapprochement and military cooperation agreement, which enabled Greece to 
use certain Syrian military bases, increased the significance of Turkey’s threat perception.   
In the mid-1990s, the relationship between Turkey and Israel was transformed into 
a security and military partnership, which significantly impacted Turkey’s relations with 
the region.54 The most controversial areas of cooperation during this period were the 
military and intelligence spheres. In September 1995, Turkey and Israel signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding to cooperate in the training of both nations’ pilots. 
According to the agreement, the Israeli Air Force would train Turkish pilots, particularly 
against anti-aircraft missile systems, whereas Turkey would allow Israeli pilots to conduct 
military maneuvers in Turkish airspace. Another Military Cooperation Agreement was 
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signed in February 1996 and included plans to exchange military personnel and conduct 
joint training exercises. With the Military Industrial Cooperation Agreement, which was 
signed in August 1996, Israel and Turkey agreed to cooperate in military modernization 
and arms trading. The extent and scope of these articles greatly increased later in 1996, 
when the parties also agreed to initiate political dialogue in order to strategize a common 
foreign and security policy. Meanwhile, Turkey and Israel also engaged in more 
controversial forms of cooperation in intelligence-gathering and sharing, as well as in the 
field of counterterrorism. The content of these agreements were kept confidential under the 
Security and Secrecy Agreement, which was signed in May 1994.  
Such a rapid acceleration in the alliance between Turkey and Israel can be 
attributed in part to the growing tensions between Greece and Turkey. In the late 1990s, 
the two countries were at the brink of war in several instances. In January 1996, the two 
countries were closer to war than any other period in their 80-year relationship as a result 
of the conflict over a disputed island in the Aegean Sea. Although the U.S. mediated the 
conflict, the main dispute over maritime delimitation remained unresolved. In 1997, the 
two countries again faced a significant crisis regarding the Cyprus issue. The Cypriot 
government’s decision to purchase S-300 anti-aircraft missiles and make them operational 
across the island created a great deal of tension between Turkey and Greece. The crisis 
escalated in a very short period of time due to Greece’s support of Cypriot authorities, but 
ultimately concluded without an armed confrontation after Greece decided to place the 
missiles on the island of Crete instead of Cyprus. These developments were particularly 
significant for the strengthening of the Turkish-Israeli alliance. However, during this 
period, groups that desired improved relations with Israel also took into account domestic 
political developments in Turkey. The rise of the Welfare party, its electoral victories and 
its critical approach to mainstream Turkish foreign policy, particularly its relations with 
Israel, drew a harsh reaction from the Turkish military. According to some within the 
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Turkish military, which was the predominant power in foreign and security policy at the 
time, Turkey’s relationship with Israel had an ideational dimension and those who wanted 
to disrupt these relations were also targeting Turkey’s secular and pro-Western nature. 
Thus, the relationship with Israel was associated with Turkey’s traditional stance in regards 
to the West.  
During the 1990s, another significant dimension of Turkish foreign policy was 
related to Turkey’s relationship with the European Union. Although the initial application 
for full membership was rejected in the late 1980s, the process was not completely halted. 
In 1992, the leadership of the European Community met in Lisbon and came to the 
consensus that Turkey’s role in European politics was significant. The Association Council 
also agreed to resume the process of establishing a Customs Union. Turkey took several 
steps to fulfill the requirements to become a part of the Customs Union. Following 
Turkey’s legal and economic adjustments, the Association Council signed the Customs 
Union agreement in Brussels on March 6, 1995 and the European Parliament ratified it on 
December 13, 1995.55 
Many in Turkey hoped that the Customs Union agreement would pave the way for 
a smooth transition to full membership; however, this soon proved to be not the case. 
According to the EU, Turkey still had many problems that prevented it from becoming a 
full member. As a result, Turkey found itself last on the list of many European states vying 
for full membership.56 During the 1997 European Council Summit in Luxembourg, the 
accession negotiations with many Eastern and Central European states were completed; 
however, the council excluded Turkey on the basis of its economic and political 
condition.57 This was a major blow for Turkey, as countries that became independent from 
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the Soviet Union just a few years prior were given a better likelihood to attain membership 
than Turkey, which had aspired to become a member state for almost half a century.  
The Luxembourg summit resulted not only in a major setback in Turkey’s goal to 
join the EU; it  also increased the level of mistrust on both sides.58 This worsened the 
strategic dilemma that Turkey had felt since the end of the Cold War. Angered by the 
decision, the Turkish Prime Minister, Mesut Yilmaz, boycotted the European Conference 
in Cardiff that March and broke off political dialogue with the EU.59 Regarding Turkish 
foreign policy, the Luxembourg Summit made many Turkish citizens feel excluded from 
the Western camp. However, Turkey’s isolation from the Western camp was not the only 
dilemma that Turkey faced during this period.60 The increasing strategic and military 
relations between Turkey and Israel angered many Middle Eastern countries and the 
Islamic World. In 1997, Turkey was openly criticized by the Arab League, as some 
member states accused Turkey of trying to redraw the map of the Middle East. Later that 
same year, Turkey was criticized by member states for forming strategic relations with 
Israel during the Tehran Summit of the OIC. The isolation that Turkey experienced from 
both the Western world and the Middle East led Turkish policy makers to search for 
alternative approaches to conduct foreign policy and discuss the need for 
multidimensionality and a “region-based foreign policy.”  
After 1997, dramatic changes began to take place in Turkish foreign policy. The 
first important change in Turkish foreign policy took place 1998 as a result of a crisis 
between Turkey and Syria, which brought the two countries to the brink of war.61 The 
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crisis happened as a consequence of increasing PKK infiltration from the Syrian- Turkish 
border. The logistical support of Syria to PKK forces were already known by the Turkish 
government but the intensity of the attacks increased in late 1990s, which led to a serious 
ultimatum by the Turkish military to the Syrian government. With the impact of the 
postmodern coup in Turkey, the military had consolidated his impact on design and 
implementation of Turkish foreign and defense policy, civilian leaders follow the lead of 
the military in critical foreign and security matters. In a very short period of time, the tone 
of the Turkish government increased and the two countries came to the brink of an armed 
confrontation. Turkey requested that Syria stop the activities of the PKK within its border 
immediately. It was only after the shuttle diplomacy by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak 
that Turkey agreed to stop the escalation of crisis with Syria. Shortly after this crisis, 
Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK leader who used to reside in Damascus, was expelled from 
Syria and during his hunt for refuge was arrested by Turkish officials in Kenya. The crises 
between these two countries were transformed into an opportunity to heal the relations in a 
short period of time. After this event, a protocol was signed in Adana between Turkey and 
Syria in which the Syrian government promised to cooperate with the Turkish government 
on security and terrorism issues. The Adana Protocol paved the way for a new era in 
Turkish-Syrian relations. In the aftermath of this protocol, the two countries started to 
restore diplomatic, economic and social relations in a short period of time. High level 
meetings were launched between the two countries in 1999, which led to a rapid 
rapprochement between two countries that continued until the use of force by the Assad 
regime until the demonstrators in 2011.  
In 1999, Turkey also began to alter its relations with Greece, which led to an 
appreciable change in its threat perception.  Following the 1999 earthquake in Turkey, 
Greece was one of the first countries to offer to assist Turkey. Turkey responded in kind 
when a major earthquake took place in Athens. Diplomatic reciprocity helped to thaw their 
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strained relations. Later, the personal diplomacy between Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail 
Cem and his Greek counterpart strengthened these ties. Although the two countries could 
not reach a solution over the most controversial problems, such as the delimitation of 
territorial waters in the Aegean Sea, the level of confrontation was significantly reduced.  
The last significant foreign policy change in 1999 was related to Turkey’s relationship with 
the European Union. Following the disappointment of the 1997 Luxembourg Summit, 
Turkey was given the status of an official candidate for membership at the European 
Council’s Helsinki Summit in December 1999. For the first time, Greece did not stand in 
the way of Turkey’s addition to the membership list.62 However, the process toward 
official membership was far from simple for Turkey. Due to long and strained 
negotiations, the Turkish government approached the 1999 Summit as its last attempt for 
membership and resolved not to re-apply if negotiations did not move forward. Both public 
opinion and the Turkish government were extremely frustrated with the perceived double 
standard towards Turkey and public support for EU membership, which rose dramatically 
after Turkey’s accession to the Customs Union, plummeted in a very short period of time.  
Thus, the European Council’s decision was considered to be the result of a more 
determined Turkish foreign policy by many. In the presidential conclusion of the Helsinki 
Summit, members declared that Turkey would be recognized as a candidate country based 
on the same criteria as all other states; Turkey would be a recipient of coordinated pre-
accession assistance; the EU would seek enhanced political dialogue with the aim of 
helping Turkey meet the accession criteria; and finally, Turkey would be included in 
community programs and agencies.63 
However, in order to avoid unrealistically high expectations, the Council was clear 
that candidacy did not mean that Turkey had fulfilled all of the necessary criteria to 
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become an EU member state. In particular, according to the Council, Turkey did not meet 
the Copenhagen political criteria, and had “serious shortcomings” in terms of human rights 
and the protection of minorities.64 There were also several issues in relation to maintaining 
active civilian control over the military, which needed to be reformed. Therefore, a 
decision was made to establish an accession partnership with Turkey which could serve as 
a “road-map” to eventual membership.65 In addition, the EU also expanded the number of 
acceding countries to include Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania and Slovakia. 
During this time, the U.S. was a constant advocate for Turkey’s acceptance into the 
EU. Following the Helsinki Summit, President Clinton sent a personal letter to Bülent 
Ecevit congratulating him on the country’s progress and emphasizing that Turkey could 
rely on U.S.’s support to help them reach full membership.66Although the Turkish people 
celebrated the decision, the Turkish government was cautious not to orient its foreign 
policy solely towards the EU and thus continued to improve its relations with Middle 
Eastern countries, particularly Syria. The failure of the Camp David process, the Syrian-
Israeli track of negotiations and the launch of the Second Intifada in the Occupied 
Territories increased Turkey’s political interest in the Middle East. After the abrupt end of 
the Syrian-Israeli track, the Syrian government began to make more of an effort to 
approach Turkey, signing multiple economic agreements that would pave the way for 
regional economic integration. Moreover, the Second Intifada and the harsh response of the 
Israeli Defense Forces increased public scrutiny and criticism of Turkish-Israeli relations, 
but also increased Turkey’s involvement in the peace process. Both the Turkish Prime 
Minister and Turkish President criticized the Israeli government for its handling of the 
demonstrations in the Occupied Territories, which strained relations between the two 
countries.  
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September 11 was a significant turning point for global politics and especially 
Middle Eastern politics. The Turkish government was one of the first countries to condemn 
the terrorist attack on U.S. soil and threw its support behind the U.S.-led global war on 
terror. Following NATO decision to consider the strikes as an attack on an alliance 
member, Turkey assisted the U.S. war efforts in Afghanistan by allowing U.S. forces to 
use Turkish airspace and military bases. Furthermore, Turkey also contributed to the 
International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, which was vital for U.S. efforts in 
the region. 
 
STUDY OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY UNTIL THE RISE OF AK PARTY; 
It is important to understand that the evolution of Turkish foreign policy over the 
last decade had a lot of repercussions on the study of Turkish foreign policy in the 
literature of international relations . For many years, Turkish foreign policy has been 
studied in regards to  a few areas of foreign policy disputes that have been present since the 
establishment of theTurkish Republic. One of those study areas has been issues related to 
the interpretation and outcome of the peace agreements after the First World War, 
specifically the Lausanne Peace Agreement. This agreement and its ramifications to the 
foreign policy in Turkey have been discussed frequently by  scholars of Turkish foreign 
policy. Lausanne was not only a recognition of the Turkish Republic by  Western 
countries, but it also played a significant role in shaping Turkey’s relations with  Western 
countries. Because of the timing of the agreement, in the formative years of the Turkish 
foreign policy, there was constant emphasis on the significance of this agreement to the 
foreign relations of Turkey with other countries.  Early studies of Turkish foreign policy, 
such as those done by Yusuf Hikmet Bayur’s Turk Devleti’nin Dis Siyaseti 67 and Cemal 
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Bilsel’s Lozan68 deal with this issue specifically. Ataturk era foreign policy was mostly 
discussed in the context of Lausanne and attempts to normalize Turkish foreign policy in 
the aftermath of this agreement. Most importantly Turkish relations with  Western 
countries and Greece were studied and analyzed in this context.69  
 
The end of the World War II and the beginning of the Cold War was a serious 
turning point in the history and study of Turkey’s foreign policy. In general this period of 
world history dramatically transformed the study of diplomatic relations between countries 
and helped with  the development of the field of international relations in general. The 
changing nature of the international system and the emergence of a bipolar world also 
dramatically impacted the study of Turkish foreign policy. Instead of studying Turkey in 
relation to its smaller neighbors such as, Syria and Greece, Turkish foreign policy started 
to be studied in the context of the greater Cold War and thus was looked in relation to the  
superpowers,  the United States and Soviet Union. Studies that focused on this period of 
Turkish foreign policy include, Abdulahat Aksin’s study on the issues of Turkish foreign 
policy after 1945 70 and Kemal Karpat’s study on the transition of Turkish foreign policy 
during this period.71 One of the first studies on  Turkish foreign policy during the same 
period conducted by a foreign scholar was  Ferenc Vali’s study. 72 Most of these studies 
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look at  Turkish foreign policy and its challenge to find and adjust to a new orientation due 
to the systemic transformation within the country.  
 
During this period several regional problems relating to Turkey arose. One of these 
problems was the deterioration of the situation in Cyprus between Turkey and Greece . 
Other issues about Turkey-Greece relations, such as the dispute over islands and territorial 
waters in Aegean Sea also became very prominent during this period. With the rising of 
tensions and increasing internationalization of the crisis, the Cyprus issue has  attracted the 
attention of the Western scholars. Ehrlich’s book on Cyprus and its place in  international 
law was one of the first examples of these studies. 73 During this same period, Turkey’s 
relations with  Middle Eastern countries also raised significant attention among the 
scholars. In accordance with  regional developments studies about Turkey’s position in 
regards to crises such as the Palestinian-Arab conflict and the increasing issues about  oil  
increased during this period. Additionally,  the Cold War increased discussion by the 
scholars of foreign policy about Turkey’s relations with in the region . In particular, the 
Baghdad Pact and the debates about the emergence of different ideological blocs in the 
region were addressed..  
 
The internal turmoil in Turkey during the 1970s also impacted the event driven 
nature of Turkish foreign policy in this period. Turkey’s relations with other countries were 
only discussed in the case of major crises. The infamous Johnson’s Letter and the impact it 
had on Turkish-US relations was one of the most famous topics in the field. In addition, the 
deterioration of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the role of Turkey in this conflict also started 
to be discussed more frequently by scholars.  
 
                                                
73 Ehrlich, T. International Crises and Role of Law: Cyprus, 1958-1967. Oxford University 
Press, 1974.  
 87 
 
One of the critical turning points in Turkish foreign policy studies took place in the 
aftermath of the military intervention to politics in 1980. While the Armenian problem 
continued(now considered a classic Turkish  foreign policy issue) with the increasing 
effectiveness of the Armenian lobby and increasing degree of violence of the groups, such 
as ASALA.   the Ozal government, launched brand new policy initiatives in the  region. 
The neoliberal economic reforms and Turkey’s opening towards the Middle East started a 
new wave of scholarship about the foreign policy of Turkey. There were several issue 
areas that were discussed by the scholars during this period.74 One of the most critical 
issues was the rapprochement between Turkey and Greece as a result of the personal 
rapport between Ozal and Papandreou.  This relationship revived the conversation on  
topics such as Greece, the Aegean Sea and debates about the situation of Turks in the 
Western Thrace. A second issue that was raised during the Ozal years was the membership 
debate about joining the European Community. The debates about the relation of Turkey 
with this organization became more prominent with Turkey’s application for the full 
membership in late 1980s. The third and more significant debate was about Turkey’s 
involvement in the Middle East. In the early years this issue was mostly related to the 
increasing economic relations of Turkey with the Middle Eastern neighbors and rising 
foreign direct investment from the Gulf States. However with the eruption of the Gulf 
Crisis and beginning of the Gulf War, Turkey’s relation to its Middle East neighbors 
changed in nature. Studies, such as Mustafa Aydin’s work on the Turkish foreign policy 
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during the Gulf War gained increasing prominence due to the more complicated nature of 
this foreign policy issue.75  
 
Studies of Turkish foreign policy increased dramatically with the end of the Cold 
War. The opening of Turkey to the world economy and changing politics during the Ozal 
years was a major factor contributing to this new wave of scholarship. Changes within the 
international system and an emerging debate on  potential foreign alignments also 
impacted this trend. One of the most prominent of these studies was an edited volume of 
different debates on Turkish foreign policy in the period after the Cold War. Edited by 
Graham Fuller and Ian Lesser, this study provided different options for the main focus of 
Turkish foreign policy, including the Balkans, Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East.76 
Ian Lesser also published another monograph on the relations between Turkey and its 
Western allies, including the US and the EU after the end of the Cold War during the early 
years of 1990s.77 In the midst of 1990s, the debates about the foreign policy of Turkey 
focused mostly on its relations with Israel. The Turkish government preferred to improve 
its relations with the state of Israel sometimes at the expense of its relations with the other 
countries in the region. This situation continues until the 2000s and major changes in 
regional and global politics as well as Turkey’s relations with the Middle Eastern 
countries.  
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TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY: A MULTI-SIDED, MULTI-DIMENSIONAL 
AND MULTI-TRACKED CONSTRUCT 
 
STRATEGIC DEPTH DOCTRINE: 
 
The Strategic Depth Doctrine has been one of the most frequently cited and debated 
topics of Turkish foreign policy in recent years. The doctrine is based on a book of the 
same name written by Ahmet Davutoglu, advisor for the Prime Minister after the electoral 
victory of the Justice and Development Party in November 2002 and later Foreign Minister 
of Turkey. The book and the idea behind it is said to have guided Turkish foreign policy 
under the rule of the JDP in the last ten years.  
Davutoglu’s book focuses on Turkey’s repositioning in the international system in 
the post-Cold War period. In his introduction, Davutoglu states his goals as providing an 
analysis of Turkish strategic depth that takes into account its historical background as well 
as the geocultural, geopolitical and geoeconomic dimensions of Turkish foreign policy. In 
addition, for him, the shift to a dynamic international system after a relatively static bipolar 
system during the Cold War creates an important challenge for analyzing Turkish foreign 
policy. According to Davutoglu, Turkey stands at an important turning point in history. As 
such, Turkey needs to integrate the depth of its own history and geography through a 
rational strategic plan, which in turn will provide a pro-active and forward-looking policy. 
Examining the domestic aspect alongside the dynamic dimensions of the global order in 
particular will pave the way for the emergence of alternative perspectives that may fill the 
voids in Turkey’s strategic approach. Suggesting alternative perspectives for Turkish 
foreign policy is extremely innovative in a period during which the EU was considered the 
only dimension of Turkey’s foreign policy and Turkish foreign policy makers felt 
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segregated as a result of self-isolation from the Middle East and exclusion from the 
European Union.78 
The book is divided into three main parts. The first section offers a theoretical 
introduction alongside a background of Turkey’s lack of strategic outlook and the causes 
of it, as well as examining the influence of historical legacy in shaping a country’s foreign 
policy. Rather than defining power narrowly, Davutoglu provides a broad equation of 
power:  
 
Power= (CV+PV) x (SM+SP+SW) 
In the above, CV signifies Constant Variables, which include history (h), geography 
(g), demography (d), and culture (c). PV signifies Potential Variables, which include 
economic capacity (e), technological capacity (t), and military capacity (m).  In fact, 
Davutoglu asserts: 
 
CV= h+g+d+c whereas PV=e+t+m 
SM is Strategic Mind, SP is Strategic Planning, and SW is Strategic Will. 
Interpreted together, the extension of the equation of power above becomes: 
 
Power: {(h+g+d+c) + (e+t+m)} x (SM+SP+SW)79 
After offering various explanations and examples with respect to different elements 
of the equation, Davutoglu focuses on the absence of a strategic dimension in Turkey’s 
foreign policy. According to him, excessive pessimism and exaggerated optimism 
regarding the Turkey’s future role in the international system is partly responsible for the 
lack of a strategic approach. This was somewhat a result of the unstable political climate in 
Turkey in the 1990s. Instability in different coalition governments’ approach to foreign 
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policy was challenged by the risk averse and pro-status quo Turkish foreign policy 
bureaucracy, which in turn created contradictory messages in foreign policy. For example, 
one of the most significant foreign policy problems during this period was the fluctuating 
nature of Turkey’s relationship with the European Union. The idea that the membership to 
the European Union would be a long and difficult journey (as was underlined by Turgut 
Ozal when Turkey officially applied for membership), had swung between two extremes: 
full commitment and dedication to EU membership, and the belief that the EU was not 
Turkey’s sole option for foreign policy integration. Changes in power introduced different 
discourses adopted by short-term governments, leading to such mixed assessments about 
the EU.80 
Another factor that played a significant role in the absence of a strategic vision in 
Turkish foreign policy has to do with disagreements over the value of constant and 
potential variables. For instance, among different groups of foreign policy elites and public 
opinion, some of the variables hold different meanings and values. Historical background, 
for example, is a huge asset for certain groups of people, while others consider it a major 
burden in designing and implementing an autonomous foreign policy. Geographical reach 
and demographic characteristics have similar debates regarding value priorities.  
The same disagreements are also present in the potential variables, such as 
economy and technology. For Davutoglu, this was most apparent in the energy sector, 
where a divergence of opinion took place in the measurement of the variables.81 According 
to him, the same level of disagreement and confusion also existed in the other variables, 
such as strategic planning. Especially during the 1990s when Turkish foreign policy 
experienced important challenges and transient governments, it was difficult to design and 
implement a long-term strategic plan. The short-lived coalition governments, existence of 
multiple actors along different levels of government that held contradictory political and 
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foreign policy goals, and constant change in the position of the foreign ministry made it 
difficult for Turkey to develop a strategic plan.  
During this period, Turkish foreign policy was primarily reactive to external 
developments, rather than proactively designing foreign policy goals. This also caused 
Turkey to lose the consistency and stability of domestic political discourse, as well as 
external credibility in the international sphere.82 Davutoglu argues that another significant 
problem that contributed to the lack of strategic vision took place as a result of the delay of 
a more dynamic evaluation of the constant variables of power. Despite the changes in the 
global system, Turkish foreign policy makers and observers preferred to approach the 
variables in a more static manner. In this sense, for instance, geopolitics was interpreted 
through Cold War codes instead of adapting to changing circumstances and regional 
developments. This failure to adapt to new geopolitical realities caused Turkish foreign 
policy to miss an important input of strategic vision.83 During this period, most of the 
optimism of the early 1990s –  particularly with the independence of Central Asian 
Republics – was replaced with pessimism as well as a lacking sense of direction. In most 
instances, rather than an overarching strategic vision, tactical moves guided and shaped 
strategy and determined the foreign policy direction of Turkey.84  
According to Davutoglu, there are various reasons for Turkey’s failure in 
developing a strategic theory. First, the institutional structure of Turkish foreign 
policymaking does not allow foreign policymakers to develop alternative strategic 
viewpoints. On the one hand, the Turkish foreign ministry does not have any financial or 
institutional infrastructure to serve as a hub for strategists and analysts to develop alterative 
strategies. On the other hand, opposition parties do not have any preparation to provide 
credible criticisms to majority foreign policy. As a result, actors fail to bring foreign policy 
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issues to the Turkish parliament. Furthermore, universities and independent research 
institutes are not equipped to create debate or stimulate a discussion regarding foreign 
policy options for Turkey. Both of these institutions have serious infrastructural problems 
that hinder the establishment of a  venue for foreign policy discussions.85   
Second, Davutoglu argues that historical background also creates an important 
impediment to more active and independent foreign policymaking. Late Ottoman and early 
republican concerns and threat perceptions shaped the main tenets of Turkish foreign 
policymaking for most of the Republican period. As a result, foreign policymakers focused 
on domestic and external threat perceptions. The same concerns also led them to ignore the 
Eastern world altogether. In many circumstances, domestic threat perceptions – such as the 
fear of Islamism and the Kurdish Question – led Turkey to make problematic foreign 
policy decisions. It also alienated Turkey from its neighboring regions, including the 
Middle East, Balkans and Caucasia. While significant regional changes were taking place, 
Turkish foreign policymakers had difficulty in taking autonomous positions.86   
A final contribution to Turkey’s lack of strategic theory has to do with problems 
about historical consciousness as well as an issue of split identity. According to Davutoglu, 
a failure to recognize historical continuities leads to the polarization of a society and a 
clash of identities domestically. This also engenders significant contradictions between 
domestic and external identities. Turkey, in order to be more effective, needs to create a 
harmony between two such identities. For him, it would be extremely difficult for a nation 
that does not have historical memory and consciousness to leave its mark on history. The 
factor that distinguishes between nations, shapes the flow of history, and is shaped by 
external developments is the way that these nations approach their own histories.87 
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Davutoglu states that Turkey started to feel the absence of a strategic theory more 
seriously after the end of the Cold War. Changes in power configurations during this 
period forced Turkey to reevaluate its position in the international system. For Davutoglu, 
this period actually provides a lot of opportunities for states that are preparing to move to 
an upper level in the global hierarchy of power. During the immediate aftermath of the 
Cold War, however, countries like Turkey were not prepared to utilize this opportunity due 
to a lack of strategic theory.88 Further, Turkey was simultaneously experiencing significant 
domestic debates regarding political identity, culture, institutions, and legitimacy. In order 
to avoid similar failures, Davutoglu provides a schema for Turkish foreign policymakers: 
the first step in overcoming such a chaotic situation is recognizing particularities of 
Turkey’s political cultural infrastructure.89  
Davutoglu argues that there are certain characteristics that make Turkey’s political 
culture different from others’. Historically, it holds a geopolitically crucial space where 
significant global powers once existed. This central position and subsequent engagement 
with other centers of civilization deeply impacted the sociology of Turkish political 
culture. The West’s defeat of and later collapse of the Ottoman Empire created a major role 
in the formation of this new political sociology. Despite their rivalry and the Ottoman loss 
of power, Turkish political elites wanted to integrate the newly founded republic in the 
Western bloc, and especially in the European Union. However, the European nations 
rejected Turkey’s attempts in most instances. According to Davutoglu, what makes Turkey 
unique in this situation is partly a result of this contradiction between historic significance 
and simultaneous attempt to integrate itself into another civilization. 90 
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CONSTRUCTION OF NEW STATE IDENTITY: 
The strategic depth discourse developed by Ahmet Davutoğlu in the recent years 
transformed Turkish foreign policy both in theory and practice.91 Davutoğlu is the 
intellectual architect behind AK Party cabinets’ foreign policies and therefore the 
intellectual architect of Turkish foreign policy of the last few years. The transformation 
was realized in foreign policy visions and inspirations, as well as in practice. Foreign 
policy was purged of the concerns and changes of domestic politics.92 Foreign policy that 
served as an instrument of domestic politics became a factor that delineated domestic 
politics. With the advent of the strategic depth discourse, a safer domestic political 
platform became a necessity in order to execute more decisive practices in foreign policy. 
The envisioned restructuring of foreign policy for more effective stand in the international 
community required the undertaking of a set of initiatives in order to reshape politics on 
the domestic level. In fact, economic developments, political progress, dynamic social 
actors, democratic progress and concord with opposition allowed Turkey to play a more 
effective role in international politics. Turkey deemed it a principle to cooperate with 
international actors using its accumulation historical, civilizational and cultural of 
knowledge and practices. 93 
A multi-dimensional and execution of various strategies in foreign policy 
strengthened Turkey’s status. A balanced approach to politics among all global and local 
actors was developed. While maintaining the US as the most important political ally, 
Turkey became the most prominent commercial partner with Russia. While proceeding 
with the accession negotiations, it embarked on a process of unifying neighbor states in 
cooperation and undertook new initiatives towards states situated farther geographically. 
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Turkey became a more outspoken and self-confident country in the international platform 
through its independent international actions. It is highly possible for Turkey to become a 
global actor in the near future, provided that it achieves a national coherence through the 
resolution of its current domestic issues, and provided that it makes good use of 
opportunities and its strategic plans.  
As substantiated by the theoretical discussion above, the realist approach, whose 
explanatory power started to be questioned in the light of global developments, seems 
insufficient to explain the current Turkish foreign policy and the changes that took place in 
this sphere in the last 13 years. With the AK Party rule, Turkey national politics, identity 
and its relationship with its neighbors were reconstituted and redefined.94 Although it is 
difficult to evaluate the strategic depth concept that shaped Turkey’s most recent foreign 
policy in terms of conventional international relations theories developed in the West, it 
can be situated in the conceptual map of IR theories closer to the constructivist approach.  
 
1. Sub-national Construction 
The strategic culture that determines the process of foreign policy making is an 
effect of the structuring and restructuring of state identity at the intersection of the 
perception of space based on geographic data and the perception of time based on a 
historical consciousness. According to Davutoğlu, a fragmented sense of identity caused 
by the lack of strategic theory (a “torn country” in Huntington’s words95) and historical 
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consciousness are96 in the process of constructing a new historical narrative after the 
establishment of the Republic, the new elite, rejecting  Turkey’s historical inheritance, 
endeavored towards a national identity that designates Turkey as a part of the Western 
world. However, Turkey today, under AK Party’s leadership is able to turn this historical 
inheritance into an asset in its foreign policy practices and, hence, modify the national 
identity. Therefore, while the historical inheritance in Kemalist foreign policy functioned 
as a negative constitutive factor, in AK Party foreign policy under Davutoğlu’s leadership 
it serves as a positive factor.  Bearing semblance to the concept New Ottomanism 
developed at the end of the 80s during Özal’s rule97 as an alternative to the negative 
conations assigned to Turkey’s historical inheritance, Davutoğlu’s approach, since 2003, 
takes this cultural inheritance as historical, geographical, and cultural reference in his 
initiatives.98  
 
i) Construction of a New Identity 
The transformation of Turkish foreign policy, aligned with the constructivist school 
of thought, can be explained by the amendment of Turkey’s national, social and 
civilizational identity caused by the redefined perceptions of the parameters of threat to its 
national security such as its geographical location, particularly of Istanbul, and its relations 
with its neighbors, particularly designation of friend and foe, because the reconstruction of 
political, economic and social structures and institutions necessitates a redefinition of 
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relationships as well. In fact, each instance of construction and reconstruction demands the 
structuring and restructuring of foreign policy.  
Therefore, which of the continuation or transformation factors are more effective 
can only be revealed at the end of the process of construction and reconstruction required 
by the developments in the domestic and international environment. The new state, after 
the establishment of the Republic, was constructed based on a new Western identity that 
was developed by following developments in the West. The new nation state was 
established based on political nationalism inspired by the French Revolution.99  
In order to accommodate the sustainability and endurance of this identity and new 
political regime, remnants of institutions or concepts from the old regime were removed 
from use. The transformation realized during the first years of the Republic is a 
manifestation of this move. A lot of attention was paid so that this new nation state was 
constructed as a modern and Western state based on the principles of nationalism and 
secularism. Following this, Turkey’s foreign and domestic policies were determined and 
executed in accordance with this new state identity. On the domestic level, any activity or 
group opposing the current regime was excluded from the political stage with accusations 
of partisanship, factionalism and reactionary politics. This is best illuminated by the fact 
that the two most deployed concepts in addition to nationalism and laicism, reactionarism 
(Islamic) and factionalism (Kurdish) are still at the center of political, economic and social 
debates.100  
In tandem with this new identity, in the period immediately following the end of the 
war in which Turkey suffered huge territorial and material damages, Turkey followed a 
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formal foreign policy that was concerned with maintaining the status quo. It built 
relationships with all new states established with Western assistance, because of their 
affiliation with Western states, particularly with those in near vicinity. This move 
prompted colder, more distanced relationships with nations and groups with whom Turkey 
had shared a common history and geography. Nations and states of the Middle East, 
Balkans and the Caucasus were avoided and otherized, because any cooperation or 
coalition with these states evoked images of the past the new nation-state was trying to 
purge. Manifestations of this Western approach can be observed in Turkey’s perceptions of 
Iran and Israel in terms of their nuclear energy and weapon activities. In the Turkish public 
sphere, while silence is maintained about the nuclear weapons Israel currently possesses, 
much is said about Iran’s acquisition of weapons. The short and long-range missiles 
developed by Iran are characterized as worrisome for Turkey. One cannot find articles 
criticizing Israel’s possession of approximately 200 nuclear missiles even though Israel 
declared in no uncertain terms that, if need be, it would deploy these weapons. The reason 
for this inconsistency is that Israel is not perceived as a threat by the Western nations. 
Since Turkey’s perception of threat is constructed similar to the Western states, it 
determines its foreign policy towards Israel and Iran in accordance with the Western views 
on the subject of nuclear weaponry.  
As a result of this western construction of the perceived threat, every step Iran—
ostracized and otherized by the political elite with Western inclinations in Turkey—is 
watched closely and carefully during the process of producing nuclear energy (and 
presumably weaponry) and much is written in the media about the threat this process poses 
to Turkey.101 When Iran experimented with Şahap missiles, it was emphasized heavily in 
the media that first Diyarbakır and Ankara, then Istanbul, are within the range of these 
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missiles. Iran is perceived as a threat by the Western proponent political elite of Turkey 
because it is perceived as a threat and otherized by the Western states. Furthermore, not 
even the fact that Turkey and Iran shares one of the oldest borders in the world, and not 
even the vehement declarations of Iran state representatives to the fact that nuclear 
technology is being developed only as an instrument of economic development and 
potential defense and that they have no intention of producing weapons of mass 
destruction102 could satisfy the Western suspicions, hence the suspicions of the Western 
inclined elite of Turkey. In reality, when examined from a realist and nationalist 
perspective, nuclear weapon technology developed in the region, regardless of the state 
that develops or possesses it, should be perceived as a potential threat to Turkey.  
Similar Westernist attitudes can be traced in Turkey’s stand in the Bandung 
Conference (although party caused by the Cold War), its leading role in formation of the 
Baghdad Pact, its appearance as an ally to France during the Algerian Independence 
struggle, and its reactions to national political developments in Middle Eastern countries 
such as Syria and Lebanon. At times, Turkey undertook symbolic economic and political 
initiatives towards the East in order to increase its negotiating power and to assuage its 
economic weakness.  
With the AK Party, Turkey entered process of delineating a new identity more 
suitable to its new conditions and the new developments in the international arena. 
According to this new identity, the conventional nation-state discourses are being 
abandoned in favor of discourse on civilization. Regarded as “New Ottomanism”103 by 
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some, the process of constructing a new identity that is more inclusive and more suitable to 
the process of globalization has began in Turkey. With the construction of this new identity 
how national interest and perceived threats were defined is transformed as well. New 
perceptions of threats are constructed. Conceptions of threat and interest constructed in the 
West in Turkey’s name are gradually being abandoned. Existent threats have been 
reinterpreted from a Turkey-centric perspective. In this context, initiatives to establish 
close relationships with states long perceived as threats such as Iran, Syria, Iraq and 
Armenia are implemented.  
In the process of constructing the new identity, history is conceived as field of 
opportunity and not as a burden as it was previously conceived.104 In particular, the 
Ottoman inheritance that was forgotten or suppressed was reinvigorated and an emphasis 
on historical depth began to appear in foreign policy discourses. A newfound importance is 
assigned to Turkey’s historical values in addition to the values borrowed from the West.  In 
other words, in juxtaposition with the Western concepts and institutions of democracy, 
primacy of the law, and free market, new concepts and values are being produced as a 
result of the East-West synthesis and of the remembrance of a poly-lingual, poly-ethnic, 
multicultural and pluralist past. 105 
Turkey endeavors to possess historical, geographical, strategic, political and 
civilizational depth on the regional, international and universal level. In order for Turkey to 
become one of the core states or a global power, it first needs to overcome its national 
issues. Because the construction of a new identity involves the restructuring of both 
domestic and international politics, in order to bring its political initiatives towards 
Armenia, the Caucaus, Middle East, Africa and the Balkans to fruition, Turkey first needs 
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to ensure the success of its current democratic initiatives towards Kurdish and Alevi 
minorities.  
 
ii) Re-Construction of Domestic Politics 
Under the new government, a balance between democracy and security in the 
restructuring of domestic politics was observed. When foreign policy is conceived as an 
extension of domestic policies and politics, it is clear to see that steps taken towards the 
democratization of the country not only improves the stability and security of the country, 
but it also develops a more effective, flexible, constructive, and peace promoting foreign 
policy. A state’s legitimacy is best justified by its ability to provide security for its citizens. 
However, this security cannot be achieved through restriction of freedoms and human 
rights in the country. Freedom cannot be sacrificed in the name of security. Sacrificing 
freedom in the name of security creates the space for an authoritarian regime to emerge. 
Under the new leadership in Turkey, attempts are made to improve civil liberties without 
neglecting the nation’s security.106 This path is evinced from the initiatives made towards 
Kurdish and Alevi minorities and progress made in the process of accession to EU.  
Due to the balance achieved between security and democracy, Turkey’s latest 
foreign policy stresses soft power more than hard power.107 The practice of securitization 
of all foreign policy issues in the last decades is being abandoned gradually. Soft power 
factors assists in implementation the soft balancing strategy. For example Turkey is 
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gaining a reputation as a lending and donor country. 108  In the year of 2008, Turkey’s 
foreign aid exceeded 700 million USD and to 3.5 billion dollars in 2012.109 Perhaps 
because of these developments, Istanbul gained preeminence in foreign policy instead of 
Ankara, which reflects the traditional nationalist nation state perspective. As the symbol of 
two civilizations and as the bridge between two continents, Istanbul is accepted as a 
universal center in which universal values are easily accommodated. For this reason, in the 
recent period many bi-lateral and multi-lateral international conferences take place in 
Istanbul and not in Ankara.  
Turkey no longer practices a hierarchy in its foreign policy issues as suggested by 
the realist school of thought, because it does not have the luxury of neglecting or avoiding 
certain topics in its foreign policy analyses. The common saying, “All matters are 
footnotes to the unity of the Nation” gives the impression that foreign policy is composed 
solely of security concerns. However, under the new government, the concept of security 
has also gone through a fundamental transformation. The due importance is given to 
economic, communal and individual rights, health and environment issues.    
 
iii) Participation of Non-State Actors in Foreign Policy Decision Making  
For the first time in its history, in addition to government institutions, non-state 
actors such as civil society organizations and corporations began to participate in foreign 
policy effectively in their roles of providing support and guidance to governmental 
activities. Civil society organizations, think tanks, corporations and charity organizations 
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were activated in order to actualize the new foreign policy discourse.110 For example, 
TÜSİAD, MÜSİAD and TUSKON, which represent the business world, assume activities 
that support the new multi-sided, multi-dimensional foreign policy. TÜSİAD, which 
houses Turkey’s biggest corporations, takes part in activities towards speeding the process 
of accession to the EU as well as activities towards Westernization of the country. 
MÜSİAD, which represents the interests of the businesses that emerged in Anatolia 
recently, facilitates the improvement of relations with Middle Eastern and Muslim 
countries,. In addition to these, various civil society and human rights organizations 
support the new foreign policy with their efforts in various countries such as Pakistan, 
Indonesia, Palestine and Africa. 111 
Foreign policy practices in accordance with Davutoğlu’s views implemented by AK 
Party governments since 2003 hold an important philosophical depth, variety and efforts to 
restructure, incommensurable to any of the prior governments. As a result of this foreign 
policy, deemed as the strategic depth policy, Turkey began to play more and more 
important roles in regional or international crisis and participated in almost all global 
developments. As a result of the rapid expansion of its foreign policies, Turkey became a 
country to pay attention to and to contend with. Turkey, with its Ottoman inheritance, 
growing economy, and civilizational accumulation, will become one of the major players 
of the international arena, provided that it overcomes international and particularly 
domestic obstacles in relation to its new foreign policy.112  
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In conjunction with participation of the domestic non-state actors in foreign policy 
making, Turkey focused on developing relationships with international non-state actors. 
Under the new government, Turkey practiced politics actively with various communities, 
nations, and regions simultaneously and consequence developed constructive 
communication with these actors. While maintaining the traditional vigorous interaction 
with the West, Turkey, began to take an active role in the regional politics of the Middle 
East, the Balkans, Middle Asia and the Caucus. It played a functional role in the 
international crises involving Iraq, Palestine, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo, Georgia and 
Azerbaijan. Psychological obstacles that emerged in the Middle East in the 20th century 
and became chronic were eliminated. Turkey interacted with political actors situated in the 
different fronts in the Middle East such as Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, 
Hamas, Al-Fatih and Hezbollah on both formal and informal levels. For instance, while 
only state institutions were considered legitimate actors during the previous governments 
in Turkey, the AK Party government developed relationships with Shia, Kurdish and 
Turkic groups and made progress in very short time. This change in domestic politics 
actually played an important role in the construction of a new identity in Turkish foreign 
policy and Turkish state. It was a construction that took place through transformation of 
domestic politics.  
 
2. International Construction 
i) Reconstruction of Relationship with Neighboring Countries  
Turkey, under AK Party leadership, reconstructed its relationships with the 
neighboring countries. First operating under the “zero problems with neighbors” principles, 
it began mending relations and offering solutions to existing problems. Then, under the 
“maximum cooperation” principle, it aimed to jumpstart a process of unification by 
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optimizing the potential of cooperation between the countries.113 As a consequence of 
these principles Turkey no longer perceived itself as a country surround by its enemies. 
The saying, “Turks do not have any friends but Turks” was finally abandoned. Concrete 
steps towards resolving the problems with neighboring countries and cofounding 
institutions that would work to determine common targets and purposes. After achieving 
resolutions to problems with Georgia, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Bulgaria and Greece, Turkey 
moved onto resolving its issues with Armenia. After completing the first phase of reaching 
a “zero problems level” with its neighboring states, Turkey is implementing policies to 
attain relationships based on maximum levels of cooperation in realizing common 
interests. The target is the invigoration of relationships that were originally founded on 
geographical and historical depth.  
The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Davutoğlu began to deploy the term “neighbor” in 
two separate and distinct ways—close neighbors with common borders by land and distant 
neighbors with common borders by sea. States located in nearby regions were included in 
the definition of a neighbor. 114According to this modification, Turkey’s close neighbors 
are Greece, Bulgaria, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Its distant 
neighbors are Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Egypt, Lebanon, and Israel.  
 
ii) Cooperation with Various Global and Regional Powers  
Turkey during this period also started to exhibit a multi-dimensional and pluralist 
approach in its relationships with global and regional powers. On the one hand, bilateral 
relationship between Western states and Turkey, strategic relationships with the Unites 
                                                
113 Ioannis N. Grigoriadis. “The Davutoglu Doctrine and Turkish Foreign Policy.” Working Paper 
No. 8, 2000. http://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/ΚΕΙΜΕΝΟ-ΕΡΓΑΣΙΑΣ-
8_2010_IoGrigoriadis1.pdf 
114 Ahmet Davutoğlu. “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007.” Insight Turkey, 
Vol. 10, No.1 2008, 77-96, http://arsiv.setav.org/ups/dosya/9595.pdf 
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States and relationships in the context of the NATO were maintained while the process of 
accession to the EU was expedited.115 On the other hand, close relationships with Eastern 
states and states in close proximity were developed. More attention than usual was paid to 
relations with Russia and China.116 While close relations were maintained with the West, 
new initiatives were undertaken towards the Western and Southern states. Turkey 
perceived these attempts to develop relationships with various states as strategic foreign 
policy moves and not as competition or conflict. Turkey assumed a foreign policy based on 
the principle of acting Western in the West and Eastern in the East. Its relationships with 
the East developed, not as an antithesis of its relationship with the West, but as 
complementary factors. It took a more active and comfortable role in the international 
arena. The process of establishing interdependent partnerships with various states, instead 
of depending on a single center of power, state or ally began. In this way, the influence 
independence on a single state or nation has on politics has been diminished. Instead of 
being dependent solely on the Western states, by creating interdependencies with both the 
West and the East Turkey expanded the effectiveness of its foreign policies. For instance, 
Turkey, after having signed the Nabucco Project in Ankara this year, was considered 
Westernist; however, shortly after signing this project, it signed a bilateral commercial 
agreement with Russia that covers a wide range including natural gas. Through this Turkey 
also reformed its social relations with the countries around it and other global powers and 
actors. This change in relations with other countries impacted the social identity of Turkish 
state and its foreign relations and policy in the same period. This situation created an 
external impact on the emergence of identity change in foreign policy of Turkey. 
 
                                                
115 See Meltem Müftüler Baç. “Turkey’s Political Reforms and the Impacts of the European Union.” 
South European Society and Politics, Vol 10, No. 1, 2005. 
116 See Fatih Özbay. “The Relations between Turkey and Russia in the 2000s.” Perceptions, Vol. 16, 
No. 3, 2011. 
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3. Inter-mestic Construction: The Discourse on Civilization  
There were also some dimensions that we may consider as intermestic which 
experienced major transformations during AK Party period. Except for under Özal regime, 
until 2000s, Turkey followed an exclusionary foreign policy. During the rule of AK Party 
governments, a more constructive and more inclusive political and diplomatic discourse 
was developed. Turkey was characterized as a country “surrounded with enemies in every 
direction” under the Kemalist leadership, and for Turkey’s traditional political elite, Turks 
did not have any friends other than Turks. Kemalist Turkey, in order to ensure its existence 
and security was perpetually seeking a balance of power as ascertained by the prevalent 
international relations theories. Having determined its foreign policy and international 
behaviors under the influence of these prevalent theories, Kemalist Turkey followed an 
antagonistic foreign policy. Under the new rule, an inclusive and constructive discourse 
was developed. This new language, discourse, and voice aimed to construct a new way of 
doing politics.  
Davutoğlu, in his scholarly articles, criticized several prominent theories developed 
in the aftermath of the Cold War and defended by a large group of Westerners, such as the 
“new world order, “the end of history” and “the clash of civilizations.”117 He defended the 
alternative approaches such as shifting the homogenizing effects of globalization towards 
an adventure that promotes differences and as “improving dialogs between civilizations”. 
In fact, these assertions Davutoğlu made in his articles were calls to Western powers to 
abandon their hegemonic discourses. Turkey, under Davutoğlu leadership, aimed to 
increase the effectiveness of traditional civilizations, particularly of Islam as a prerequisite 
of the civilizational discourse and to advance an alternative discourse to Western 
conceptions based on conflict. One of the reasons that make Davutoğlu policies the target 
                                                
117 Ahmet Davuotglu. Stratejik Derinlik. 
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of insistent criticism by Westerners is its purported aim of revitalizing the civilization 
discourse. Turkey aspires to utilize its Ottoman inheritance and the revitalization of the 
Islamic civilization, in its foreign policy, as a constitutive power factor. 118  
Turkey hosted a high number of important international conferences in the recent 
years. Turkey’s social, bureaucratic, economic and social actors are functioning with an 
unprecedented vigor. The extent of intensity in diplomatic relations can be easily discerned 
from the number of international conferences that took place in Turkey since 2003. Multi-
lateral meetings such as the NATO summit in 2004, African Summit in 2005, International 
Water Forum and International Finance Summit in 2007 and bilateral meetings such as 
Solana-Laricani, Musharraf-Karzai and Abbas-Peres encounters indicate that Turkey has 
become an effective actor in International Politics.  Turkey also hosted direct and indirect 
meetings for the actors of regional disputes. For example, indirect encounter between Syria 
and Israel and direct encounters between Afghanistan and Pakistan took place in Istanbul.  
Turkey’s leaders also deploy a productive and active diplomatic strategy. The travel 
itinerary of the Turkish president, Abdullah Gül, only since 2009 testifies to Turkey’s 
active role in international politics. The president traveled to Riyad to speak at the 
Consultative Assembly of Saudi Arabia in 2009, to Russia to facilitate the negations about 
commercial transactions being conducted in Russian ruble, to Iran for the EcoSummit, to 
Iraq to mediate the Talabani-Barzani encounter, and to Belgium to visit the European 
Union Commission. The president is an active player in the international arena even 
though the presidential office is a relatively symbolic office in Turkey.  
Turkey applies an active diplomatic strategy not only to its own international issues 
with regional or global forces, but also to international crises that does not involve Turkey 
directly. Turkey took initiative in resolving regional problems instead of waiting for the 
Western nations to take the first step. For example, during the Georgian civil war and 
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Caucasian crisis, Turkey’s representatives paid official visits to Georgia, Azerbaijan and 
Russia before any of the European countries. In order to overcome the crisis, Turkey 
proposed the first initiative of creating a Caucasian platform of stability and security, 
which included five countries (Turkey, Russia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia). Turkey 
also prevented a potential NATO vs. Russia conflict by promoting diplomacy. On another 
front, following Israel’s attacks on Gaza towards the end of 2008, the prime minister, 
Erdoğan, visited four important Arab countries, while the minister of foreign affairs 
Davutoğlu traveled back and forth between Damascus and Cairo. The prime minister’s 
intervention of the tensions between Iran and Pakistan and Iraq and Syria after terrorist 
attacks in Iran and Iraq with in the last month is enough to evince the active role Turkey 
plays in regional politics.   
This new Turkey promotes equidistance in its interactions with others, establishing 
coalitions to resolve problems and initiating wide based strategic actions. It pays particular 
attention to not taking sides and remaining disinterested in conflicts, and makes 
constructive moves towards a win-win strategy to assuage concerns of the international 
actors. In order to play a peace-building and mitigating role in the solution of regional 
problems, it insists on taking preventative measures in order to increase the trust between 
Turkey and states with which it interacts. For example, Turkey is the only country that 
maintains constructive relations with all actors in Iraq. In order to achieve stability in Iraq, 
Turkey works relentlessly on the international platforms such as United Nations Security 
Council and Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and calls all ethnic and 
religious groups to action in order to attain stability, security and unity in the country.  
Davutoğlu’s strategic depth approach renders national borders obsolete in practice 
while still respecting the national sovereignty of the states. Some initiatives taken under 
this approach aim to make the concept of national borders in the Middle East, particularly 
those drawn by foreign powers in southern Turkey, irrelevant. Davutoğlu insists that the 
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concept of nation state is a Western invention and not universal unit of political analysis. 
He propounds the importance of historical and geographical factors in the development of 
relations among states and takes these factors into account while delineating strategies for 
Turkey’s interaction with states in its proximity.  
As an alternative to prejudiced discourses employed by the US such as 
characterizing its adversaries as the “axis of evil” or “rogue states”, Turkey purports to 
build axis of stability and to this end, promotes new discourses based on the civilizational 
particularities of the geographical and strategic regions in which it is located. Aiming to 
build relationships among states, not by otherizing but by accommodating, Turkey began 
to work towards building an axis of stability in the regions the United States declared ‘the 
axis of evil’ and towards restructuring the political order in the region by developing 
bilateral and multilateral relationships and by playing a mediating role among states. 
According to Davutoğlu any development in the region may cause a domino effect. Since 
regional political and economic issues are closely related to each other, development in any 
one of them may have a negative or positive effect on the region. Therefore, in order to 
achieve stability in the area, the domino tiles must be organized well ensuring the fall of 
the first tile towards the right direction.  
In Turkey’s new inclusive foreign policy based on civilizational foundations, a 
positive sum game based on the win-win strategy is preferred to the zero sum game in its 
interactions with its neighbors. To this end, new strategic approaches to its problems with 
Cyprus, Kurds, Iraq, Iran and Armenia are developed. For example, When Davutoğlu 
invoked the “just memory” concept shortly after signing a protocol with Armenia, calling 
both sides to assume a constructive approach that reflects a common target; he was acting 
within the parameters of his foreign policy strategies. This strategy employs an 
accommodating, inclusive and constructive discourse that mitigates the expectations of 
both sides instead of an exclusionary and otherizing policy.  
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As a result of this transformation in Turkey’s foreign policy, a positive change in 
perceptions of Turkey in its region has been observed. Turkey’s new strategy of stressing 
cooperation and coalition improved its regional image. For example, the president 
Abdullah Gül, became the first Muslim country leader who addressed the Consultative 
Assembly of Saudi Arabia. He also became the first and only leader to stay overnight in 
occupied Iraq. During his visit, Iraq’s first lady, who rarely attends official ceremonies, 
attended to such events out of respect for the Turkish President. In addition to state 
representatives, lay people, political and intellectual elite also are also becoming more 
trusting of Turkey. While Turkish cinema and television series find an unprecedentedly 
high number of audiences, Turkish is quickly becoming a regularly spoken language in the 
region. Turkey’s relatively stable and progressive democracy, its powerful political 
institutions, developed economy, historical accumulation, strategic depth, civilizational 
discourse and social progression combine to impress the states and peoples of the region.  
Under the leadership of the AK Party and aligned with the conceptual framework 
summarized above, Turkey began to follow a multi-dimensional, multi-sided and multi-
tracked foreign policy. The new foreign policy developed in three different dimensions. As 
stated above, the mainstream theoretical approaches, such as liberalism and realism, fails 
to explain the change in foreign policy in Turkey. The transformation can be explained 
best by utilizing the theoretical tools of constructivism. What took place in Turkey was a 
complicated process that includes the change of state and foreign policy identity from 
within, through a major change in domestic politics and discourse on foreign policy 
through the actions of different actors and from outside, through a transformation of 
Turkey’s relations with its neighbors and other global actors. The outcome of this 
transformation was a Turkish foreign policy with a new identity. Three dimensions of this 
new identity particularly differed from the premises of the traditional foreign policy. First, 
contrary to the realist discourse it started to interact with informal actors. Second, it began 
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to establish close relationships with groups of states that engage in different ideologies and 
regimes. Finally, non-state actors representing different sections of the country, for the first 
time, participated in the process of foreign policy making as international actors. In the 
remaining chapters of the dissertation the outcomes of these conceptual changes will be 
discussed in three different case studies of Turkish foreign policy in recent years.  
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THE MEETINGS OF THE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES OF IRAQ 
 
 
Turkey’s policy in the Middle East has substantially gained momentum due to the 
new foreign policy pursued by the Justice and Development Party (AK Party). This new, 
proactive policy was first apparent in the “Initiative of Iraq’s Neighboring Countries,” 
introduced by Turkey on the eve of the U.S. invasion in Iraq.1 In the days leading up to the 
occupation of Iraq, the AK Party managed to take a vital and transformative step—a step 
that was not recognized as such at the time. By initiating the Neighbors of Iraq Conference, 
the AK Party made the first attempt at contact with countries in the region both at the state 
and non-state levels in 80 years. For the first time, Turkish foreign policy makers and 
security bureaucracy had to work with Middle Eastern actors.2 The Neighbors of Iraq 
Conference, which first took place on January 23, 2003 in Istanbul, met a total of 15 times. 
Having started with the participation of regional countries, it soon included the UNSC’s 
                                                
1 Bülent Aras. “Turkey’s Rise in the Greater Middle East: Peace-Building in the Periphery.” Journal 
of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2009, 29-41. 
2 Stephen Larrabee. “Turkey Rediscovers the Middle East.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 4, 2007. 
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P5, G8, the UN, the OIC, the Arab League, the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council, and the 
EU.  
The Iraq meetings, in which the U.S. did not take a special interest, became an 
important platform during and in the aftermath of the occupation of Iraq. In 2005, which 
was considered a year of crisis in the occupation of Iraq, the Conference played a 
significant role in ensuring the participation of the Sunni community in the process in Iraq. 
More importantly, however, it played a crucial function in the transformation of Turkish 
foreign policy. The Iraq meetings helped Turkish foreign policy gain a natural opportunity 
and self-confidence to revise the nation-state’s clichés of the past 80 years. By refusing to 
participate in the occupation of Iraq, Turkey had to confront U.S. for the first time since 
the Cyprus Operation of 1974. The AK Party, as the chief actor of this confrontation, faced 
harsh criticism and was accused of being a “political Islamist” party by the U.S. 
neoconservative administration in the post-9/11 atmosphere. However, as the events started 
to unfold in Iraq, the significance of the conference became more obvious.. 
The recommendations offered by the conference, which were never taken seriously 
by the U.S. administration, could have offered a solution for the problems that emerged in 
Iraq following the occupation and withdrawal of U.S. forces. Especially after 
developments in 2014, including the rise of ISIS and re-emergence of sectarianism, it 
became quite clear that the participants of the conference foresaw most of the problems 
and disputes that might emerge in the region. However, the occupying forces in Iraq did 
not pay attention to the suggestions of the local and native actors in the region; instead, the 
Western powers tried to engineer a new system that had no relevance to the situation on the 
ground. The meetings also significantly changed the perception of Turkey in the region. 
Particularly, Turkey’s Iraq decision increased its popularity both domestically and in the 
region. Also, the conference allowed Turkish foreign policy makers to understand and 
learn about the region and its actors. While they were taking place, the Neighbors of Iraq 
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Conference did not receive a lot of attention from many foreign policy analysts and 
academics. Nevertheless, these meetings obliged the Turkish bureaucracy to do its most 
intensive work in the Middle East since WWI. The network that emerged during the 
meetings became influential in dealing with Middle Eastern actors and issues in the years 
that followed. 
The subjects and issues that were negotiated in these meetings were mostly matters 
that had not been addressed intensively by Turkish foreign policy since the WWI. The 
process of adapting the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has accelerated largely due to the hard 
work of Ahmet Davutoğlu, who became the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2009. The 
results of the Neighbors of Iraq meetings were felt in Turkish foreign policy especially on 
the eve of the Iraqi elections in March 2010. 
 
 
A NEW ERA IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE REGION 
The AK Party, which came to power in November 2002, was faced with the 
consequences of the occupation of Afghanistan and impending invasion of Iraq during its 
first days in office. Preceding the occupation of Iraq, the Turkish government was put 
under serious pressure by the Bush administration and faced a big crisis. This crisis was 
recorded in Turkish foreign policy as “the Bill of March 1, 2003.” The AK Party drafted 
the bill in the Council of Ministers, which proposed “to deploy Turkish Military Forces to 
foreign countries and to allow foreign military forces to be present in Turkey.” The bill 
was particularly important for the U.S. war effort of in Iraq. Opening of a Northern front in 
the war with the support of the Kurdish forces and Turkish geography was considered vital 
for the U.S.’s rapid success in defeating the Iraqi army and controlling different regions of 
Iraq. 
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The bill was introduced to the parliament because Article 92 of the Turkish 
Constitution gives the power to authorize the deployment of Turkish Armed Forces into 
foreign countries and allow foreign troops to be stationed in Turkey to the Grand National 
Assembly of Turkey (TBMM). The bill proposed, as stipulated by the Article 117 of the 
Constitution, that the Council of Ministers would be responsible to the TBMM for national 
security and the preparation of the Armed Forces for the defense of the country. As such, 
the government would have the authority to determine the scope, limits and duration of the 
deployment of troops into northern Iraq. Furthermore, the bill proposed, also in accordance 
with the Article 117, that the TBMM authorize the government to determine the limits and 
scope of the use of Turkish land and airspace by foreign armed forces in order to create 
more credible deterrence against Iraqi forces.  
The bill would have authorized the entry of no more than 62,000 U.S. troops into 
Turkey, composed of the 4th Infantry Division, the 3rd Armored Cavalry regiment, 255 
fixed wings and 65 rotary wing aircrafts. In a closed parliament session, 264 MPs voted for 
the bill, 250 MPs voted against the bill and 19 abstained. In accordance with Article 96 of 
the Constitution, the bill would have required 268 votes to pass. When the quorum was not 
reached, the bill became void.3 The process that led to the rejection of the bill began in late 
December 2002.  
 
 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TURKEY AND IRAQ 
The relationship between Turkey and Iraq has always been full of ups and downs. 
In the 1980s, there was a large increase in trade between the two nations during the eight-
year Iran-Iraq war; however, the possibility of a change in the borders led to the 
reemergence of Turkey’s security concerns that began when all the Kurdish groups in 
                                                
3 TBMM, Genel Görüşme Tutanakları, 22. Dönem 1. Yasama Yılı, 39. Birleşim, March 1, 2003. 
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North Iraq united and came under the control of Iran, and the Iranian army came close to 
Kirkuk and began to threaten the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık oil pipeline. In the face of these 
developments, Turkey did not refrain from taking certain military measures along the Iraqi 
border. On the other hand, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) became a serious source of 
tension in the region. Iran viewed Turkey’s operation against the PKK in northern Iraq as 
an assault on all Iraqi Kurds, whom it saw as allies and therefore Tehran believed that 
Turkey was assisting Baghdad in the war. As Turkey’s operations against the PKK in 
northern Iraq increased, Iran – fighting alongside the Iraqi Kurds – and Turkey began 
confronting one another. 
The influence of the nation-state paradigm on Turkish foreign policy from the 
1930s to the 1990s led Ankara to perceive neighboring countries as threats to national 
security, negatively impacting Turkish-Iranian relations.4 During the Cold War, however, 
Turkey’s relations with countries in the Middle East, particularly Iraq, as a regional power 
followed the trajectory of the U.S. The nation-state and Cold War paradigms dominated 
foreign policy thinking and approach in Turkey. The relations with Iraq was handled in 
terms of the Kurdish question, and the possibility of the foundation of an independent 
Kurdish state was constantly kept on the Turkish agenda, eventually transforming into an 
element of fear. 
1990 and 1991 were turning points, as the parameters on which Turkish foreign 
policy was based both at the regional and international level since 1945 and 1965, 
respectively, finally changed. One could argue that this transformation took place because 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the war that ensued changed the balance of power in the 
Middle East, the Soviet Union disintegrated and the Cold War ended, and the Arab-Israeli 
peace process began. During this period, two additional factors began to play a 
fundamental role in Turkish-Arab relations: the PKK question and the water issue. 
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As the PKK began to significantly impact the relations between Turkey and Iraq, 
Turkey became involved in the question of northern Iraq due to the group’s abuse of the 
power vacuum. The refugees gathering at the Turkish and Iranian as a result of the Kurdish 
revolt against the Saddam regime in northern Iraq following the Gulf War led to an 
intervention by the U.S. and its allies. In the face of the possibility that these developments 
might lead to the disintegration of Iraq and thus the foundation of a Kurdish state in 
northern Iraq, Turkey and Iran grasped the importance of the territorial integrity of Iraq 
and began to cooperate; however, the continued ambiguity of the situation resulted in the 
escalation of tensions and conflict in the region.  
Starting in the 1990s, Turkey attempted to consolidate its regional power character 
in the Middle East. This diplomatic evolution reflected Turkey’s goal as a regional power 
to take advantage of the vacuum left by other superpowers/great powers in regional 
politics. This goal will inevitably occur as Turkey pursues an active and dynamic 
understanding of diplomacy that includes mediating and game-setting activities in order to 
gain a more permanent position in global affairs. Turkey has endeavored to highlight not 
only historical and cultural bonds, but also shared elements of identity, taking a more 
active role in the international politics of neighboring regions such as the Middle East, the 
Caucasus, the Balkans and the Mediterranean Basin. This has been important in 
strengthening trade relations and cultural bonds between Turkey and its neighboring 
regions. 
This change and improvement in Turkey’s Middle Eastern policy through has also 
helped Turkey to be seen as a normative power, meaning that it determines certain norms, 
acts in line with them, and contributes to their recognition at the international and regional 
level. Similarly, the concept of soft power, which works in a more effective way than hard 
power, has been used to explain the effectiveness of Turkish foreign policy in the Middle 
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East. In this regard, Iraq has been handled from a more holistic perspective, rather than 
with the reflexes of a nation-state or Cold War paradigm.5 
Turkey’s commercial activities and efforts to increase trade with the region in the 
AK Party era6 have strengthened the country’s hand both in direct political relations and in 
diplomatic steps to find solutions to regional problems. The increase in trade volume based 
on interdependence during this era has become even more important in relations with Iraq, 
which are critical for Turkey in terms of both national security and economic resources and 
potential. This way, Iraq has ceased to be perceived as a threat and become a trade partner. 
Developments such as the reactivation of the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık oil pipeline and the 
increasing activities of Turkish companies in Iraq have strengthened bilateral relations.7 
Turkey is Iraq’s second largest partner in trade today.8 Iraq, in turn, has risen to the fifth 
largest importer of Turkish goods. Nevertheless, trade relations between Turkey and Iraq 
could expand in the areas of tourism and education. 
Political relations with Iraq was not left far behind economic relation ties, and steps 
have been taken to improve them further. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to 
Baghdad in 2008 marked the first visit from a high-level Turkish official to Iraq since 
1990, and although “the high-level cooperation approach”9 agreed upon during the visit 
became increasingly inactive over time, it has gained recent momentum. This process is 
being regarded as the beginnings of economic integration. Another critical turning point in 
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http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/DISPOLITIKA/Bolgeler/ortadogu/irak/Ortak%20Siyasi%20Bildirge.pdf 
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Turkish-Iraqi relations was in May 2009 when Prof. Dr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, who developed 
the “strategic depth” doctrine and argues in favor of strengthening relations with the 
Middle East, became the Minister of Foreign Affairs. His visit to Baghdad in August 2009 
was important in terms of the Bilateral High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council’s 
activities in the domains of diplomacy, security, energy and the economy. The Council 
aims to implement a common security framework, political dialogue, economic 
cooperation and cultural harmonization between the two countries.10 
To conclude, unlike other actors who continue to see Iraq as a risky partner, Turkey 
displayed a more active attitude in terms of both bilateral and multilateral relations 
between 2005 and 2011 and developed a “new partnership model” with Iraq, a country 
with which it has profound religious, linguistic, ethnic and historical bonds.11 Turkey has 
moved beyond being one of the neighbors of Iraq in terms of both foreign policy objectives 
and commercial activities and has taken important steps to become its partner and ally. In 
2012, however, this process has come to a halt when the Maliki government was founded 
with the support of the U.S. and Iran even though the Al-Iraqiya Movement won the 
elections. 
The Neighbors of Iraq Conferences were very significant for the Turkish foreign 
policy as well as for the region during this period. Having shaped its relations with Iraq 
through the elements mentioned above in this period, Turkey took significant steps to 
become an influential actor and to resolve the problems of the region through multilateral 
dialogue. When it came to power, Ak Party government was engaged in negotiations with 
the U.S in order to resolve the problem about launching the troops from Turkish soil. 
However when the resolution failed to pass from the Turkish National Assembly and when 
the crisis in the region deepened, Turkey tried to take an active part on this issue. Ak Party 
                                                
10 DEİK, Irak Ülke Bülteni. İstanbul: DEİK, 2010. 
11 Nasuhi Güngör, “Ankara-Erbil Hattında Yeni Dönem,” Star, April 2, 2010. 
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government aimed to revitalize the country’s relations with different actors in Iraq and the 
Middle East. These renewed relations soon paved the way for the birth of the Neighbors of 
Iraq Conference. The network formed during these meetings became an important element 
of Turkish foreign policy in the years that followed. The relations established through the 
Neighbors of Iraq Conference often played a facilitating part in Turkish foreign policy 
regarding the instability in Iraq, which began after the March 2010 elections and expanded 
into a bigger crisis in 2014.  
In fact, this conference was a starting point in changing the conceptualization of 
foreign policy in Turkey. After so many years, Turkey was engaging in with the Middle 
East through an initiative that it had launched for the first time. This engagement was 
different than any other political actions because of its intention to form multilateral ties 
with states that adhere to different ideologies in order to achieve stability and prosperity in 
the region. It was the formal end of the non-intervention policy for regional conflicts and 
regional politics that dominated most of Turkey’s Cold War history. For the first time, and 
at such a critical juncture in international and regional politics, Turkish foreign policy 
attempted to transform its foreign policy identity. After this period, Turkey was involved in 
almost all of the conflicts in the Middle East and tried to find solutions to problems in the 
region. The Turkish state’s identity in terms of Middle Eastern politics transformed from 
being a non-interventionist and outsider to an active insider and potential resolver of 
regional conflicts.  
 
 
THE FORMATION OF THE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES OF IRAQ 
MEETINGS  
The Iraq War represented a major change in the grand strategy of the only global 
super power, the United States, from the Cold War strategy of containment to pre-emptive 
 124 
 
action. After 9/11, the U.S. tried to redefine its National Security Strategy in order to 
eliminate the perception of vulnerability that emerged after the attacks. The U.S. 
transitioned to a new foreign policy platform by espousing a new security doctrine in the 
post-Cold War era. In accordance with this new understanding, the U.S. set its main goals, 
including the integration of China and Russia with the West, the construction of a new 
global order to strengthen freedoms, and the stabilization of the Middle East by 
empowering democracy and free market conditions in the region. In keeping with its new 
security-based foreign policy, the U.S. incorporated the concept of pre-emptive military 
interventions in other countries into its repertoire. 
With this new security paradigm, the U.S. regarded Iraq as a “rogue state” under 
the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein, and considered it a possible threat on the grounds that 
Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and would use these weapons against 
the U.S. and other Western countries. Therefore, the U.S. began preparations for a pre-
emptive military intervention in Iraq. The U.S., failing to secure a favorable United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution, embarked on a mission to form a “coalition 
of volunteers.” Concerned about the reactions of the regional countries to its illegitimate 
intervention in Iraq, the U.S. garnered support by establishing a “coalition of volunteers.” 
However, it failed to ensure legitimacy for its military intervention due to its failure to gain 
the support of the UN and the fact that pre-emptive wars are against international law. 
Various countries have developed initiatives to prevent an intervention by the U.S. 
and the “Coalition of willing” in Iraq. The most effective and long-lasting among these 
initiatives has been the Neighboring Countries of Iraq. With this initiative, Turkey aimed 
to prevent the invasion of Iraq by the U.S. and its coalition, and to protect Iraq’s territorial 
integrity and political unity, while simultaneously preparing the ground for a political 
solution by involving the neighboring countries of Iraq. Within the scope of this new 
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process, 12 meetings of foreign ministers were held, beginning with the first meeting in 
İstanbul on January 23, 2003. 
At first, under the leadership of Turkey, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Syria 
participated in this initiative to seek a genuine solution to Iraq’s problems. Later, 
participants from many countries and international institutions of regional and global 
importance attended these meetings as they comprehended the significance of this 
platform. The Meetings of the Foreign Ministers of Iraq’s Neighboring Countries have 
allowed neighboring nations to reiterate their commitment to the protection of Iraq’s unity 
and territorial integrity, and to find a common denominator to ensure calm and security 
within the country. These meetings have also been beneficial to convey to the international 
community the concerns and apprehension of regional countries that chaos in Iraq may 
cause problems not only regionally, but also globally. 
For Turkey’s new foreign policy, which was exposed to the international 
community through the attendance and organization of these meetings, regional problems 
necessitated regional solutions. While engaging with one of these Middle Eastern countries 
was approached with skepticism in the 1990s, Turkey started to engage with multiple 
actors from the region simultaneously. In fact, the new foreign policy encouraged foreign 
policy makers to take steps in order to actively engage and become involved in these 
regional initiatives. Ahmet Davutoğlu’s idea of pro-active and rhythmic diplomacy was a 
reflection of this new identity of foreign policy. 
The Meetings of the Foreign Ministers of Iraq’s Neighboring Countries have 
provided a critical ground for coordinated discussions on developments in Iraq, and they 
have given Iraq’s neighbors the opportunity to confirm their continued support for Iraq’s 
political and territorial integrity. In the final reports, emphases have placed on Iraq’s 
territorial integrity, political unity, rights of sovereignty and independence, as participant 
countries condemned the terrorist activity in the country in the strongest terms. 
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Accordingly, representatives have suggested the option of political dialogue from the very 
beginning, rather than a military intervention. A total of 12 meetings at the foreign 
ministers level were held, nine of which were official. 
 
 
Official Meetings: 
1. İstanbul  January 23, 2003 
2. Riyadh  April 18, 2003 
3. Tehran  May 28, 2003 
4. Damascus  November 2, 2003 
5. Kuwait  February 14-15, 2004 
6. Cairo  July 21, 2004 
7. Amman January 6, 2005 
8. İstanbul  April 28-30, 2005 
9. Tehran  July 8-9, 2006 
 
 
Unofficial Meetings 
1. İstanbul,   June 15, 2004 (Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers 
margin) 
2. Sharm El-Sheikh November 22, 2004 
3. New York  September 22, 2006 (UN Security Council margin) 
 
 
Expanded Neighboring Countries of Iraq Foreign Ministers Meeting 
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1. Sharm El-Sheikh May 4-5, 2007 (With the participation of the members of the 
Neighboring Countries Initiative, Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, and the 
G-8 Countries) 
2. İstanbul  November 2-3, 2007  
3. Kuwait  April 21-22, 2008 (With the participation of the Neighboring 
countries, Egypt, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Oman, Qatar, the UN Security 
Council’s P5, the G-8 and the UN, the Organization of Islamic Development, the 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the Arab League, the Cooperation Council for 
the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC), and the EU) 
 
 
THE MEETING OF NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES PRIOR TO THE 
OCCUPATION OF IRAQ 
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. administration has radically changed 
its political course. Following the invasion of Afghanistan, various attempts were made to 
find diplomatic solutions for Iraq.12 In order to prevent the probable military intervention 
in Iraq, the recently empowered AK Party invited the regional countries to İstanbul on 
January 23, 2003 for a Neighboring Countries of Iraq meeting to discuss the “Foreign 
Ministers’ Regional Initiative on Iraq.” The Neighboring Countries of Iraq initiative 
determined its mission as the protection of the territorial integrity of Iraq, and set as its 
objectives the prevention of the U.S. invasion of Iraq and a peaceful solution for the issue 
of the Saddam Hussein regime. To launch the process, the first meeting at the foreign 
minister level was held with the participation of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran and 
Syria, despite the stern response of the U.S., which was determined to invade Iraq. The 
meetings, in time, have transformed into a platform where regional countries have 
                                                
12 Held in İstanbul in 2003. 
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announced their support for Iraq’s territorial integrity, political unity and the Iraqi 
government.13 
The meeting convened with the objective of preventing the U.S. and its allies’ 
military intervention in Iraq and to seek a diplomatic solution. The Turkish Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs requested that Iraq fully comply with UNSC Resolutions 1284 and 1441 
for disarmament, and warned of the probability of military intervention if it did not 
comply. Although the main goal from the very beginning was to stop another military 
conflict in its region, which could cost thousands of lives and bring economic and political 
instability to the Middle East, the meetings was also used to exchange views and opinions 
in regards to the other conflicts and problems in the region. For instance, in the first foreign 
ministers meeting, officials also addressed the Palestinian issue, which was then in the 
third year of the 2nd Intifadah. 
Although there were different regional organizations, such as the GCC and the 
Arab League, this was a unique venue for the countries that attended the meeting. First of 
all, it was open for almost all of countries in the region that would be affected by armed 
regional conflict. Secondly, the main focus of the meeting was Iraq and the potential 
destabilizing impacts of a regional war. The goal of the participant countries was to create 
a win-win situation. The attendees include different actors from different countries with 
variant interests. Instead of trying to remain distant from Middle Eastern politics, Turkish 
foreign policy makers attempted for the first time to become architects of an initiative that 
deals with a very significant regional problem and whose membership extends across 
sectarian and ethnic divisions. This was the first of such an opening in Turkish history and 
a major revision in the identity of Turkish foreign policy. It demonstrates a more regional 
focus that emerged in Turkish foreign policy and a willingness to engage in the 
                                                
13 “Irak’a Komşu Ülkeler girişimi nasıl başladı?” CNN Türk, November 2, 2007. 
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construction of a new regional order in the Middle East through the actions of regional 
actors. 
During the summits and meetings, delegations held intensive talks regarding what 
messages they should send to the U.S. and Iraq both in the final reports and agenda items. 
The ministers argued over the Palestinian issue and discouragement of the U.S.’s 
preparations for war. There were also debates in regards to the list of participant countries. 
For instance, Saudi Arabia and Iran criticized the exclusion of Kuwait. The Turkish 
delegation, however, emphasized that Kuwait was not invited because it was directly 
involved in the issues at hand, but that the country had been informed regularly. In the two-
page final report released at the closure of the consultations, the ministers did not directly 
refer to the U.S. and Israel. However, they strongly appealed to the Iraqi administration 
and implicitly conveyed opposition to a U.S. military intervention attempt and Israel’s 
actions.14 
The delegations, stressing that war should not be an option to resolve this crisis, 
declared that the countries of the region did not wish to live through yet another war and 
all its devastating consequences. This was also Turkey’s position in regards to a possible 
war in Iraq from the very beginning of the crisis. The Turkish public was almost 
traumatized after witnessing the outcomes of the First Gulf War as well as the impact of 
the sanctions on civilians in Iraq, and hence they were very sensitive to the potential 
consequences of another conflict. The new Turkish foreign policy took into account the 
negative outcomes of previous conflicts and was actively engaged in preventing another 
major humanitarian disaster in the region.  
During the meetings, the delegations also urged the Iraqi government to take 
serious steps to restore peace and regional stability. The ministers asked Iraq to cooperate 
with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations Monitoring 
                                                
14 Ibid. 
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Verification and Inspection Committee (UNMOVIC), and to comply with UNSC 
Resolution 1441. In the same vein, the ministers asked Iraq to provide the requested 
information and material to the international institutions that were attempting to prepare a 
report on nuclear capabilities. In its statement, the delegation requested that Iraq initiate 
policies that would unambiguously inspire confidence in its neighbors, and it emphasized 
its support for the protection of Iraq’s territorial integrity and national unity. In the 
concluding statement, regional countries included multiple emphases on the territorial 
integrity and national unity of Iraq and repeated appeals for peaceful solutions as an 
implicit call against U.S. military intervention.15 
 
 
THE MEETINGS OF THE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES OF IRAQ FROM THE 
INVASION TO THE ELECTIONS (2003-2014) 
Five days after the meeting was held in İstanbul with the dignitaries of regional 
countries, U.S. President George W. Bush announced that the U.S. and its allies might 
strike Iraq without a UN resolution on January 28, 2003. Then, on March 17, 2003, he 
issued Saddam Hussein a 48-hour ultimatum to leave Iraq.16 After Hussein rejected the 
ultimatum, the allies launched Operation Iraqi Liberation on March 20, 2003.17 The 
Pentagon announced the end of war with the takeover of Tiqrit on April 14, 2003,18 and 
President Bush declared on May 1, 2003 that the U.S. had won the war.19 
                                                
15 “The Joint Declaration of Regional Initiative on Iraq,” Hürriyet Daily News , January 25, 2003, 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=the-joint-declaration-of-regional-initiative-
on-iraq-2003-01-25 
16 “Bush’tan Saddam’a ültimatom: Son 48 saat,”  NTV,  March 18, 2003, 
http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/206345.asp 
17 “Bombardıman ve kara harekatı başladı” Hürriyet , March 21, 2003, 
http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2003/03/20/264051.asp 
18 “Tikrit’te de Tık Yok,”  Hürriyet, April 15, 2003, 
http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=140281 
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The Foreign Ministers of the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Republic of Turkey, the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, the Arab Republic of Syria, the state of Kuwait, the Arab 
Republic of Egypt, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
held a meeting on April 18, 2003 with a focus on the danger of instability in Iraq, the 
formation of a future vision for the nation, and assistance for the Iraqi people.20 Bahrain 
and Kuwait were invited to participate in the initiative, beginning with the second meeting. 
After the meeting, the participants announced that they could not accept any interference in 
the internal affairs of Iraq. Turkey was again a major actor in the organization and 
diplomacy that brought these countries together to discuss the question of Iraq. The major 
outcome of this meeting was not different than the first one. The participating countries 
emphasized once again the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political unity of Iraq, and 
under the leadership of Turkey, they tried to integrate the platform of the Neighboring 
Countries Meetings within the process of restructuring Iraq in the post-Saddam period. In 
this vein, the regional countries announced their determination to hold meetings until the 
situation in Iraq returned to normal in the 9-article Riyadh Statement. This meant that the 
ad hoc meetings that Turkey initiated were shifting towards institutionalized gatherings. 
The 9-article final statement reflected the stance and demands of regional countries, which 
would endure for five years. 
In their statement, the ministers stressed the formation of a new government based 
on popular will, broad participation and full representation. As they agreed with the war for 
oil criticism that was purported by the opponents of the invasion, the ministers also 
underlined that the natural resources of Iraq must be allocated in accordance with the 
wishes of the legitimate Iraqi government and the Iraqi people. The U.S.’s observance of 
                                                                                                                                              
19 “Bush: Terörizme karşı zafer kazandık,” Hürriyet, May 2, 2003, 
http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2003/05/02/283209.asp 
20 Held in Riyadh in 2003. 
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these principles indicated that the regional countries, in fact, conveyed a message to the 
U.S.-led coalition.  
In the Riyadh joint declaration, regional countries reaffirmed the central role of the 
UN by issuing a message for the U.S. Pro-occupation countries and analysts had suggested 
that the UN would forfeit its relevance if it refused to issue a resolution in favor of a 
military intervention. In this view, the Riyadh statement, while addressing the U.S. and its 
allies, may be regarded as an indirect message to the UN, asserting that the organization 
cannot leave Iraq alone and must play a central role in the country after the war. The 
ministers who convened in Riyadh affirmed their countries' readiness to offer assistance to 
the Iraqi people, and to participate in international efforts, be they humanitarian assistance 
or the full reconstruction and rehabilitation of Iraq. The final communiqué of the meeting 
demonstrated that the change and transformation in Turkish foreign policy was also 
transforming the foreign policy of the region as a whole. Turkey’s approach to find 
regional solutions for regional problems was adopted by other countries in the region as 
well. Thus, Turkey increasingly became a norm-instead of a norm-taker in the politics of 
the Middle East.  
The impact of the meetings became clear after this second meeting. For the first 
time, the U.S. took a step to address the demands of the foreign ministers of the Iraq’s 
Neighboring Countries Meeting by acknowledging that Russia, France, Germany and the 
UN must play a more effective role in Iraq. The U.S. submitted a draft resolution to the 
UNSC in this spirit. As a matter of fact, on May 22, 2003, the UNSC unanimously 
approved the joint draft submitted by Spain, Britain and the U.S., and introduced it as 
Resolution 1483. In the document, the UNSC welcomed the resumption of humanitarian 
efforts and the appointment of a Special Adviser by Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Annan 
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appointed Brazilian UN Human Rights High Commissioner Sergio Vieira de Mello as his 
Special Envoy to Iraq for a four-month period.21 
Another major impact that Turkish foreign policy had on the meetings was in 
regards to Syria. Despite the Bush administration’s insistence that Syria should be 
considered a rogue state, Turkey had continuously emphasized its willingness to continue 
to engage with Syria. The improvement of relations between Turkey and Syria, especially 
after the Adana Protocol, represented a major change in Turkish foreign policy. In this new 
approach, Turkey decided to resolve its foreign policy problems with neighbors through 
diplomatic means and turned the crisis with Syria into an opportunity to jumpstart 
diplomatic and economic relations. Thus, Turkey decided not to follow U.S. policy in the 
region; instead, it continued its engagement with Syria and attempted to integrate 
Damascus into the international system. Its approach to Syria also influenced the approach 
of the meeting: nations expressed their disagreement with Ankara by voicing allegations 
against Syria, but they welcomed the news of the U.S Secretary of State’s intention to visit 
Damascus to discuss Syrian-American relations.22   
Next meeting of the Neighboring Countries of Iraq Meetings held in Tehran.23 On 
May 28, 2003, the countries of the region met to discuss the duration of the invasion of 
Iraq. In this meeting, the participants one more time emphasized the significance of the 
decisions taken in Riyadh summit and the necessity of close cooperation to achieve these 
goals. In addition to the reactions against the US, in this meeting Turkish foreign policy 
makers emphasized the need for a more comprehensive analysis of the situation in Middle 
East and the requirement for reform and development. This was also a signal of a regional 
                                                
21 “13 yıllık ambargo kalktı,” Hürriyet, May 22, 2003, 
http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2003/05/22/292403.asp 
22 “The Joint Declaration of Regional Initiative on Iraq,” Hürriyet Daily News , January 25, 2003, 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=the-joint-declaration-of-regional-initiative-
on-iraq-2003-01-25 
23 Held in Tehran in 2003. 
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approach in foreign policy of Turkey. Turkish foreign policy makers, unlike earlier periods 
started to consider Turkey, beside Europe, Asia and Africa a part of the Middle East as 
well and thus deliberate on the necessity to reform its domestic and foreign policy as well. 
During the meeting in Tehran, then Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül, emphasized 
this issue by stating that, "In short, we must first put our house in order." Gül reminded that 
the Muslim world has a spiritual heritage of peace, harmony, tolerance and affection, and 
he urged Islamic countries to establish a new vision in which good governance, 
transparency and accountability reign, the fundamental rights and freedom and gender 
equality are upheld, and there is no place for blunting rhetoric and slogans.24 Thus, instead 
of being a status quo state Turkish foreign policy makers started to emphasize the necessity 
of change in the Middle East and slowly took a step towards being a more revisionist 
power in the region. For the first time in the history of Turkish Republic, Turkish foreign 
policy makers offering constructive criticisms in a regional meeting without any protest 
from other countries.  
In Tehran, the ministers and delegation leaders agreed to express solidarity with the 
Iraqi people in the spirit of Islamic brotherhood, and to reaffirm the imperative of respect 
for the sovereignty, political independence, national unity, territorial integrity and stability 
of Iraq. The ministers and delegations leaders thus decided to continue to hold meetings 
until normalcy, security and stability were fully restored in Iraq.25 During this meeting 
Turkey emphasized the need for a more regional approach and further interaction and 
integration between nations. Turkey’s tone became more assertive as time passed, as 
                                                
24 “İslam dünyasına Gül dersi,” Milliyet, May 29, 2003, 
http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2003/05/29/dunya/adun.html 
25 “The Joint Declaration of Regional Initiative on Iraq,” Hürriyet Daily News , January 25, 2003, 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=the-joint-declaration-of-regional-initiative-
on-iraq-2003-01-25 
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Turkish foreign policy makers became more comfortable and confident in their approach. 
For instance, Gül suggested: 
We should leave the confrontational period behind us. As the immediate 
neighbors of Iraq, we should assist their people in every possible way we 
can. We should act in a manner that will enhance the process of Iraqi 
national reconciliation. We should remain vigilant against their 
disintegration. We should cooperate with the parties in Iraq along the lines 
of the Security Council resolution. And we should impress upon all on how 
Iraq’s neighbors wish to see this country as a bastion of stability in the 
region. In short, the message that will emerge from our meeting today 
should be one that stresses our vision for a stable, prosperous, free and 
united Iraq, and that extends our hand for cooperation for the Iraqi 
transition. We should be aware that the world community is watching us, 
because we are so important and have so much to offer to Iraq.26  
As they wrapped up the meeting, the ministers underlined most of the statements 
emphasized in previous meetings. They also welcomed all the steps taken by the UN and 
the Interim Government of Iraq in preparing the ground for the full participation of all 
Iraqis in the political process by holding general elections before the end of January 2005, 
as envisaged in UNSC Resolution 1546.  They also stressed the need for enhancing mutual 
border security cooperation between their countries within the framework of existing 
bilateral agreements. The timing of this meeting overlapped with the increase in terror 
attacks against civilians in Iraq. Therefore, the participants also condemned terrorist acts 
against people, humanitarian institutions, foreign workers and transporters, diplomatic 
missions and international organizations, as well as religious Holy places in Iraq. They 
expressed their readiness to provide training and equipment if requested to the Iraqi police 
force and border guards in order to assist the Iraqi government with restoring stability. 
As part of additional efforts, the Foreign Ministers of Kuwait, Jordan, Iran, Syria, 
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Lebanon and Turkey convened in Damascus on November 1-2, 
                                                
26 T. C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı, “İslam Konferansı Teşkilatı Dışişleri Bakanları Toplantısı Marjında 
Gerçekleştirilen Irak Konulu Toplantıda Yapılan Konuşma,” May 28, 2003. 
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2003.27 The participants stressed the restoration of security in Iraq.28 Formulas to bring 
peace to Iraq “without troop deployment” were also among the main subjects discussed. 
Distinct from the previous meetings held in İstanbul and Riyadh, the Damascus meeting 
expressed full solidarity with the Iraqi people and discussed ways to accelerate the transfer 
of authority to Iraqis as quickly as possible.29 Following this meeting, Turkish foreign 
policy started to focus more on the issue of Iraq’s internal stability and the peaceful 
resolution of conflicts between different groups in the country. This was also a major 
departure from mainstream Turkish foreign policy because of its emphasis on the domestic 
politics of another country. Regional peace and stability necessitated constancy in all 
countries in the region and thus Turkey departed from its earlier non-interference policy 
for the sake of regional harmony. From this point on, Turkish foreign policy makers took 
an active role in trying to mediate disputes among different factions and sects in Iraq.  
Regional countries convened for a fourth meeting to concentrate on escalating 
violence and terror despite the appointment of a United Nations Special Envoy and the 
establishment of the Iraqi Transitional Governing Council on July 12, 2003. Nations used 
the Neighboring Countries of Iraq Meetings as a platform to discuss the latest 
developments not only in Iraq, but also in the whole region; they also issued a statement 
condemning the Israeli Air Force operation in Syria on October 5, 2003. The congregation 
discussed the current situation in Iraq as a contribution to the objective of enhancing the 
unity and independence of Iraq and its sovereignty over its natural resources as recognized 
by Security Council Resolution 1511. The ministers agreed to express their sympathy and 
full solidarity with the Iraqi people with regards to their suffering due to the serious 
                                                
27 Held in Damascus in 2003. 
28 “Şam komşuları ağırlayacak,” Radikal,  October 29, 2003, 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=93679 
29 “Irak’a komşu ülkeler toplantısı başladı...,” Milliyet,  November 2, 2003, 
http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2003/11/02/son/sontur14.html 
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deterioration of security and economic conditions. They rejected any measure that might 
lead to the disintegration of Iraq, and once again reiterated their respect for Iraq’s 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and political unity.30   
The meeting was attended by the foreign ministers of Syria, Iran, Turkey, Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan and Egypt.31 The seven ministers urged the restoration of security 
as quickly as possible and pledged to aid the Iraqi government in ensuring the integrity of 
its borders. On Turkey's initiative, the group acknowledged the danger that terrorist 
organizations in Iraq pose to neighboring nations and called upon the Iraqi administration 
to work towards eliminating this threat. Thus, the Iraqi administration has been asked to 
cooperate with Turkey in the fight against terrorist organizations.32 
Following the 2003 meetings, the “Agreement on Political Process” was signed on 
November 15 by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III of the Coalition Provisional Authority 
(CPA) and Jalal Talabani of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), which pledged to transfer 
governmental control to Iraqis by July 1, 2004. According to the agreement, the 
transitional government would be elected by a Transitional National Assembly made up of 
regional assemblies. The coalition forces, trying to resolve their legitimacy problem, did 
not welcome the regional countries’ idea to let the UN play a more central role in the 
process. 
Next, Kuwait hosted the fifth ministerial meeting on February 14-15, 2004. Foreign 
ministers from Iraq's six neighboring countries, Egypt and Bahrain, as well as the UN 
representative to Iraq, Lakhdar Brahimi, and the Iraqi delegation responded to the 
                                                
30 “Final Statement of  The Meeting of The Foreign Ministers of Iraq’s Neighboring Countries 
Damascus,” November 2, 2003. 
31 “Iraq’s Neighbors Discuss Effects of War,” Latimes,  November 2, 2003, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2003/nov/02/world/fg-syria2 
32 “Iraq’s Neighboring Countries Call for Security and Integrity of Borders,” Today’s Zaman, 
November 3, 2003, http://www.todayszaman.com/news-3841-iraqs-neighboring-countries-call-for-security-
and-integrity-of-borders.html 
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invitation extended by the State of Kuwait. For the first time, the meeting was held in a 
country that was not among the founders of the regional initiative. The ministers also 
welcomed the participation of Iraq. In addition, Brahimi’s participation in the meeting 
helped solidify the official bond between the initiative and the United Nations, as the 
minister expressed his support of an enhanced role for the UN to enable it to assist in Iraq’s 
transitional period. Still, regional countries criticized Iraq for not responding to previous 
invitations and for failing to attend the Damascus Meeting in November 2003, although the 
Interim Iraqi Foreign Minister had been officially invited. In the meeting, Egypt defined 
the protection of Iraq’s democratic structure as a simple task, and indicated that trade 
relations and intelligence cooperation between Turkey and Iraq must be improved and 
accelerated.33 
Participants commended the decision of the Iraqi people to bring to justice to the 
leaders of the previous regime—particularly the former President of Iraq—by trying them 
for their crimes against humanity and calling upon all states not to provide them safe 
haven. The representatives affirmed the importance of continuing the meetings of the 
neighboring states. The ministers decided to convene further meetings, and they welcomed 
the offer by the Arab Republic of Egypt to host the forthcoming meeting.34   
Turkish Foreign Minister Gül, who represented Turkey in the meeting, expressed 
the necessity of cooperation and coordination among the countries of the region in order to 
speed up stabilization: 
We raised our collective voice in a manner unprecedented in the modern 
history of this region. The very fact that we could assume a common 
posture on Iraq attests to how deeply our security and well-being is 
interlinked, and how clearly we all come to recognize this and all of us 
know very well that the terrain on which the Iraqis are striving to establish 
                                                
33 “Mübarek’le mesai,” Radikal, September 2, 2004, 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=105544 
34 “The Final Communique of the Fifth Conference of the Foreign Affairs Ministers of Iraq 
Neighboring States Kuwait,” February 14-15, 2004. 
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their new way of life is a very difficult one. Terror continuously claims lives 
of many. Only this week two successive suicide bombings resulted in the 
death of more than one hundred young Iraqis who wished to assume duties 
for their country’s security. The vicious terror has already caused heavy 
losses and untold suffering to all segments of the Iraqi society. Our 
sympathy is with them and we stand by all Iraqis in helping overcome this 
difficult phase.35  
He also mentioned solutions to these problems and discussed their execution:  
We should take confidence in having claimed the ownership of our own 
region. We can equally play our respective role in linking our region with 
the security and well-being of entire Middle East, with the Mediterranean 
and even with the southern Eurasian geography. We should prepare 
ourselves to take the further step of building overall confidence in our wider 
region. Like Europe did after two world wars, we should draw our lesson 
from the successive conflicts and wars that constantly undermined our 
stability and well-being. With political resolve and inspiration, we can 
create our own multilateral framework for cooperation and security. We 
deserve prominent roles in these changing times, and are capable of 
assuming them.36 
Thus, Turkish foreign policy makers were extremely insistent on keeping the major 
goals of the meeting on the agenda and wanted foreign policy makers in other countries to 
focus on the stabilization of the region and avoid any competition that would challenge this 
goal. Although neighboring countries did their best to help the Iraqi people and the 
occupation forces increased their efforts to control the insurgency, violence continued to 
escalate. Photos of prisoners being tortured in the Abu Ghraib Prison were leaked to the 
international media in April 2004,37 putting the coalition forces in a difficult spot.38 
Despite the violence, scandals and instability, the transfer of sovereignty to Iraqis, as 
envisaged in the Agreement on Political Process in 2003, was realized on June 28, 2004.39 
                                                
35 Ibid 
36 T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı, “Irak’a Komşu Ülkeler Toplantısında Yapılan Konuşma,” February 14, 
2004, http://www.tccb.gov.tr/sayfa/konusma_aciklama_mesajlar/kitap/65.pdf 
37 Held in Cairo in 2004. 
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After the Iraqi Transitional Government took office, the foreign ministers of the 
regional countries met in Cairo on July 21, 2004 to assess the new situation in Iraq and 
discuss various incidents in Iraq and the region. The Cairo Meeting convened on three 
main topics of discussion: methods of supporting the interim government to fulfill its 
political and security duties, threats caused by escalating violence and instability in Iraq for 
its neighbors, and Israel’s activities in Iraq.  
The participants supported the transfer of sovereignty to the interim government as 
a critical step, but affirmed that it was crucial to have an elected, fully representative 
government in Iraq. The foreign ministers also suggested that their countries would 
improve cooperation with the interim government. In the final statement, the ministers 
focused on political stability and security, expressing their support. The foreign ministers 
of Syria and Iran addressed Israel’s activities in Iraq, and the issue was added to the 
agenda. This effort indicated that the regional initiative was more than an ordinary meeting 
to provide assistance to the transition process in Iraq; it had also become a platform where 
regional countries’ perception of national issues could be discussed. 
The Cairo meeting also was a platform for Turkey to address its problems on the 
southeastern border, which stemmed from the instability in Iraq. After many years of 
avoidance and, in some rare instances, bilateral diplomacy, Turkish foreign policy makers 
brought up a problem that was considered a “domestic issue” by previous governments. 
Turkey discussed its perception of this issue with regional countries. The increasing 
terrorist attacks in Turkey due to the instability in Iraq helped neighboring countries 
understand the threat, and with the initiative of Turkey, it was added to the agenda of the 
meeting. These discussions were included in the final statement of the initiative, where 
participating nations emphasized that the terror threat to neighboring countries emanating 
from Iraqi territory must be dealt with. Turkey’s initiative added a new dimension to the 
regional initiative, which included the ministers of Internal Affairs and security officials 
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from neighboring countries. Thus, the meetings that were intended to be a forum only for 
states gained a more successful and institutional framework through the addition of a 
security dimension.  
At the meeting, the foreign ministers, Iraq's Arab neighbors, and representatives 
from the UN, the EU, the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic States cautiously 
endorsed U.S.-sponsored plans for national elections in Iraq. The representatives approved 
a final declaration, which condemned "terrorism," pledged to follow a policy of "non-
interference," and stressed a commitment to elections in Iraq, under the auspices of the 
UN, for a transitional government responsible for drafting a permanent constitution.40 
 
 
IRAQ’S NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES MEETINGS IN 2005 
The year 2005 was shaped by the elections and Iraq’s new political structure in the 
post-Saddam era. Despite escalating violence, terror and instability, electoral registrations 
started on November 1, 2004. However, the administration declared a state of emergency 
on November 7 due to uncontrollable violence. This cast a shadow over the elections. A 
few weeks before the January 2005 General Elections in Iraq, the regional countries 
gathered for the seventh meeting of Iraq’s Neighboring Countries on January 6, 2005 in 
Amman, Jordan. The regional initiative urged all segments of Iraqi society to participate in 
the forthcoming elections. The ministers also affirmed the right of the Iraqi people for a 
secure and stable life and for the free determination of their future through democratic 
means. Deteriorating conditions in Iraq presented a clear threat to both the elections and 
neighboring countries; thus, the initiative focused on this instability.  
                                                
40 “Iraq’s Doubtful Democracy Will Not Inspire Others,” Common Dreams, December 1, 2004, 
http://www.commondreams.org/headlines04/1201-23.htm 
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The Iraqi people headed to the polls on January 30, 2005 under the shadow of terror 
and a Sunni boycott. Only 8.5 million out of 14 million possible voters cast their ballot and 
turnout settled at 58 percent. However, in regions heavily populated by Kurds, the turnout 
varied between 80 percent and 89 percent. The ratio was between 59 and 73 percent in 
Shiite neighborhoods. In the province of Anbar, where the Sunni boycott was quite 
effective, the turnout was considerably low, at 2 percent. The Sunni turnout varied between 
29 percent and 34 percent in general. Mostly supported by the Shiites, the United Iraqi 
Alliance won 140 seats in the 275-seat Iraqi Parliament, becoming the strongest faction. 
The Kurdish Alliance gained 75 seats and became the second strongest group, as the Iraqi 
List of Iyad Allawi settled for 40 seats. The other nine parties sent a total of 20 
representatives to the Iraqi National Assembly.41 
With this formation, the National Assembly of Iraq began writing a new 
constitution, which was one of the most critical steps in the construction of the new 
system. As Iraq started the constitution-drafting process following the elections in January, 
the regional countries met again in İstanbul on April 29-30, 2005 to assess the situation and 
extend their full support for the country’s democratic transition process. The regional 
initiative expressed their strong desire that the elected bodies pursue and complete the 
political transition in an inclusive, transparent and democratic manner, which would ensure 
the participation of all Iraqis in the political, economic and social rebuilding of the nation. 
The ministers stressed the pivotal role that the United Nations should play in this new 
phase, where consensus building and articulation of a unifying constitution would become 
paramount. 
The meeting in Istanbul was opened by the then-Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan. Ashraf Qazi, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, also 
                                                
41 Gökhan Çetinsaya, “30 Ocak 2005 Irak Seçimleri Sonrası Irak,” SETA Yorum, January 5, 2005, 
http://setav.org/tr/30-January-2005-irak-secimleri-sonrasi-irak/yorum/270 
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attended the meeting. The participants convened to assess the new situation in Iraq 
following the general elections of January 2005. Turkish Foreign Minister Gül stressed the 
importance of political unity and the territorial integrity of Iraq. Addressing the elections, 
Gül said, “It would have been much better if Sunnis had participated in the elections.”42 
These statements were in direct contradiction with Turkey’s earlier position regarding non-
interference in the domestic affairs of the other countries in the Middle East.  
The four main goals of Iraq’s Neighboring Countries were crystallized during this 
meeting: they pledged to assist the development of Iraq, to keep neighboring countries on 
common ground, to contribute to regional stability, and to help neighboring countries 
contribute to the international stage.43 During his speech, then-Minister of Interior 
Abdülkadir Aksu said that everyone should have an equal say in preparing Iraq’s future in 
order to facilitate peace and security in the nation. In terms of sustainable stability, Aksu 
highlighted border control as the most urgent issue. Participants welcomed the rising 
awareness of the international community towards the fight against terror. However, they 
shared concerns that a discourse associating Islam with terror had gained popularity, which 
was a negative development. Aksu emphasized that such discourses give terrorists the 
upper hand in the war against terrorism and cause a great deal of harm to intercultural and 
interreligious tolerance and dialogue.44 
The ninth Foreign Ministers of the Neighboring Countries of Iraq was held in 
Tehran on July 9, 2006. The Foreign Ministers of Iraq, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, 
Syria, Kuwait, Egypt and Bahrain, as well as the General Secretaries of the Arab League 
and the Islamic Organization Conference, and the UN Deputy Secretary-General, attended 
                                                
42 “Irak’a komşu ülkeler toplantısı İstanbul’da,” Hürriyet, April 28, 2005, 
http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=315302 
43 “Irak’a komşu ülkeler toplantısı başladı,” Sabah, April 29, 2005, 
http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2005/04/29/gnd98.html 
44 See on T. C. İçişleri Bakanlığı, http://www.icisleri.gov.tr/default.icisleri_2.aspx?id=3053 
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the meeting. The ministers reasserted their countries’ support for Iraq, expressing their 
concern about the ongoing acts of violence targeting civilians in Iraq.45 The 11-article final 
statement from the meeting stressed the significance of a broad-based government and the 
need to assist the nation in establishing stability and security in Iraq.46 
The foreign ministers emphasized the need to raise the readiness of Iraq’s defense 
and security forces, and to transfer defense and security responsibilities to them as soon as 
possible. In this context, the ministers welcomed the contributions of the Arab League and 
the OIC, as reflected in the Baku declaration and relevant resolutions.47 
At another interior ministers’ meeting, participants gathered in Amman, Jordan on 
October 24, 2008 to show their countries’ support for Iraq’s security. During this meeting, 
Turkish Minister of Internal Affairs Beşir Atalay expressed:  
As Iraq’s neighbors, we have gathered once again to pledge our support to 
the Iraqi people and the Iraqi government in their move toward greater 
stability and prosperity. We need to focus our efforts on stabilizing and 
reviving Iraq; our priorities should be parallel among us as well as with 
those of Iraqi government. Support of the new government in Iraq shown by 
the international community, especially by the neighbors of Iraq will 
facilitate the conditions for achieving lasting peace in Iraq. We should do 
our utmost to help Iraq regain stability and prosperity by also improving 
economic relations. In turn, Iraq needs strengthening cooperation with its 
neighbors in the political, security, economic, trade and other fields. We 
should also keep in mind that, in this world, and especially in our region, 
negative developments reinforce each other. Worsening tension and outright 
escalation in Palestine will disrupt our efforts directed at ensuring stability 
in Iraq. Therefore, the international community should not fail to see how 
negative the effects of worsening conditions in Palestine will have on Iraq. 
We must be vigilant concerning such side-effects and should do our best to 
restrain the escalation over there. We are never tired of reminding the 
utmost importance of the territorial integrity and political unity of Iraq to its 
neighbors and to the region.48 
 
                                                
45 Held in Tehran in 2006. 
46 “Komşuları Irak’a destek verdi,” Haber10, July 9, 2006, 
http://www.haber10.com/haber/35625/#.UmjRt3BSi6M 
47 “Tahran: Tahran’daki 9. Irak’a Komşu Ülkeler Dışişleri Bakanları Toplantısı,” Haberler, July 9, 
http://www.haberler.com/tahran-tahran-daki-9-irak-a-komsu-ulkeler-haberi/ 
48 “Neighboring countries gather in Amman to show support for Iraq’s security,” China View, October 
24, 2008, see. http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90777/90854/6520593.html 
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UNOFFICIAL MEETINGS  
In addition to these official meetings, which took place with the initiative of 
Turkey, there were also several gatherings that took place during the convention of foreign 
ministers at different summits. Dignitaries from Islamic countries met in İstanbul on June 
15, 2004 for a meeting at the foreign ministerial level. Along with representatives from 
Turkey, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, Jordan and Egypt, the foreign ministers of Iraq 
and Kuwait attended the İstanbul meeting for the second time.49 
In the same year, the Foreign Ministers of the Neighboring Countries of Iraq 
convened in Sharm El-Sheikh on November 23, 200450 with the objective of consulting on 
the implementation of the political process as envisaged by UNSC Resolution 1546.  
Participants in the meeting included the Foreign Minister of Egypt, Ahmed Abul Gheith, 
Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari and Foreign Minister Gül. Dignitaries also included 
the foreign ministers of the "Group of Eight" –Canada, France, Italy, Germany, Japan, 
Russia, Britain and the U.S.51 The objective of the summit was to provide the infrastructure 
for the January 2005 Iraqi General Elections. The ministers also encouraged the Interim 
Government of Iraq to continue the political process and urged non-governmental 
organizations to participate in the elections.52 
In Sharm El-Sheikh, the foreign ministers underlined the importance of broad 
political participation and the involvement of all individuals who reject violence in the 
political process. The conclusion statement also stressed the importance of stability and 
                                                
49 “Irak’a komşu ülkeler toplantısı bugün,” NTV, June 15, 2004, 
http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/274234.asp#BODY 
50 Held in Sharm El-Sheikh in 2004. 
51 “Irak’a komşu ülkeler toplantısı başladı,” Milliyet, November 22, 2004, 
http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2004/11/22/son/sonsiy21.html 
52 “Irak kavgası, Şarm el Şeyh’de,” Yenişafak, November 22-23, 2004, 
http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2004/November/14/p03.html 
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security in Iraq; therefore, it called upon Iraq’s neighbors to intensify cooperation in this 
direction. This meeting was considered a step towards achieving broader participation in 
Iraq, thus contributing to the success of the political process and providing solutions to the 
problems of Iraq.  
In another effort, the foreign ministers of Kuwait, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, 
Egypt, the UAE, Turkey and Syria, as well as then-OIC President Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, 
gathered for a meeting at the United Nations Headquarters in New York on September 22, 
2006.53 The foreign ministers recalled their previous meeting and the meeting of the 
ministers of interior, reiterating their determination to assist the government and people of 
Iraq in ensuring stability and security.  
Following the meeting where participants provided Iraq with “strong support,” 54 
Turkish Foreign Minister Gül met his Iraqi counterpart, Hoshyar Zebari, and conveyed that 
Turkey would work with the Iraqi people and the government even after the war. He 
expressed that all Iraqis are partners and neighbors of Turkey, saying, “We all are 
relatives.”55 In his meeting with then-UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, Gül also shared 
his views about the Middle East and the situation in Iraq.56 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
                                                
53 Held in New York in 2006. 
54 “ AB için TBMM erken toplanabilir,” CNN Türk, July 9, 2006, 
http://www.cnnturk.com/2006/dunya/07/09/ab.icin.tbmm.erken.toplanabilir/198871.0/index.html 
55 “Gül, Irak’a Komşu Ülkeler Toplantısı’na Katıldı,” Haberler, September 22, 2006, 
http://www.haberler.com/gul-irak-a-komsu-ulkeler-toplantisi-na-katildi-haberi/ 
56 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ““No:142 - 19-29 September 2006 tarihlerinde New York’da 
Birleşmiş Milletler (BM) 61. Genel Kurulu genel görüşmelerinin gerçekleştirilmesi hk.”, September 15, 
2006, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_142---15-eylul-2006_-19-29-eylul-2006-tarihlerinde-new-york_da-
birlesmis-milletler-_bm_-61_-genel-kurulu-genel-gorusmelerinin-gerceklestirilmesi-hk_.tr.mfa 
 147 
 
The Neighboring Countries of Iraq meetings represented an important departure 
from mainstream Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. For the first time, the 
Turkish government launched an independent initiative in the Middle East in order to 
contain a possible crisis resulting from the spillover of the invasion of Iraq. The initiative 
signaled a change in the state’s identity and conceptualization of Turkey’s role in the 
Middle East. It represented the emergence of a foreign policy that is more active and 
autonomous and that has a significant regional focus. The leaders of Turkey’s civilian 
foreign policy makers and the support of the public were particularly important for the 
change in the state’s identity and thus the transformation of its foreign policy. The 
Neighboring Countries of Iraq meetings were one of the early indications of this newly 
emerging identity.  
The first meeting of Iraq’s Neighboring Countries was held in January 2003 with 
Turkey’s initiative to prevent a possible war in Iraq. Later on, the meetings transformed 
into a platform that aimed to limit the negative impacts of the war on the region. 
Eventually, the agenda of these meetings shifted to explore ways to provide assistance to 
Iraq’s reconstruction process. The meetings constantly underlined the importance of 
healing the wounds of Iraqi society that was gravely harmed by an illegitimate military 
intervention, meeting the public’s needs, establishing a strong constitution with an 
independent, prosperous and democratic system, and the participation of all Iraqis in the 
decision-making process.  
In the aftermath of the occupation and in line with the progress made in Iraq’s 
institutional restructuring and the sensitivities of Iraqi leaders who were driven by an urge 
to regain the nation’s sovereignty, the Iraqi administration mistakenly believed that the 
“Neighboring Countries Initiative” was unnecessary. The U.S.’s attitude and political 
dynamics in Iraq played a role in this view. The U.S. had always remained aloof to these 
meetings, and the political dynamics of the country were always concerned with 
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maintaining the support of the U.S. A diplomatic note, dated July 30, 2011 and sent from 
the Iraqi Embassy to the Saudi Foreign Ministry, stated that the Secretariat formed for the 
Interior Ministry advisers in the framework of the Neighboring Countries of Iraq Initiative 
was no longer needed and that matters would be discussed at bilateral level. The Iraqi 
Embassy in Ankara issued a similar note, dated August 2, 2011. The note, however, made 
no reference to the Interior Ministries. In this frame, it may be concluded that the meetings 
had been ended by de facto. 
 This left most of the well-thought out recommendations unenforced. If they were 
applied and implemented thoroughly, these recommendations could have been very critical 
in the peaceful resolutions of the conflict in Iraq and stability in the region as a whole. The 
situation in Iraq today demonstrates how useful these recommendations could have been 
for the future of Iraq. 
Although it had a limited impact, the Neighboring Countries of Iraq meetings were 
critical in terms of Turkey achieving its goal of becoming a regional and global foreign 
policy actor under the AK Party’s rule. The Party’s attitude towards the Iraqi issue became 
a critical test to prove its adequacy both inside and outside Turkey. First of all, all global 
actors saw that Turkey, with its pro-active stance on the Iraq question, had already 
departed from the foreign policy understanding of the old period. 
During these meetings, the transformation of Turkish foreign policy makers’ tone 
and the departure from the previous identity of Turkish foreign policy was easily 
observable. Turkish foreign policy makers become more regionally-oriented and more 
willing to engage and discuss regional issues with their counterparts in neighboring 
countries. As part of the policy of “regional problems necessitate regional solutions,” the 
Turkish government initiated a platform to discuss regional problems with neighboring 
countries. It was also interesting to see that Turkey’s perception of itself geographically 
was also altered as a result of these meetings. Instead of trying to avoid the label of a 
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Middle Eastern country, Turkish foreign policy makers started to recognize that they are 
also a part of the geography and thus need to play a part in the resolution of conflicts in the 
region. Without this change in Turkey’s foreign policy identity, it would have been 
inconceivable to organize, initiate and lead regional organizations like the Neighbors of 
Iraq meetings. Another important dimension of these meetings was that for the first time, 
Turkish foreign policy makers were engaging in regional arrangements without expecting 
the leadership of the U.S. or any other Western power. It was a more localized initiative 
than any other groupings that had previously emerged. Turkey started to have a more 
autonomous foreign policy identity starting from the Iraqi crisis. Later, in several 
instances, the impact of these changes on foreign policy making was observed. 
The Neighboring Countries of Iraq meetings have had a serious impact on Turkish 
foreign policy, the foreign policy bureaucracy and the reflexes/reactions of the state. The 
meetings have played a significant role in returning to the Middle East, where Turkey had 
clearly drifted away from in the aftermath of World War I. Turkish modernization and 
Westernization, as an important internal issue in Turkey, has been tested by the Iraq 
question. 
After many years, Turkish bureaucracy had to deal with the official and unofficial 
delegations that were involved in these conferences. The Turkish military tutelary regime, 
which overthrew the elected government in 1997 for allegedly being “politically Islamist,” 
had to directly deal with different Islamic groups in 2003. Capability issues in Turkish 
foreign affairs have surfaced as well. The cost of keeping neighbors at bay for so many 
years has come to light. Although the capacity problem could not be resolved immediately, 
the adaptation issues have been mostly eliminated due to the political capital afforded by 
the AK Party’s continued rule. 
Contacts established during these meetings proved fruitful in the crisis that broke 
out during the 2005 Iraqi general elections. As the U.S.’s project to incorporate Sunnis into 
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the democratization process came to a deadlock, Turkey came into play. The political 
capital accumulated throughout the conferences was used to persuade different Sunni 
groups to participate in the 2005 elections. Turkey was partly successful in these efforts. 
The real outcome was seen during the 2010 general elections in Iraq. Thanks to Turkey’s 
support and persuasion, various Shiite, Sunni and Turkmen groups joined the elections 
under the Iraqiyya umbrella and succeeded. The Iraqiyya Movement, as the winner of the 
elections, has, therefore, become the only movement embracing the diversities of Iraq. This 
is because other parties that joined the election only represented the Shiite or the Kurds. In 
this regard, it may be said that the Iraqiyya has a structure resembling that of the 
Neighboring Countries of Iraq meetings. As the Iraqi crisis has deepened in 2014, the need 
– although undeclared – for the Neighboring Countries of Iraq platform has been expressed 
in various ways.  
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HAMAS’ VISIT TO TURKEY IN 2006 
 
 
One of the most serious reflections of the paradigm shift that occurred in the AKP-era 
Turkish foreign policy, the dimensions of which we have tried to describe in earlier 
sections, was the visit paid to Ankara on February 16, 2006 by Khaled Meshaal, the leader 
of Hamas’ Political Bureau which won 76 seats in the 136-member Palestinian Assembly 
in elections on January 25, 2006. Khaled Meshaal’s visit represented a departure from the 
nation-state centric, pro-Western orientation of Turkish foreign policy. Despite the 
criticism of the international media, Turkey demonstrated its commitment to integrating 
Hamas into the Arab-Israeli peace process. Turkey continued to play a constructive role in 
mediating the disputes between Israel and Hamas in the 50-day conflict during the summer 
of 2014. While the case represents a missed opportunity for long-term peace in the region, 
it shows how a change in the foreign policy identity of Turkey make it possible for policy 
makers to meet and engage with Hamas, which is considered as a terrorist organization by 
Western countries. 
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Turkey’s engagement with Hamas marked a major departure from its traditional 
foreign policy in three ways. First, through direct contact with Hamas, Turkey for the first 
time opened its foreign policy to non-state actors instead of limiting itself within the 
nation-state paradigm. In this sense, Turkey was one of the first actors in the region to 
recognize the significance of non-state actors. Building up diplomatic channels and 
pursuing a multi-dimensional foreign policy have become significant elements of foreign 
policy making in Turkey. Turkey’s experience in Iraq was particularly valuable for foreign 
policy makers to establish a method for interacting with competing actors. In the following 
years, Turkey leveraged this experience effectively to encourage the participation of Sunni 
groups in the political process in order to minimize the sectarian conflict in the country. 
This experience colored Turkey’s engagement with Hamas just after its electoral victory. 
Turkish government recognized Hamas as a major factor in regional politics and wanted to 
open a channel of communications with them. Such a move began a new epoch of Turkish 
foreign policy.  
Second, Turkey’s attempt to communicate with Hamas after the elections made 
clear its newfound investment in mediating a potential peace process in the Middle East. 
Historically, Turkish foreign policy makers distanced themselves from the conflict in 
Palestine. Although Turkey generally voted on the issue in unison with Arab countries in 
the UN and other international organizations, it continued to engage in indirect diplomacy 
with Israel. Upon the breakout of major armed conflicts in the region, Turkish foreign 
policy makers typically issued passive condemnations of violence instead of making 
positive contributions to end the crises. Whatever declarations of intention they made to 
engage meaningfully in the resolution process were rarely fulfilled and often insincere. Yet 
under the AKP, the country demonstrated its remarkable ability to pursue warming 
relations with Hamas, Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) 
simultaneously. Especially with the suggestions that Turkish foreign policy makers gave to 
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Hamas officials during their visit, in terms of denouncing violence and recognize the 
constraints of legal and legitimate political arena, Turkey tried to contribute to a potential 
peace process in the region, which was a unique episode for Turkish foreign policy makers, 
most of whom are not accustomed to engaging in dialogue with multiple actors from the 
same country. This was made possible by the change in the identity of Turkish foreign 
policy in a few years before Hamas took power in the elections. In fact, following 
Neighbors of Iraq meeting, Turkey improved its ability to juggle the demands of multiple 
actors from the same country and used this experience to inform its negotiations with 
Hamas. 
Third, Turkey’s engagement with Hamas countered the country’s previous 
commitment to Western initiatives in the Middle East. By addressing the humanitarian 
crisis in Palestine, Turkey approached the Arab-Israeli conflict in new way and established 
its foreign policy autonomy from the West. Case in point, Turkey’s invitation to Khaled 
Meshaal took place despite ample protests from the United States. While Meshaal was in 
Turkey, U.S. Congress sent a scathing letter to the Turkish administration criticizing the 
initiative and asking Turkish officials to cut off engagement that would unconditionally 
“legitimize” Hamas. The newly emerging state identity of Turkey allowed Turkey to 
develop more autonomous foreign policy in the Middle East. Especially when it is 
analyzed in the context of Turkey’s relations with the state of Israel that started to be 
developed during the 1990s, the Hamas visit can be considered as a representation of major 
transformation of foreign policy.1  
Khalid Meshaal’s visit took place after the Palestinian Legislative Elections in 
2006. The elections resulted in a victory for Hamas with 44.5 percent of the votes, whereas 
Fatah received only 41.5 percent. Hamas also won a clear majority of seats in the 
parliament. The election surprised major Western powers, including the United States, who 
issued statements expressing reservations about the voting results. For instance, the 
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Secretary State of the United States Condolezza Rice stated that despite the group’s 
democratic success, the U.S. still considered Hamas a terrorist organization. She said, “a 
party could not have one foot in politics and the other in terror. Our position in Hamas has 
therefore not changed.”1 On the other hand, Javier Solana, the foreign policy chief of EU, 
recognized the validity of the Palestinian people’s democratic expression but said that 
Hamas must renounce violence in order to gain the support of the European Union.2 
During this process, the EU and U.S. debated the appropriate reactions to Hamas’ electoral 
victory; however, in the final analysis both of the actors did not consider Hamas as a 
legitimate Palestinian political representative.  
Despite censure from Western countries, Turkish policy makers decided to 
approach the issue from different angle. Policy makers believed Hamas needed to be 
invited to join the conflict negotiations because they thought Hamas’ social base in Gaza 
would be an important factor in the peace process. Thus, unlike the traditional Turkish 
foreign policy where the country only interacted with other nation-states, the new Turkish 
foreign policy aimed to construct informal channels of communication with other actors. 
This approach developed from the early days of the AK Party government. To do so, 
policy makers subscribing to the new paradigm coopted other actors in order to invite them 
to the reconciliation process. In this sense, Hamas was a significant player in shaping the 
future of Palestinian politics and the fate of the peace process. After the election, Hamas 
gained legitimacy as the elected representative of the Palestinian people; to exclude such 
an actor from the process would hurt the peace process and stability in the region. Turkey 
expressed its recognition of this fact just days after the elections in Palestine. Officials also 
                                                
1 Scott Wilson, “Hamas Sweeps Palestinian Elections, Complicating Peace Efforts in Mideast,” 
Washington Post, January 27, 2006. 
2 “EU Says Hamas Must Change to Win its Support,”  DW, January 30, 2006, 
http://www.dw.de/eu-says-hamas-must-change-to-win-its-support/a-1876777 
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insisted that the international community must give Hamas a chance to contribute to the 
peace process and asked the Israeli government allow its participation.3 
Meshaal’s visit to Ankara took place immediately after the elections. A delegation 
from Hamas arrived in Ankara to meet with Turkish officials. Although they were publicly 
promised that they would be received by then-prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the 
Prime Minister’s office stated shortly thereafter that such a meeting would not be possible. 
Instead, Meshaal was received by then-foreign minister, Abdullah Gül, at the AK Party 
headquarters. Gül’s meeting with Hamas was heavily criticized by the U.S. Congress and 
Israeli government. The Israeli ambassador to Ankara refused the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs’ invitation to attend to a briefing on Hamas’ visit. Israeli spokesman Ra’anan 
Gissin drove home the country’s displeasure by asking how Turkey would react if the 
Israeli government hosted PKK-leader Abdullah Ocalan. Instead of showing sympathy to 
this comparison, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs called Gissin’s analogy baseless 
and wrong. Nevertheless, a few days after the visit, the Israeli ambassador to Ankara met 
with AKP leaders at the party headquarters to discuss both the Hamas visit and the future 
of Israeli-Turkish relations. After these meetings, the Israeli ambassador stated that 
relations had hit a minor crisis but that the bilateral relationship would stabilize.4 
Members of the American-Israeli community, joined by senior Democratic 
congressman Tom Lantos, also protested the visit. In his letter to Turkish Prime Minister, 
Tom Lantos stated that the visit would harm Turkish national interests and would weaken 
relations between Turkey and the United States. According to Lantos, the visit undermined 
the efforts of those who wanted Hamas to abandon its violent approach and to recognize 
                                                
3 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Dışişleri Bakanlığı Sözcüsü Namık Tan´ın Haftalık Olağan 
Basın Toplantısı,” February 2, 2006, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/2-subat-2006_-disisleri-bakanligi-sozcusu-
namik-tan_in-haftalik-olagan-basin-toplantisi-.tr.mfa 
4 “Reverberations Still Echoing After Hamas Official Visits Turkey,” JTA, 27 February 2006, 
http://www.jta.org/2006/02/27/archive/reverberations-still-echoing-after-hamas-official-visits-turkey. 
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the state of Israel. The letter not only sent shockwaves through U.S. and international 
media but also created a stir among the ultra-secular opposition in Turkey. The Ultra-
Secular elites in Turkey also criticized the visit as a move against the principles of 
conventional Turkish foreign policy.  
Turkey’s new understanding of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict surprised many in the 
U.S. policy community who had grown accustomed to seeing convergence between 
Turkish and U.S. policy approaches. The crisis over the March 1st Memorandum was 
considered an accident, and the initiatives that Turkey started in the region to create 
stability in the Middle East were regarded as a symptom of Turkey’s territorial concerns. 
Though some policy differences, such as the question of whether to isolate Syria for its 
state sponsorship of terrorism, were emphasized as part of the debate over Turkey’s 
“shifting axis,” the Hamas visit represented a distinct change in Turkish foreign policy 
toward greater autonomy, which was seen as a total departure from the pro-Western 
foreign policy track. Policy makers in Washington managed to establish a wide variety of 
opinion regarding the significance of this shift.   
For instance, pro-Israeli think tanks in Washington reacted harshly to the visit. 
They criticized Turkey for potentially hurting Turkey’s longstanding role as an honest 
broker in the dispute in the region between Palestinians and Israelis and for creating 
another major foreign policy breech between Turkey and the West.5 What was not 
understood among these circles, however, was Turkey’s new foreign policy identity, which 
aimed to establish channels of communications with all of the major actors in the region in 
order to become a major actor itself. Turkish policy makers were not interacting with 
different players in order to create “a shift of axis” or “turn away from the West”—rather, 
they were merely shaping a new identity in foreign policy.  
                                                
5 Soner Çağaptay, “Hamas Visits Ankara: The AKP Shifts Turkey’s Role in the Middle East,” The 
Washington Institute, February 16, 2006. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/hamas-
visits-ankara-the-akp-shifts-turkeys-role-in-the-middle-east 
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Despite the criticisms that were mentioned above Turkey stand behind its decision 
to host the Hamas delegation. During the talks, Hamas was advised that being a 
democratically elected power brought about new responsibilities, it would be for the 
benefit of peace in the region to act in line with them and become a legitimate actor of the 
international system and thus he should not open Israel’s right to exist to debate, abstain 
from violence and embrace the roadmap that came into being a result of Israeli-Palestinian 
talks.6 In a formal statement after the visit, Turkish foreign ministry stated that the request 
for the meeting came from Hamas, who won a democratic election and whose visit was 
important for Turkey to continue to play the constructive role that it has been playing in the 
region. The statement also underlined that Turkey made significant suggestions to Hamas 
to act more responsibly and constructive during this process.7 
Hamas’ statement seemed to confirm these sentiments after the group’s visit to 
Turkey. Upon returning to Gaza, Meshaal made the following comment: “We have taken 
the advice of Turkish authorities and listened to their suggestions, which we find serious 
and valuable. Candid suggestions are undoubtedly welcome by the Palestinian people. We 
will take them into consideration.”8  
The visit created major repercussions in international media, but it was also 
important in terms of Turkish state and its identity. On one hand, it was an unexpected step 
for the state establishment in Turkey to allow civilian authorities to take such a dramatic 
move without their consent. Likewise, it was a shocking development for many in Israel 
and the U.S. to have an administration in Ankara that assessed the Israeli-Palestine issue 
from a perspective different than that of the West and to host in Ankara an actor that had 
                                                
6 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Hamas Heyetinin Ziyareti hk.”  http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_25--
-16-subat-2006_-hamas-heyetinin-ziyareti-hk_.tr.mfa 
7 Ibid. 
8 Volkan Yıldırım, “Halid Meşal: Nasihat niteliğinde tavsiyeler aldık,” Hürriyet, February 17, 2006, 
http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=3947272 
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been viewed as a terrorist organization by the USA since August 10, 1997 and by the EU 
since 2003, for which it faced the threat of sanctions. 
Hamas’ visit revealed growing fissures in the civil-military structure of the Turkish 
government. Yaşar Buyukanit, who was then-Commander of the Land Forces and was 
expected Chief of Staff of the Turkish military, called Hamas a terrorist organization, 
thereby ignoring Hamas’ democratic mandate and reflecting the entrenched nature of 
Western political understanding in Turkey9 Thus, Hamas’ visit demonstrated a major crisis 
between civilians and the military in Turkey and demonstrated a major change in the 
nature of the Turkish state.   
Until recently, Turkey’s foreign and security policy was dominated by the military 
and foreign policy bureaucracy. In most instances, foreign ministers were regarded as 
puppets of the state establishment. The 1980 military coup institutionalized the hegemony 
of these policy makers by bringing the National Security Council under stronger control of 
the security sector. In doing so, the Council was given greater authority to determine 
foreign and security policy of the country, which proved relevant for Turkey’s relationship 
with Israel in 1990s when the National Security Council undertook major initiatives to 
improve relations with the country. Unlike other democracies where security agreements 
are approved with civilian oversight, most of the Turkey’s security agreements with Israel 
were authorized by the military, specifically Deputy Chief of Staff Çevik Bir. Such 
autonomous military action became almost a norm in foreign policy making of Turkey.  
For instance, Çevik Bir later wrote an article for a pro-Israeli journal about the need 
to improve relations between Turkey and Israel, a sort of manifesto for the development 
and consolidation of this partnership. According to Bir:  
The 1990s loom like the lost decade in the Middle East. The carefully-
constructed house of cards known as the Arab-Israeli "peace process" lies in 
a heap. Saddam Husayn still menaces his neighbors and the region. And the 
                                                
9 “Hamas terör örgütüdür,” Sabah, 4 March 2006, http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2006/03/04/siy107.html 
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prime export of the region, aside from oil, is fundamentalist-fueled terror, 
whose recent performance in Manhattan wrenched the city's tallest 
buildings from its skyline. In the balance sheet of stability, the 1990s left 
the Middle East in the red. But at the top of the plus column is one 
indisputable achievement: the Israeli-Turkish relationship.10 
Çevik Bir went further to argue that the U.S. needs to pay attention to the growing 
partnership between Turkey and Israel because their relationship would serve Western 
interests:  
As U.S. policymakers scan the ruins for bits of scaffolding with which to 
reconstruct a semblance of order, they should consider the Israeli-Turkish 
relationship. The ties between these two countries—democratic, pro-
Western, non-Arab—could provide the Middle East with stabilizing ballast, 
which is now a vital interest of the West. Yet theirs is a peculiar relationship 
with a complex history. Its potential may be very great indeed, but realizing 
it requires that the partnership be promoted and managed with utmost 
care.11 
This view was no different than the views of pro-Israeli experts in Washington, DC. 
Both groups considered Turkey’s relations with Israel and the Middle Eastern in zero-sum 
terms. Any détente with Middle Eastern powers was considered a threat to Turkey’s 
relationship with the West. For instance, Alan Makovsky, a well-known analyst in 
Washington wrote a piece on Prime Minister Erbakan, when he was trying Turkey to 
improve neighborly relations with the Middle Eastern countries. According to him, for 
instance, an improvement in economic relations between Turkey and Iran needs to be 
considered as a major threat to the Western world. He wrote:  
Shortly after Turkey's new Islamist prime minister, Necmettin Erbakan, 
signed a $23 billion gas pipeline deal with Iran, Thomas Friedman of The 
New York Times wrote an article titled "Who Lost Turkey?" In fact, Turkey 
is not really lost. It remains a secular, pro-Western, democratic state. 
However, the unprecedented emergence of an Islamist at the pinnacle of 
power raises a warning flag for Americans, who can do much to help insure 
that Turkey does not become "lost."12 
                                                
10 Çevik Bir and Martin Sherman, “Formula for Stability: Turkey Plus Israel.” The Middle East 
Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 4, 2002, 23-32. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Alan Makovsky, “How to Deal with Erbakan.” The Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1997, 3-8. 
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As in Bir’s article, Makovsky emphasizes Turkey’s identity and the necessity of 
Turkey to stay away from any interaction with Iran.  
The civilianization of Turkey’s civil-military relations dramatically impacted the 
Turkey’s foreign policy. Foreign and security policy making became a venue for civilian 
authorities, and public opinion began to play an important role in determining that policy. 
The civil-ization of foreign policy also included institutional measures to stop the impact 
of foreign policy. The structure of National Security Council changed to decrease the 
number of military members and increase the civilian elected leaders. While the Hamas 
visit was taking place the AK Party government still did not achieve full civilian control of 
military, -another military intervention took place in April 2007 ahead of presidential 
elections in Turkey. However they succeed to open a space for the civilians to be more 
active in foreign policy making of the country. This was a significant change from the 
previous episodes of the foreign policy making in Turkish history. The input of civilians 
who are accountable to electorates and who are susceptible to the public opinion started to 
transform the foreign policy identity of the state as a whole. In fact, the Hamas visit with 
the reactions of high level generals demonstrated that Turkish-Israeli relations were taking 
place in the faultline of civil-military relations. The military was not the only party that 
reacted to the visit: harsh criticism flowed from other institutions that represented state 
identity, including the presidency and the ultra-secular opposition. Although President 
Ahmet Necdet Sezer was not as vocal as Turkey’s military generals about the visit, he still 
he refused to meet with Hamas’ elected leader upon his visit to Palestine, a move 
interpreted as a deliberate snub to the government in Gaza.13 As a result, it appeared that 
President Sezer stood beside the military instead of his civilian colleagues on the issue.  
                                                
13 “Sezer’den Hamas Dersi,” Milliyet, 2005, http://www.milliyet.com.tr/sezer-den-hamas-
dersi/siyaset/haberdetayarsiv/04.06.2006/159385/default.htm 
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The ultra-secular opposition in Turkey also supported the decision of the military. 
As the head of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), Deniz Baykal claimed that the AKP 
administration sidelined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when it invited Khaled Meshaal to 
visit Turkey. He argued, “Turkey’s foreign policy has been dragged into inconsistency 
through private contacts and formers solidarities.”  He also stated that such a move could 
harm the relation between Turkey and the West.14 Thus, the main opposition party of 
Turkey mimicked the military in its accusations against the AK Party. The change that was 
taking place in foreign policy in Turkey also created some discomfort among the 
opposition ultra-secular groups and parties as well.  
Hamas’ visit was unprecedented in Turkish foreign policy history, in that the 
elected government—not the military or foreign policy bureaucracy—took the initiative to 
invite the group to Ankara. Deniz Baykal was particularly outraged by the administration’s 
choice to bring the group to Ankara. According to Baykal, the government did not alert 
various organs of state institutions of the visit prior to its occurrence; instead, diplomatic 
engagement was was undertaken in secret.15 This theme, which had previously been 
brought up at the time of the Expedition to the East, a series of visits to various Muslim 
countries by the Refahyol16 government, and led to the submission of a parliamentary 
question regarding these visits at the time, which had become popular once again.17 The 
state establishment that, the visit was considered almost a betrayal to these principles, even 
though high-level officials did not personally receive Khaled Meshaal, followed the 
                                                
14 “Baykal criticizes gov’t for Hamas visit,” Hürriyet Daily News, 18 February 2006. 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/baykal-criticizes-govt-for-hamas-visit.aspx?pageID=438&n=baykal-
criticizes-govt-for-hamas-visit-2006-02-18 
15 “Baykal Sıkıntı Yaratacak,” Radikal, 18 February 2006, 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=179035 
16 The coalition government formed by the Welfare Party (RP) and the True Path Party  (DSP). 
17 “Altından o çıktı,” Hürriyet, 18 February 2006, 
http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=3952035&tarih=2006-02-18 
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traditional structure and conduct of foreign policy making so faithfully. It was something 
that is regarded as unmatched for the identity of Turkish foreign policy. As mentioned 
before, the traditional government elite’s commitment to “secular foreign policy 
principles”18 and action as “a reluctant neighbor”19 to the Middle East, in the pre-AK Party 
period generated serious disturbances domestically.  
The CHP’s claims that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was bypassed were not 
completely unfounded, as the Ministry of Foreign affairs had long been regarded by 
secular elites as tool to protect the status quo in Turkey, from which they benefitted.20 As 
one writer observes:  
The diplomats of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarded themselves as 
foreign policy watchmen. Governments would come and go, but they were 
there to stay. They had to make sure that the ship of the state would not 
deviate from its route. Bureaucrats of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were 
ready to undermine the unconcerned plans of the elected politicians.21  
Secular politicians worked with the Turkish military to keep the country’s foreign 
policy pro-Western and passive.22 Pro-Western intellectuals, businessmen and journalists 
were also regarded as potential partners in the fight against civilian foreign policy makers. 
With the military, these diplomats considered themselves as the strongest protectors of 
                                                
18 Ömer Taşpınar, ““Turkey’s Middle East Policies: Between Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism.” Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, No. 10, 2008, 8, 
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/cmec10_taspinar_final.pdf; Hasan Ulusoy, One Policy, Many 
Identities: The Consistency of Turkey’s Foreign Policy With Special Emphasis on Its Security 
Dimension in the Post - Cold War Era. Istanbul: ISIS, 2007, 139. 
19 Henri J. Barkey, ed., Reluctant Neighbor: Turkey’s Role in the Middle East. Washington 
D.C.:United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996; Philip Robins, “The Foreign Policy of Turkey.” The 
Foreign Policies of Middle East States, ed. Raymond A. Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002, 315-336, 321. 
20 Şaban Çalış, ““Ulus, Devlet ve Kimlik Labirentinde Türk Dış Politikası.” Liberal Düşünce, Vol. 4, 
No. 13, 1999, 5-21. 
21 Malik Mufti, “Daring and Caution in Turkish Foreign Policy.” Middle East Journal, Vol. 52, No. 1, 
1998, 32-50, 43. 
22 Bülent Aras and Aylin Görener, “National Role Conceptions  Foreign Policy Orientation: The Ideational 
Bases of the Justice and Development Party’s Foreign Policy Activism in the Middle East.” Journal 
of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2010, 73-92, 79. 
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Turkey’s national interests and defense of human rights. Foreign policy was considered too 
important to be entrusted to civilians; thus, it the state bureaucracy and military 
paternalistically took control to maintain a passive, isolationist foreign policy oriented to 
the West.  
The AK Party changed that, however, transforming Turkish foreign policy from a 
passive, isolationist position to proactive engagement in matters relating to the Middle 
East. Yet this foreign policy activism that flourished under the AK Party should be 
differentiated from that of the state in the 1990s, when Turkey more actively engaged Syria 
and others in the region over concerns about the PKK.23 That so-called activism was 
adopted by the state in the interests of protecting Turkey’s security. As Mufti argues:  
Turkish generals turn to foreign policy activism not because they are after a 
new political regime or empire but because they aim to protect the “Six 
Arrows,” which they believe they have been entrusted with by Ataturk. 
Even when they appear active in foreign policy, they are in fact reactive, not 
proactive, and their desire to be active stems not from their ambition but 
from their fear.24  
The state of assertiveness and activism in the new foreign policy period, on the 
other hand, is motivated by a new vision of the region, not by fears such as divisionism, 
state collapse and theocratization. It should be emphasized that one of the key factors that 
enabled the paradigm shift in Turkish foreign policy is Turkey’s path to democratization 
under the AK Party. This democratic wave dramatically altered state identity in Turkish 
foreign policy. When foreign policy was under the control of Kemalist elites, relations with 
Israel improved largely because the elites believed ties with the country would open doors 
to Europe and the United States, not because the Turkish electorate demanded it. 
Moreover, when the Turkish state experienced an identity crisis in the aftermath of the 
                                                
23 Alan Makovsky, “The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy.” SAIS Review, Vol. 19, No. 1, 
1999, 92-113; Sabri Sayarı, “Turkey and the Middle East in the 1990s.” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 
26, No. 3, 1997, 44-55. 
24 Malik Mufti, “Daring and Caution in Turkish Foreign Policy.” Middle East Journal, Vol. 52, No. 1, 
1998, 32-50, 164. 
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Cold War due to the loss of its frontline status and thus prestige in international affairs, 
Turkish state representatives also lost their access in Western capitals and failed to 
challenge the Greek and Armenian lobbies in these capitals about anti-Turkey legislations 
in their Congresses. In order to provide access to Western capitals, Turkish foreign policy 
makers decided to approach to Israel, a powerful ally of the West. Losing frontline status 
also meant losing privileged access to the military and defense industry. The United States 
and Europe stopped or slowed down the sale of military equipment and weaponry to 
Turkey. The Turkish defense industry carefully followed the military confrontation 
between Iraq under Saddam Hussein and the United States, as Saddam Hussein started to 
fire SCUD missiles at Israeli cities. The heightened military capability of Turkey’s 
neighbors acted as a wake-up call for the domestic defense industry. Consequently, the 
state establishment launched a rapid military modernization campaign, which also brought 
Turkey and Israel together, because of the military-industry of the Israeli Defense Forces.  
Furthermore, the state establishment considered its burgeoning relations with Israel 
in 1990s as another anchor for Turkey in its secular and pro-Western orientation. Any 
resistance to the state’s plan to build relations with Israel was considered an attack against 
Turkey’s Kemalist heritage. Although the Turkish state establishment always described the 
relations with Israel one that was based on mutual interest and not against any third parties 
in the region, in the cognitive map of Turkish state there was a clear separation between 
pro-Western Israel and the Arab world. Even though Turkey balanced its efforts of 
engagement between Palestinians and Israelis, the Turkish elite saw themselves firmly 
planted on Israel’s side out of an unexpected cultural affinity. Starting from 1990s, any 
ripple in Turkish-Israeli relations was considered as a major threat to Turkey’s pro-
Western orientation. Thus, during this time, Turkey preferred to continue this Cold War 
foreign policy orientation instead of pursuing a more autonomous foreign policy. However, 
in the absence of Western desire to treat Turkey as an equal ally, Turkey tried to form this 
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link indirectly by improving its relations with the state of Israel. It was an artificial attempt 
to extend the Cold War mentality and Kemalist identity to the conditions of a changing 
world and ultimately failed. Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, organs of the state 
structure saw different benefits from engagement with Israel: the military saw the country 
as a unconditional supporter of military assets; policy makers regarded Israel as a way to 
court the West; and Kemalists viewed it was a way to consolidate Turkey’s Western, 
secular character. These views lost popularity, however, as the increasing democratization 
in Turkey transformed Turkish foreign policy identity.25  
As mentioned above, the invitation to Hamas was one of the first signs that the 
elected government was willing and able to use its power in foreign policy matters. 
According to Hakan Yavuz and Mujeeb Khan, this visit only occurred because it “was a 
great display of self-confidence on the part of Turkey in that it revealed the country’s 
belief that it could bring Hamas to the point of moderation.” They continue:  
It was important in that it pointed to the belief that an actor could come to 
have a say and earn trust through ambitious and unusual diplomatic efforts 
and in that it highlighted a new style of policymaking. The AK Party would 
later talk about this style as the soft power of Turkish foreign policy.26  
Nevertheless, Hamas’ visit fueled Western fears of political Islam. Many people—
from Israeli President Moshe Katsav to Member of the US House of Representatives and 
Co-President of the Turkish-American Friendship Group Robert Wexler—claimed that 
Turkey legitimized a Western-sanctioned terrorist organization by inviting Hamas to 
visit.27 A fast, prejudiced and inconsistent analogy was drawn between Hamas and the 
                                                
25 M. Hakan Yavuz ve R. Mujeeb Khan, ““Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict: 
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27 “Hamas Daveti Yanlış oldu,” Sabah, April 1, 2006, 
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PKK, and it was argued “the decision of Ankara to grant Hamas with a legitimacy it does 
not deserve was incomprehensible.”28  
Yet Western criticism failed to understand the changes at play in Turkey. Many 
scholars overlooked the nuances shaping Turkish society and assumed that by inviting 
Meshaal, Turkish officials intended to reorient Turkey to the Syria-Iran axis.29 This 
approach unduly emphasized the power of individual actors at the expense of structural 
factors affecting the decision: namely, a shift toward a more autonomous and regional 
foreign policy approach as a result Turkey’s political democratization, public 
empowerment and globalization. Moreover, it overlooked the clear paradigm shift in 
Turkish foreign policy despite the occupation of Iraq, the work for EU accession and the 
change of policy concerning Cyprus. 30 
Turkey responded to Western criticism by arguing that placing external sanctions 
on Gaza’s elected political leaders demonstrated hypocrisy and undermined the West’s 
commitment to democracy. This argument stemmed from a belief among some that 
Western powers were trying to disrupt the practice of political Islam, particularly as 
manifested by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. At the time when it was invited to 
Turkey, Hamas was looking for allies in the Middle East in order to end the isolation to 
which it was condemned in the international community and to break the economic and 
political embargo on it, and the solution would probably be the Iran-Syria and Hezbollah 
axis should Turkey had chosen not to get involved.  
                                                
28 “Reverberations Still Echoing After Hamas Official Visits Turkey,” JTA, February 27, 2006, 
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24. 
29 “Meşal Suriye İstihbaratının Parçası”, Radikal, February 27, 2006, 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=179861 
30 Ibid. 
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Another reason for Turkey’s engagement with Hamas was to convince the young 
government to participate in the political process as well as to persuade Hamas to agree to 
a ceasefire with Israel in exchange for an end to the embargo on Gaza.31 Ultimately, 
Turkey aimed for to prepare Hamas to be a responsible government now that it had won 
the popular mandate in the Palestinian territories.32 Additionally, Turkey worked in line 
with the principles of crisis prevention and conflict resolution—important aspects of its 
new foreign policy paradigm—to prevent the likelihood of conflict in response to Western 
sanctions on Hamas. The following statement by the Foreign Minister reveals clearly the 
new mode of thinking and vision:  
We could close our eyes and wait, but if a crisis occurs in the future, won’t 
Turkey be affected? So what we have done is not that risky. In fact, the 
USA and Israel should be thankful to us because we are trying to ease the 
tension. If things continue this way, developments will take place in 
Palestine to shock the region and the Islamic world in a way even the 
caricature crisis did not, and they will spread to the entire world. Our 
messages to Hamas will perhaps lose their meaning in two or three months. 
Those who criticize us today will then say that Turkey should spend efforts 
to persuade Hamas, but it will be too late.33  
The importance of this invitation, which led Washington to ask the question “where 
is Turkey heading?”34 in the days and weeks that followed, became clearer when Israel 
attacked Gaza at the end of 2009 following the sanctions on Hamas. Richard Falk, the UN 
special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories, 
commented on the tragedy in Gaza due to the Operation Cast Lead:  
It is tragic that this effort [Turkey’s invitation to Hamas] went futile. It was 
criticized at the time, but if Turkey’s initiative was taken into consideration 
and the preparedness of Hamas for a long-term ceasefire was utilized, then 
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both the safety of civilians in Gaza and the security of Israel would have 
been served.35 
Following Operation Cast Lead in 2009, Turkish policy makers attempted to 
mediate the problem between Hamas and Israeli government. If the international 
community supported Turkey’s attempt to bring Hamas to the table, the peace process 
could take move forward, ending the attacks on civilians and critical infrastructure. Despite 
the criticisms that Turkey received, the U.S. administration worked with Hamas’ 
interlocutors in Turkey and Qatar to broker a ceasefire agreement between Arab and Israeli 
parties. Once the ceasefire was achieved, Secretary of State John Kerry acknowledged and 
lauded Turkish and Qatari participation. Despite this achievement, Turkey was criticized 
by regional actors for allowing its bias for Hamas interfere with its role as an honest peace 
broker. The nature of the criticism conjured memories of the harsh words Turkey received 
upon Khaled Meshaal’s visit; yet, Turkey’s engagement with Hamas in 2006 proved useful 
in influencing these negotiations. Turkey was able to establish a rapport with Hamas, but 
the reason for the failure of negotiation, according to Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet 
Davutoğlu, was Israel’s unwillingness to accept a sustainable and long-term ceasefire.36 
The AKP government’s responses to domestic and international criticism revealed 
the new Turkish foreign policy paradigm in which “Middle Eastern policy is not seen as an 
extension of Western-centeredness.”37 The scope of the Hamas visit was specified in the 
following words by Erdoğan:  
We cannot remain indifferent to the new world order. We should contribute 
to the restoration of peace in our region and in the world. Turkey cannot be 
a mere spectator to what goes on around it. The goal of this step is only to 
achieve Middle Eastern peace, to eliminate those who intend to turn the 
Middle East into a pool of blood, and to make it a basin for peace. We are 
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the ones who are within this basin, not anybody else. We cannot continue to 
say “Let’s just look on!”38  
Consequently, Turkey’s new paradigm of an active political engagement at home 
and abroad brought foreign policy makers to devote extra attention to the Middle East, 
which had traditionally been considered a theater of little political interest. Turkish 
officials and as well as the public started to follow regional developments more closely, 
and the need for information from different parts of the region increased rapidly. Turkish 
policy makers as well as the Turkish public took an active interest in what was happening 
between Israel and Palestine, and public opinion pushed the AKP to pursue a policy of 
mediation in the conflict.  
In part because of this pressure, the Turkish government began acting with a greater 
sense of responsibility for events in the region.39 In response to criticism from the Turkish 
opposition about “excessive engagement to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute,” Foreign 
Minister Abdullah Gül emphasized that Turkey under the AKP was a Turkey at peace with 
its geography, its history and the demographics of its region and that as a result, Turkey 
should take a great interest in the Palestinian question. He also stated:  
We have the archives, the title deeds, the maps. We have the facts. Why 
should I not take an interest while those who come from the remotest parts 
of Europe can? Not taking an interest means not being aware of one’s 
greatness and power. That is why people who do not have consciousness of 
history are easily disturbed once Turkey steps out of its shell and tries to 
assume a little role in global matters.40 
In short, this new founding paradigm, which suggests a change in how Turkish 
foreign policy makers position and perceive Turkey in the global context, “not only allows 
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Turkey to demand accession to the EU and continue its strategic partnership with the USA 
but at the same time renders it normal for it to sustain contact with actors like Hamas that 
are non-state, are alienated from the West and have normative democratic legitimacy.”41 In 
fact, “it is not appropriate for Turkey to remain in the defensive, assume a defensive 
position and act as if estranged from the region since it is a center country that is both 
Asian and European and is also close to Africa through the Eastern Mediterranean.”42 This 
would be denying regional responsibility. 
On the contrary, as many have stated Turkey “should transition to the position of a 
country bringing its neighboring regions security and stability. Turkey should ensure its 
own security by pursuing a more active and constructive role to give its neighbors order, 
stability and security.”43 To conclude, one could argue that under the new paradigm, 
Turkish foreign policy has become less elitist and more open to input from civilian 
officials and public opinion. The new paradigm also opened the possibility of engaging 
with informal actors who can play an instrumental role in resolution of regional disputes. 
In its decision to become a policy maker rather than policy follower in the Middle East, 
Turkey rejected elements of Western Middle East policy in an effort to establish its 
autonomy.44 Another indication of this new paradigm took place when Turkey stand by the 
legitimate Egyptian government in the face of European and American support for the 
coup makers following the coup of the 3rd of July, which was against a government that 
had come to power at the end of the first free and fairs election in the history of Egypt. The 
principles that Turkish government depended on its support for the democratically elected 
                                                
41 Ziya Meral and Jonathan Paris, “Decoding Turkish Foreign Policy Hyperactivity.” The Washington 
Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 4, 2010, 75-86, 80. 
42 Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy,” 78. 
43 Ibid., 79. 
44 Malik Mufti, “From Swamp to Backyard: The Middle East in Turkish Foreign Policy.” The Middle Enters 
the Twenty-First Century, ed. Robert O. Freedman, Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 
2002, 80-113. 
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government in Egypt was not very different from its attempt to integrate Hamas, which 
won free elections in the Palestinian territories but was threatened with isolation and losing 
the ability to govern and popularity with its own electorate. 
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THE TEHRAN DECLARATION AND VOTING AGAINST 
SANCTIONS ON IRAN IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 
 
 
 
The change in Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East started with Turkey’s decision not 
to accept the launch of U.S. troops into Iraq from its soil. The decision led to a major crisis 
between Turkey and the United States. During the Iraq War, bilateral relations were highly 
tense in regards to conflicts in the Middle East in several instances. Turkey, starting with 
the AK Party government, began to follow a more independent and autonomous foreign 
policy that prioritizes regional solutions to regional problems. This idea was very much 
embedded in Ahmet Davutoğlu’s theoretical approach to international relations in his 
earlier works. Later, when he became a foreign policy maker in Turkey, he started to 
implement this idea. This challenged the mainstream Turkish foreign policy of avoiding 
regional problems and ignoring any conflict in the region. Meanwhile, the transformation 
of Turkey’s domestic politics and changes in the Middle East increasingly consolidated the 
shift in the identity of the Turkish state. Although the main dynamic of change was 
domestic – namely, the democratization of Turkish politics and the novel foreign policy 
approach that the new leaders brought – the shift in the state’s identity was consolidated 
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through Turkey’s interactions with regional actors and states. In fact, the new identity and 
role of the Turkish state in the Middle East was quickly embraced and welcomed in the 
region. Thus, external factors strengthened the new identity of the Turkish state and its 
innovative foreign policy towards the region. The increasing interaction with regional 
countries made this new identity more salient. 
The Neighboring Countries of Iraq meetings created the first significant test for 
Turkish foreign policy in terms of engaging in relations, meeting its partners and 
developing a new alternative foreign policy discourse with the Middle East. These 
meetings helped Turkey to develop a new approach and self-confidence in its relations 
with its partners and neighbors. With the visit from Hamas officials to Turkey in 2006, 
Ankara took this position a step further and built a means of communication with a non-
state actor from the region, who were considered illegitimate by the majority of Western 
countries.  
While Turkey launched an initiative in the absence of Western support by 
organizing the Neighboring Countries of Iraq meetings, the Hamas’ visit and Turkey’s 
attempt to bring Hamas into the peace process took place despite the opposition from 
Western countries. However, in both instances, Turkey explained that it was attempting to 
have a more autonomous and independent foreign policy rather than shifting the axis of its 
foreign policy. The new state identity of Turkey also led to greater involvement in conflict 
resolution and the contribution to the peaceful resolution of disputes in the region. With its 
attempt to resolve the crisis over the Iranian nuclear program, Turkey took one more step 
for the consolidation of its identity and reached a deal for a nuclear swap, which major 
international actors failed to successfully achieve. However, Ankara’s efforts were met 
with an unexpected reaction, as the deal was ignored by the major powers of the 
international system. The nuclear deal demonstrated that Turkey was increasingly 
becoming a major actor in its region and a significant mediator in resolving not only 
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conflicts, but also issues of international security. Turkish foreign policy makers’ 
willingness to contribute to this process was partly because of the potential dangers they 
saw in regards to conflicts in the region. When sectarianism was on the rise in the Middle 
East, Turkey stayed above any sectarian or ethnic divisions in the region. As a Sunni-
majority country, Turkey challenged the existing sectarian divides in the region by trying 
to broker a deal between the West and a Shia-majority state in order to mitigate the 
possible suffering of the Shia population in Iran from economic sanctions and, more 
importantly, from a possible military attack. Just like in the case of the Neighboring 
Countries of Iraq meetings and Hamas’ visit, Turkey’s attempt to resolve the crisis was 
misinterpreted and the region missed a significant opportunity to peacefully resolve this 
problem. Now, four years after the Tehran Declaration, the U.S. and its European allies are 
trying to reach a new agreement with Iran. If the nuclear dispute was resolved in 2010 
following the Tehran Declaration, the Iranian government could have played a more 
constructive role in major conflicts in the region, including Syria and Iraq.  
Turkey’s changing state identity was once again demonstrated in its attempt to play 
a more constructive role in another conflict in the region. Although Turkey acted 
independently, it informed Western countries and particularly the United States about the 
deal that it was trying to broker as part of its international responsibility and other global 
engagements. However, Turkey’s attempt to autonomously contribute to resolving another 
regional problem resulted in skepticism from Western observers. Turkey again faced 
accusations of “turning away from the West” and its attempt was considered as a sign of a 
shift of its axis. Later, when the U.S. sponsored a resolution to impose further sanctions on 
Iran in the United Nations Security Council, Turkey acted in line with its new identity and 
voted against the resolution despite the pressure and criticisms from Western governments. 
Turkish foreign policy makers responded to criticism by stating that whenever there is a 
possibility of resolving conflict through mediation, the adoption of any punitive actions in 
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the region would only deteriorate the situation. Turkey, as a regional actor, adopted the 
responsibility of preventing any escalation that would cause suffering in Iran or any other 
country in the region. The main motivation behind Turkish foreign policy during the 
Tehran Declaration and the UNSC voting was no different than its motivations when it 
initiated the Neighboring Countries of Iraq meetings. In time, Turkey only became more 
self-confident and assertive in its new foreign policy. 
 
 
THE NUCLEAR DEAL 
Iran’s relations with the Western bloc and the international system have been 
characterized by constant tension and crisis since the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The 
presidency of reformist Mohammad Khatami between 1997 and 2005 could be considered 
the exception with a partial improvement in the relations as well as a thaw in terms of the 
discourse that Iran and the U.S. used against one another. There were statements on both 
sides which raised expectations for a potential rapprochement between the two countries. 
During an interview with CNN, Khatami said that the U.S. and Iran needed to create “a 
crack in the wall of mistrust by exchanging writers, scholars, artists and thinkers.” He also 
stated, “all doors should now be open for such dialogue and understanding and the 
possibility for contact between Iranian and American citizens.”1 Later, there were several 
diplomatic gestures from both sides aimed at defreezing the relations. For instance, U.S. 
Secretary of State Madeline Albright joined the UN General Assembly session when 
president Khatami was making his speech, which was unheard of since the hostage crisis. 
However, these mutual diplomatic gestures did not result in an official restoration of 
relations or even an unofficial meeting between the leaders of the two countries. For both 
                                                
1 “Khatami suggests warmer relations with U.S.,” CNN, January 7, 1998, 
http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9801/07/iran/ 
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sides, domestic political constraints played an important role in the development of 
diplomatic relations and communication. The hardliners in Iran and the U.S. Congress 
were extremely skeptical about such a restoration of ties. With the Bush administration, 
any hope for the improvement of relations ended because of the hardline neoconservative 
approach to isolate and change the Iranian regime. Despite Iranian assistance to the U.S. in 
the war in Afghanistan in the aftermath of September 11, the Bush administration did not 
want to establish a cooperative relationship with Iran. Moreover, the discourse of 
democracy promotion, regime change and nation-building espoused by the Bush 
administration heightened the level of anxiety in Iran in regards to potential U.S. action.  
This situation only got worse with the war in Iraq. Although the overthrow of 
Saddam Hussein was a welcome outcome for Iran, relations between the U.S. and Iran 
became more complicated with the rise of Shia insurgency and the skepticism of the U.S. 
about Iran’s potential support of some groups within this insurgency. As the number of 
U.S. casualties increased, the U.S.’s reaction to Iran became stronger. When Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad won the presidential elections in 2005, the state of tension and crisis 
deepened. Ahmadinejad’s statements and criticisms of the U.S., as well as his reaction 
against Israel, created an extremely negative atmosphere in bilateral relations. The Western 
media particularly magnified Ahmadinejad’s controversial statements in regards to the 
Western world, the Holocaust and Israel, which eliminated all possible paths towards 
reconciliation between U.S. and Iran. 
Western analysts offered many explanations for these crises between the two 
countries. Most importantly, historical baggage was particularly convoluted, particularly 
controversial moments in bilateral relations such as the hostage crisis during the 
Revolution, assassination of opponents of the regime allegedly committed by Iran in 
Europe in the 1980s, the fatwa on Salman Rushdie after the publication of Satanic Verses, 
Iranian support for non-state armed groups like Hezbollah, Iran’s nuclear technology 
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program, etc. It is obvious that these all contributed to the tension and crises in the 
relations between Iran and the West.  
However, in more recent years, the most poisonous development to relations was 
Iran’s nuclear technology program. The disagreements between Iran and the IAEA, the 
discovery of hidden nuclear reactors and Israel’s constant warnings about a potential pre-
emptive strike made the issue a more urgent problem for U.S.-Iranian relations. The 
security implication of an Iran with a nuclear weapon was regarded with the potential to 
destabilize the region and upset the regional and international balance of power. The 
countries in the Gulf and Israel in particular transformed the issue into a major crisis of 
international security. Alarmist narratives together with a hostile discourse against Iran 
created a major problem for the international system. Despite owning nuclear weapons for 
years without any form of accountability, the government of Israel argued that the Iranian 
program would lead to nuclear proliferation in the region, posing a major security threat to 
the global community. In addition, several analysts pointed out Iran’s potential to 
weaponize its nuclear program, which could cause a nuclear arms race in the region.  
This heightened threat perception of Iran’s nuclear program was signaled in 2002 
after debates in the foreign policy circle on the potential danger of “rogue states” getting 
nuclear weapon or any weapons of mass destruction. In a speech in 2002, President Bush 
placed Iran among countries such as Iraq and North Korea, which he defined as 
constituting an “axis of evil.”2 President Bush emphasized both the nuclear program and 
the authoritarian regime in the country as a potential threat to international security. He 
said:  
Some of these regimes have been pretty quiet since September 11, but we 
know their true nature. North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and 
weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens. Iran aggressively 
                                                
2 ‘Bush State of the Union Address’, CNN.com/Inside Politics , January 29, 2002, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/01/29/bush.speech.txt/ 
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pursues these weapons and exports terror, while an unelected few repress 
the Iranian people's hope for freedom.3  
In the securitized atmosphere that emerged internationally post-9/11 and the 
political climate created by the approaching Iraq war, the crisis in U.S.-Iranian relations 
became more entrenched when Iran’s nuclear activities in the power plants of Arak and 
Natanz were revealed in 2002. The attempt to contain and resolve this crisis led to the birth 
of a group called the EU-3, originally formed by Germany and France and later joined by 
the UK. The EU-3 wanted to prevent the crisis from escalating beyond diplomacy, opposed 
the Iraq war, and aimed to resolve the crisis through negotiation and dialogue.4 
This group started negotiations with Iran in 2003. According the plan proposed by 
the EU-3 during these negotiations, Iran would share detailed information with 
international observers on the framework, size, and nature of its nuclear program, allow 
them to conduct independent inspections, terminate its uranium enrichment program, and 
offer the group guarantees on the matter.5 The EU-3, in turn, would respect Iran’s right to 
develop civil nuclear technology, and cooperate with Iran in this and other areas.6 
Nevertheless, these negotiations did not yield a significant result due to disagreement, 
particularly on the quality and nature of the guarantees that Iran would offer to the EU-3. 
When Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who embraced a stricter attitude on the nuclear issue than 
Khatami, was elected president in 2005, the negotiations were terminated.7 Thus, the EU-3 
                                                
3 Ibid. 
4 Colette Mazzucelli, “EU3- Iranian Nuclear Diplomacy: Implications for US Policy in the Middle East.” 
European Union Miami Analysis (EUMA) Papers Online, Miami-Florida European Union Center of 
Excellence, Miami, 2007, 7. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
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joined other Western countries in supporting the imposition of sanctions by the UN 
Security Council against Iran, which occurred in 2006.8 
Although the decision to place sanctions on Iran brought the negotiations to a halt, 
they were reinitiated in Geneva with the participation of the EU-3 and other members of 
the UN Security Council, including the U.S., China and Russia. The negotiations 
accelerated when a new reactor was discovered near the Iranian city of Qum in 2009.9 As 
an extension of these negotiations, the IAEA made an offer to Iran in 2009, in which Iran 
would send Russia 70 percent (1200 kg) of its 3.5 percent enriched uranium, and in return 
Russia would refine the low-enriched uranium (LEU) from Iran at 20 percent (the rated 
needed by the Tehran Research Plant) and send it to France. The 20 percent enriched 
uranium would then be processed to prevent further enrichment, transformed into solid fuel 
sticks and shipped to Iran.10 In an effort to maintain diplomacy reached in Geneva and 
Vienna, Mohammad Baradey, the then-president of the IAEA, proposed that Iran send its 
LEU to Turkey.11 However, when no agreement could be met despite the negotiations 
between Iran and the EU and the proposal by the IAEA, it was clear that the crisis between 
Iran and the West could deepen and a new wave of sanctions could be instituted by the UN 
Security Council. 
In such an atmosphere, Turkey decided to initiate a diplomatic enterprise to resolve 
the crisis through negotiations, prevent a new wave of sanctions, and preclude another 
major conflict that would shake the regional fault lines and bring further instability in the 
                                                
8 See, “Security Council imposes sanctions on Iran for failure to halt uranium enrichment, 
unanimously adopting Resolution 1737(2006)”, United Nations, December 23, 2006, 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2006/sc8928.doc.htm 
9 See, “Nuclear Talks lead to rare meeting between US and Iran,” The Guardian,  October 1, 2009, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/oct/01/iran-nuclear-geneva-talks 
10 Bayram Sinkaya, “İran Nükleer Programı Karşısında Türkiye’nin Tutumu ve Uranyum Takası 
Mutabakatı.” ORSAM Ortadoğu Analiz, Vol. 2, No. 18, 2010, 71-79. 
11 “İran, uranyumu Türkiye’ye göndersin,” Milliyet, November 8, 2009, 
http://www.milliyet.com.tr/Dunya/SonDakika.aspx?aType=SonDakika&ArticleID=1159532 
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Middle East. Turkey’s position in regards to the crisis with Iran mirrored its approach to 
other critical issues in international and regional security. Turkey believes that that 
international system should not infringe on the rights of any nation to use nuclear energy 
for peaceful purposes. Thus, Turkey consistently urged the Iranian government to 
cooperate with the IAEA regarding to its nuclear program. However, Turkey strongly 
opposed any country in the region having nuclear weapons, which would lead to nuclear 
proliferation throughout the Middle East. To ensure that Turkey – or any other nation in 
the Middle East – had the right to a potential nuclear energy program and to prevent 
another destabilizing military campaign in its neighborhood, the Turkish government 
decided to use diplomacy to contribute to the peaceful resolution of this dispute.  
From its earlier dialogue and engagement with the Iranian government, Turkish 
foreign policy makers had an idea of what could be the possible outcome of such an 
endeavor and how to broker such an agreement between Iran and the international 
community. However, when Turkey expressed this willingness to mediate the dispute, 
many in the Western world believed that it was just a wishful thinking because Turkey 
supposedly lacked the capacity, expertise and skills to broker such a complicated 
agreement. It was an unprecedented for Turkey to mediate a significant international 
conflict with such high risks. In previous crises between Iran and the Western world, 
Turkey adopted the West’s position against Iran, as Turkish foreign policy makers viewed 
the Iranian regime as a major threat and constantly accused Iran of trying to export its 
ideology to Turkey by supporting anti-Secular groups. This ultra-secular ideological lens 
resulted in Turkey’s failure to improve its relations with Iran, leading to a serious 
deficiency in mutual trust between the two countries. In many instances, Turkey tried to 
take advantage of the crisis between Iran and the West by emphasizing its pro-Western and 
secular identity. During these years, some foreign policy makers even portrayed Turkey’s 
role as a bulwark against the threat of Iran and an antidote to the Iranian regime in the 
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Middle East. Although this identity provided limited strategic advantage, it led Turkey to 
limit its economic, social, political and cultural relations with Iran. Turkey and Iran, two 
countries of similar demographic and economic potential, could not reap the benefits of 
sharing one of the most peaceful and secure borders in the Middle East without any 
territorial disputes. Any form engagement with Iran raised serious concerns among the 
members of the state establishment.  
In every attempt to improve Turkey’s relations with Iran, there was substantial 
criticism about the potential threat to secularism in Turkey. The Turkish military, which 
was in charge of Turkey’s foreign and security policy in most instances, had particularly 
serious reservations about any form of political or economic engagement with Iran. For 
instance, the reaction of the Turkish military, opposition and foreign policy bureaucracy 
against Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan’s attempts to improve relations with Iran in 
1997 is considered one of the reasons for the military coup against him. In fact, improving 
relations with Iran was almost considered as a political crime punishable by military coup. 
After many years of ignoring one of the most significant countries in the Middle East, 
Turkey started to engage with Iran regularly in order to generate a win-win situation.  
During this period, while Turkey was trying to restore its ties with Iran through 
economic and diplomatic interactions, there were serious debates in Washington regarding 
a potential military intervention in Iran. Neoconservative think tanks, in particular, 
developed different military scenarios to destroy Iran’s nuclear program. The range of 
potential attacks that was offered by these think tanks include everything from surgical 
strikes on nuclear sites to a full-scale assault on all nuclear sites and regime strongholds in 
Tehran in order to eradicate the Iranian regime. Those who supported regime change 
argued that if air strikes failed, the Iranian regime may accelerate its nuclear weapons 
program; thus, the overthrow of the regime would be the best option. The escalatory tone 
of the Israeli government also contributed to this atmosphere in Washington. The emerging 
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perception in Washington was that more hardline policies were necessary in order to deal 
with Iran. However, Turkey’s approach to the problem varied once again.  
Prime Minister Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu both expressed 
that the issue could still be resolved through diplomatic negotiation, which Turkey was 
ready to contribute to. Turkey approached Iran to launch a diplomatic dialogue and 
simultaneously tried to get the support of other countries, such as Brazil, which had a 
significant degree of experience in dealing with nuclear issues. This created a functioning 
dynamic that led to the initiation of talks with Iranian officials. Prime Minister Erdoğan 
and Foreign Minister Davutoğlu both exploited every opportunity to convey that since it 
was possible to resolve the issue through negotiation, Turkey was against any new 
sanctions against Iran. New sanctions against Iran would escalate the tension both between 
Iran and the West, as well as between the actors in the region, and would have extremely 
negative economic and social repercussions.  
Turkey launched this process of negotiation at a very early stage in Ahmadinejad’s 
presidency. When President Ahmadinejad visited Turkey in August 2008, Turkish foreign 
policy makers aimed to diffuse the tension and pave the way for the resolution of disputes 
between Iran and other countries. Ahmadinejad argued that Iran’s nuclear program was 
peaceful and that Tehran did not aim to improve its military capability.12 Ahmadinejad’s 
visit would have previously been a source of tension between the civilian government and 
the military and would have created a major backlash against the government. However, 
the changing nature of Turkish foreign policy allowed the civilian government to engage 
with its neighbors as part of its “zero problems policy” and contribute to attempts to 
reconcile disputes and differences. In addition, such a visit would have previously been a 
source of friction for the ultra-secular foreign policy bureaucracy, which considered any 
                                                
12 Ahmedinejad umutlu” BBC Turkish, August 15, 2008, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/news/story/2008/08/080815_iranturkey.shtml 
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relations with the Iranian government as a threat to secularism in Turkey. However, in the 
changing Turkey, Iran was considered as a neighbor that Ankara had to be on good terms 
with, regardless of any interference from a third party.  
Several agreements on mutual trade and the development of bilateral relations 
between Turkey and Iran during this period were met with an increasing degree of 
skepticism in the West. However, Turkish foreign policy makers were very open regarding 
the meetings’ agendas and constantly reiterated that Turkey aimed to improve its economic 
relations with its neighbor and would not sever its relationship with Iran without evidence 
of Tehran’s wrongdoing or an infringement of international law. Thus, the U.S.’s emphasis 
on sanctions against Iran made Turkish foreign policy makers extremely uncomfortable. In 
every possible platform, Turkey expressed that such sanctions would hurt the economy of 
Turkey and the region as a whole. Turkey also warned the Israeli government not to 
engage in actions that would escalate tension in the region. Erdoğan flatly denied the 
rumors about a possible Israeli strike against Iran using Turkish air space, saying that such 
unauthorized action would greatly disturb Turkish-Israeli relations.13 
The statements from Turkish foreign policy makers about their willingness to 
resolve the dispute through diplomatic channels and their readiness to mediate between 
Iran and the international community generated a debate in Western capitals. Although 
many in the West believed that Turkey did not have such a capability, they welcomed 
Ankara’s intention to help resolve the conflict.14 In this period, Mohammel ElBaradei of 
the IAEA came up with a resolution that would entail an important role for Turkey. 
ElBaradei contented that there was a serious lack of trust between Iran and the West, which 
                                                
13 Erdoğan’dan İsrail’e ‘DEPREM GİBİ’ uyarı,” Milliyet, December 10, 2009, 
http://www.milliyet.com.tr/Siyaset/HaberDetay.aspx?aType=HaberDetay&KategoriID=4&ArticleID=11724
06&Date=11.12.2009&b=Erdogandan%20Israile%20DEPREM%20GIBI%20uyari 
14 Aylin Gürzel, “Turkey’s Role in Defusing the Iranian Nuclear Issue.” The Washington Quarterly, 
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could be resolved by the friendly relations between Turkey and Iran. Baradei argued that 
Iran could transfer highly enriched uranium (HEU) to Turkey, in exchange for LEU for 
civilian and medical purposes from Russia. Baradei emphasized that Iran did trust Turkey 
on this subject and that there were excellent relations between Turkey and the U.S.; thus, 
Turkey could play a critical role.15 Baradei’s proposal was given the green light from both 
Russia and the United States. Following these signals, Turkey started to be actively 
involved in this process. Shortly after the statements from the U.S. and Russia, Foreign 
Minister Davutoğlu announced that Turkey was ready to stock the HEU for a definite 
period of time.16 However, the Iranians initially rejected this proposal. Iranian Foreign 
Minister Muttaki stated that Iran would not send its nuclear materials outside of its borders.  
Nevertheless, Turkey did not stop its efforts to resolve the problem through 
negotiations. Turkey’s new foreign policy gained considerable experience in mediation 
during this time. Turkey’s endeavors in regards to Iran were partly an attempt to develop 
its foreign policy. It was not trying to situate itself inherently against the Western position 
on the Iranian nuclear program and thus Turkish foreign policy makers tried to 
communicate with their counterparts about the negotiations from the very beginning. One 
of the first of such conversation took place when President Obama met with Prime 
Minister Erdoğan in December 2009.  In the press conference, President Obama stated that 
“Turkey could be an important player in trying to move Iran in the direction of pursuing 
peaceful nuclear energy while providing assurances that it will abide by international rules 
and norms.” In return, Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan also stated that Turkey wanted to 
contribute to the resolution of disputes in the region.17 Turkey was not only communicating 
                                                
15 “İran’la nükleer çözümde Türkiye sürprizi,” Hürriyet, November 10, 2014, 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/dunya/12888576.asp 
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with the U.S. administration; Prime Minister Erdoğan also held numerous meetings with 
his counterparts in the West in order to inform and exchange views about a potential 
resolution of the deadlock. Moreover, Foreign Minister Davutoğlu engaged in shuttle 
diplomacy between Tehran and the Western capitals about the details of the agreement. 
Through this constant communication, Turkey acted responsibly and tried to be an honest 
broker in this very complicated conflict between Iran and the West. It also conveyed to 
both the Western capitals and Tehran that the Turkish government was a neutral arbiter and 
did not favor one parties over the other. Instead, Turkey endorsed a viewpoint that would 
have brought stability and economic prosperity to the region. 
Following Iran’s rejection of the offer, one of the turning points for the nuclear 
negotiations occurred during the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC in April 
2010. For the past eight years, Turkey had tried to form multilateral forums and resolve 
issues through multilateral dialogue. Turkish foreign policy makers tried to use this forum 
in order to raise the possibility of a peaceful resolution to Iran’s nuclear program again, 
while the U.S administration was trying to convince the participant countries to impose 
additional economic sanctions. During its meetings, Turkey found an important ally, 
Brazil, which shared similar views with Turkey about finding a solution to the nuclear 
dilemma. Brazil, as one of the countries that supported the resolution of disputes in the 
region through diplomatic means, endorsed Turkey’s proposal. During the Nuclear 
Security Summit, the leaders of the two countries decided to cooperate on this issue. They 
also decided to communicate with President Obama in regards to the negotiations and 
asked for his support for their initiative. 18 
For example, in a statement on April 15, 2010, Prime Minister Erdoğan expressed 
that Turkey and Brazil held similar views on the matter and signaled that they could launch 
                                                
18 Sinkaya. 
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a common initiative to resolve the problem through peaceful means.19 Shortly after, 
Foreign Minister Davutoğlu assessed the talks between the P5+1 and Iran, where Iran’s 
demand that the exchange take place within its borders was rejected by the West, arguing 
that “Turkey is ready to act as mediator on the issue of uranium enrichment and hopes that 
the process will result to the benefit of everyone.”20The Brazilian government also 
expressed its willingness to contribute to the dispute’s resolution through negotiations. On 
April 28, 2010, Brazil proposed to mediate along with Turkey to overcome the crisis 
between Iran and the West.21  
Turkey’s mediation in a dispute between a country of the region and the West was 
a significant development in Turkish foreign policy. In the Neighboring Countries of Iraq 
Summit, Turkey attempted to resolve a problem – the Iraq war – through engagement with 
regional actors, whereas the visit of Hamas was intended to include a Palestinian political 
party in the peace process. Now, Turkey was taking their efforts one step further by 
attempting to mediate a major international dilemma between a country in the region and 
the international community. It was a problem that other major players in the international 
system had so far failed to resolve despite their clout, leverage and power. In addition, 
Turkey was cooperating on this issue with a country in South America, a region unnoticed 
by Turkish foreign policy for the most of its history. Partnership with a South American 
nation demonstrated the international opening of Turkey’s foreign policy in the last 
decade. Regardless of whether an agreement was reached, the process itself demonstrates a 
major transformation in Turkish foreign policy and the nation’s identity.  
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Following these statements, on April 20, 2010, President Obama wrote a letter to 
President Lula and Prime Minister Erdoğan on the nuclear negotiations. In the letter to 
Lula, President Obama discussed the conversation that he and Prime Minister Erdoğan had 
during the Nuclear Security Summit and offered his position on the negotiations. He wrote:  
I agree with you that the TRR is an opportunity to pave the way for a 
broader dialogue in dealing with the more fundamental concerns of the 
international community regarding Iran’s overall nuclear program. From the 
beginning, I have viewed Iran’s request as a clear and tangible opportunity 
to begin to build mutual trust and confidence, and thereby create time and 
space for a constructive diplomatic process. That is why the United States 
so strongly supported the proposal put forth by former International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General El-Baradei. 
The IAEA’s proposal was crafted to be fair and balanced, and for both sides to gain 
trust and confidence. For us, Iran’s agreement to transfer 1,200 kg of Iran’s low-enriched 
uranium (LEU) out of the country would build confidence and reduce regional tensions by 
substantially reducing Iran’s LEU stockpile. I want to underscore that this element is of 
fundamental importance for the United States. For Iran, it would receive the nuclear fuel 
requested to ensure continued operation of the TRR to produce needed medical isotopes 
and, by using its own material, Iran would begin to demonstrate peaceful nuclear intent. 
Notwithstanding Iran’s continuing defiance of the United Nations Security Council 
resolutions mandating that it cease its enrichment of uranium, we were prepared to support 
and facilitate action on a proposal that would provide Iran nuclear fuel using uranium 
enriched by Iran — a demonstration of our willingness to be creative in pursuing a way to 
build mutual confidence.” 
Following this letter, Turkey and Brazil started to conduct shuttle diplomacy to find 
a common ground between Iran’s requests and the P5+1’s conditions. The Iranian side, 
which rejected the earlier proposal by Baradei, decided to negotiate the terms of this 
agreement with the mediation of Brazil and Turkey. Iranian President Ahmadinejad 
publicly acknowledged this effort when he came to New York for a UN Conference. 
Ahmadinejad stated that Iran would approach an agreement favorably if the other side 
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demonstrated similar sincerity.22 While Turkey and Brazil were trying to broker the deal 
with Iran, the U.S. was leading an effort to impose another set of sanctions on Iran in the 
UN Security Council. Turkey opposed any new sanctions or escalatory action that would 
endanger an agreement. 
While opposing the sanctions, diplomacy between Turkey, Brazil and Iran was 
complicated by Iran’s insistence on certain issues. The process was almost halted in several 
instances. Nevertheless, on May 17, 2010, all agreed on the conditions and signed the 
Tehran Declaration. When the content of the common declaration is analyzed, it is clear 
that the Western demands were, in fact, mostly met. Articles 5, 6, and 7 of the declaration 
replicated the exchange formula previously proposed by the IAEA with the approval of the 
West. These articles suggested the transfer of 1200 kg of LEU from Iran to Turkey, the 
transformation of this uranium into the 120 kg of fuel needed by the Tehran Research 
Plant, and the shipment of this fuel to Iran.23  
Immediately after the ceremony, Iranian President Ahmadinejad said he was glad 
that an agreement was reached and expressed his gratitude to Turkey and Brazil for their 
efforts to broker the agreement. He called the pact a diplomatic victory for the Iranian 
government. Foreign Minister Davutoğlu told the press that there was no need for 
additional sanctions or international pressure on Iran.24 All parties stated that if the 
agreement was recognized by the Vienna group, Iran would start transferring its uranium 
the following month.  
                                                
22 Sinkaya. 
23 Turkish Ministryof Foreign Affairs, “17 Mayıs 2010 tarihli Türkiye, İran ve Brezilya Dışişleri 
Bakanları Ortak Deklarasyonu,” 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/17-Mayis-2010-tarihli-turkiye_-iran-brezilya-disisleri-bakanlari-ortak-
deklarasyonu.tr.mfa 
24 “İran, Türkiye ve Brezilya ile nükleer anlaşmayı imzaladı,” BBC Turkish, May 17, 2010, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkce/haberler/2010/05/100517_turkey_iran.shtml 
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Although the articles of the agreement mirrored the framework of previous 
negotiations between the West and Iran, Western authorities approached the agreement 
with a critical perspective. The French government stated that the IAEA needed to make 
the final decision about the agreement, whereas the German government said that such an 
agreement would not solve the problem of Iran’s nuclear program. The reaction of the U.S. 
administration was even more critical. In a statement on May 18, 2010, U.S. Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton argued that Iran only consented to the agreement to avoid the 
additional sanctions that Russia and China had agreed upon in the UN Security Council. 
Therefore, she made it clear that the agreement would not prevent the imposition of 
sanctions by the UN Security Council.25 The day after the Tehran memorandum, Secretary 
Clinton announced that the Security Council had agreed to pass a new round of sanctions. 
Of course the harshest critic of the agreement was Israel. The Israeli government called the 
Brazilian and Turkish attempt to resolve the issue a manipulation. 
In this atmosphere, the UN Security Council addressed sanctions against Iran on 
June 9, 2010. The U.S. administration tried to pressure Turkey to vote ‘yes.’ Although 
Turkey was not a permanent member of the UN Security Council, it was important for the 
Obama administration that Turkey voted on the side of the U.S. to create unanimity. 
However, Turkish foreign policy would no longer bandwagon to every U.S.-led initiative 
in international organizations. The Turkish government had put its credibility on the line 
for this agreement and was willing to abide by its principles and reject new sanctions or 
escalatory measures that would destabilize the region. This was another demonstration of 
Turkey’s new foreign policy identity that supports regional solutions for regional 
problems. Just like in the case of the Neighbors of Iraq initiative and Hamas’ visit, Turkish 
foreign policy makers argued that Turkey’s position was not anti-Western or anti-U.S., but 
                                                
25 “Clinton attacks Turkey-Brazil deal with Iran,” Financial Times, May 18, 2010, 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/58caa4b4-62a4-11df-b1d1-00144feab49a.html#axzz2bl38PAVy 
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for the peaceful resolution of disputes and regional stability. Turkey’s new state identity 
informed its national interest to follow a more peaceful and autonomous foreign policy in 
the region.  
Under these circumstances, the UN Security Council vote turned into a major 
confrontation in regards to the Iranian nuclear program. While all the permanent members 
voted affirmative in the UN Security Council, Turkey continued to pursue its policy of 
engagement despite pressures against it. Eventually, 12 countries voted ‘yes’ for the 
sanctions. Two countries, Turkey and Brazil, voted against the measure and Lebanon 
abstained.26 During the meeting, the Brazilian and Turkish ambassadors to the UN 
underlined the problems with a new set of sanctions on Iran. The Brazilian ambassador 
stated: “We do not see sanctions as an effective instrument in this case. They will most 
probably lead to the suffering of the people of Iran and will play into the hands of people 
on all sides who do not want dialogue to prevail.” In addition, the Turkish ambassador 
expressed disappointment about the reluctance of other countries to take into account the 
Tehran declaration and stated that Turkey was deeply concerned about the consequences of 
these sanctions on the people in the region.27 This was a major departure from Turkey’s 
earlier pattern of voting in the UN Security Council and other international organizations. 
It demonstrated that Turkey’s new foreign policy identity would not shy away from 
standing behind its policies, despite the reaction or pressure from the U.S. or the EU. 
Despite the explanation of Turkish foreign policy makers, the ‘no’ vote was regarded as 
another signal of Turkey’s “axis shift” by the Western media and think tank circles. It was 
even portrayed as a sign of Turkey’s willingness to turn away from the Western security 
establishment and build alliances with states like Iran and Russia.   
                                                
26 See, “Security Council imposes additional sanctions on Iran: Voting 12 in favour to 2 against, with 1 
abstention”, United Nations, June 9, 2010, http://www.un.org/press/en/2010/sc9948.doc.htm 
27 “UN votes for new sanctions on Iran over nuclear issue,”  BBC, June 9,  2010, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10276276 
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Addressing the vote on the June 10th, Prime Minister Erdoğan also emphasized the 
impact of this new state identity on Turkey’s decision to vote ‘no’ in the UN Security 
Council. He stated, “If we had not voted no, we would have refused our identity, we would 
have refused our signatures, and this would be dishonorable. We could not afford this 
dishonorable behavior. We do not want to be part of this mistake. History would not 
forgive us.”28 Foreign Minister Davutoğlu, on the other hand, stated: “We are the only UN 
Security Council country neighboring Iran. It is always us who has to pay the price for 
sanctions. We made sure with our vote no that the agreement would remain on the table.”  
These statements pointed to three important points concerning Turkey’s new 
foreign policy. First, Turkey’s credibility and image as an independent actor has a special 
importance to the extent that even traditional allies could be confronted when Turkey’s 
national and regional interests are at stake. Second, it showed that Turkey had abandoned 
its traditional, pro-Western foreign policy, which aimed at pleasing its allies, particularly 
the U.S., even at the expense of surrendering its own priorities and regional stability. In 
any event, the fact that Turkey voted against the UN Security Council’s sanctions on Iran 
pointed to a turning point based on many different factors. Third, Turkey’s position was 
impacted by its new state identity.  
Turkey’s performance on the Iranian nuclear issue, particularly its solution method 
and cooperation with Brazil, revealed many points regarding the AK Party’s foreign 
policy. First of all, this initiative with Brazil became more meaningful in light of the fact 
that the Iranian nuclear issue was one of the most hotly-debated subjects that kept the 
international system busy and nearly all actors who were involved in the process had a 
global character. Turkey’s decision to take initiative in such a global issue showed that it 
would be different from other rising powers, whose ascendance could generally only be 
                                                
28 “Hayır demeseydik onursuz olurduk,” T24, June 10, 2010, 
http://t24.com.tr/haber/hayir-demeseydik-onursuz-olurduk/80128 
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seen through economic indicators. In other words, Turkey revealed that it was willing to 
wield its power on regional and global matters and take initiative, and if a conflict arose 
between the agendas of the traditional powers of the international system, it would remain 
loyal to its own agenda. This picture strengthened Turkey’s perception as a principled, 
independent power, which expanded its credibility and space to exercise soft power. 
On the other hand, a strong geopolitical ground existed on which Turkey’s desire to 
seek a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue through diplomacy was based. This geopolitical 
ground had economic, energy and security dimensions. The improvement in Turkish-
Iranian relations was an important factor in Ankara’s attempt to resolve this issue through 
peaceful means. Trade relations between the two countries rose from slightly above $1 
billion in 2000 to more than $10 billion in 2010.29 In addition, Turkey’s energy needs as a 
developing economy has been steadily increasing each year. Iran was Turkey’s second 
largest energy provider after Russia at the time, meeting 20 percent of its energy needs.30 If 
Turkey had agreed to the sanctions, relations between the two countries would have 
received a sharp blow, risking the energy provided by Iran and perhaps making even more 
Turkey dependent on Russia, which would create security issues. Lastly, Turkey and Iran 
collaborated against the PKK and the PJAK by sharing intelligence. Therefore, there were 
realpolitik and normative grounds on which Turkey’s efforts to conduct diplomacy for the 
resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue were based. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
29 “Turkey, Iran aim to triple trade volume to $30 bln,” Sunday`s Zaman, February 7, 2011, 
http://www.todayszaman.com/latest-news_turkey-iran-aim-to-triple-trade-volume-to-30-bln_234803.html 
30 Meliha Benli Altunışık, “Turkey`s Changing Middle East Policy.” UNISCI Discussion Papers, 
No.23, May 2010. 
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FULL TEXT OF THE TEHRAN DECLARATION 
JOINT DECLARATION BY IRAN, TURKEY AND BRAZIL 
(May 17, 2010) 
Having met in Tehran, Islamic Republic of Iran, the undersigned have agreed on 
the following Declaration: 
1. We reaffirm our commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons and in accordance with the related articles of the NPT, recall the right of all State 
Parties, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, to develop research, production and use of 
nuclear energy (as well as nuclear fuel cycle including enrichment activities) for peaceful 
purposes without discrimination. 
2. We express our strong conviction that we have the opportunity now to begin a 
forward looking process that will create a positive, constructive, non-confrontational 
atmosphere leading to an era of interaction and cooperation. 
3. We believe that the nuclear fuel exchange is instrumental in initiating 
cooperation in different areas, especially with regard to peaceful nuclear cooperation 
including nuclear power plant and research reactors construction. 
4. Based on this point the nuclear fuel exchange is a starting point to begin 
cooperation and a positive constructive move forward among nations. Such a move should 
lead to positive interaction and cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities 
replacing and avoiding all kinds of confrontation through refraining from measures, actions 
and rhetorical statements that would jeopardize Iran's rights and obligations under the 
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NPT. 
5. Based on the above, in order to facilitate the nuclear cooperation mentioned 
above, the Islamic Republic of Iran agrees to deposit 1200 kg LEU in Turkey. While in 
Turkey this LEU will continue to be the property of Iran. Iran and the IAEA may station 
observers to monitor the safekeeping of the LEU in Turkey. 
6. Iran will notify the IAEA in writing through official channels of its agreement 
with the above within seven days following the date of this declaration. Upon the positive 
response of the Vienna Group (US, Russia, France and the IAEA) further details of the 
exchange will be elaborated through a written agreement and proper arrangement between 
Iran and the Vienna Group that specifically committed themselves to deliver 120 kg of fuel 
needed for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). 
7. When the Vienna Group declares its commitment to this provision, then both 
parties would commit themselves to the implementation of the agreement mentioned in 
item 6. Islamic Republic of Iran expressed its readiness to deposit its LEU (1200 kg) 
within one month. On the basis of the same agreement the Vienna Group should deliver 
120 kg fuel required for TRR in no later than one year. 
8. In case the provisions of this Declaration are not respected Turkey, upon the 
request of Iran, will return swiftly and unconditionally Iran's LEU to Iran. 
9. We welcome the decision of the Islamic Republic of Iran to continue as in the 
past their talks with the 5+1 countries in Turkey on the common concerns based on 
collective commitments according to the common points of their proposals. 
10. Turkey and Brazil appreciated Iran's commitment to the NPT and its 
constructive role in pursuing the realization of nuclear rights of its member states. The 
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Islamic Republic of Iran likewise appreciated the constructive efforts of the friendly 
countries Turkey and Brazil in creating the conducive environment for realization of Iran's 
nuclear rights. 
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CONCLUSION: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE AK PARTY 
ERA: A PARADIGM SHIFT AND POSSIBILITIES 
 
 
 
From the day that Turkey embraced the multi-party system until 2002, Turkey’s foreign 
policy consisted of debates and policies regarding only three issues: NATO, Cyprus and 
the PKK. Of these three topics, the intervention in Cyprus and the fight against the PKK 
can, to some extent, be considered proactive policies. Turkey’s decision to join the NATO, 
however, can be regarded as a passive relationship in the post-WWII global order. When 
the AK Party came to power, a profound change took place regarding proactive policy 
topics, while no such change has been observed in the area of mainstream Turkish foreign 
policy. In other words, while the AK Party has maintained its relations with NATO and 
took important steps in the process of integration with the European Union, it instituted 
radical policy change in the approaches corresponding to local and regional problems. 
The AK Party launched its first term in office with its foreign policy agenda. When 
the AK Party came to power in November 2002, only about a year after the 9/11 attacks, 
Afghanistan was under occupation and the countdown to the invasion of Iraq had begun. 
Domestic policy was not the first order of business for the AK Party, which was perceived 
as an “Islamist Party” that came in to power when the world was dealing with the 
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aftermath of 9/11. On the contrary, it was confronted by serious foreign policy crises, such 
as the Iraq War. The AK Party leadership, who had only a few months of experience, 
started to commute between Washington and Ankara to negotiate a deal to allow the 
launching of U.S. troops from Turkish soil.  
The U.S. administration, which had hitherto enjoyed Turkey’s almost unconditional 
support in most foreign policy affairs, expected that the AK Party would follow suit. The 
United States believed that it could use its close ties to the secular, civil and military 
establishment’s power to strong-arm Turkey into supporting American policy in Iraq, even 
if the sitting government disagreed. U.S. political elites and analysts were shocked and 
disappointed when the bill to open a ‘second front’ in Northern Iraq for the U.S. was 
rejected in the TBMM on March 1st, 2003.1 Instead of trying to understand the main 
dynamics that led to this decision and trying to grasp Turkey’s new approach to foreign 
policy, American pundits claimed that the refusal was motivated by the identity politics of 
the founding cadres of the AK Party, who rose up from the ranks of the Islamist tradition. 
This was also seen as an axis shift in Turkish politics. In fact, the claim that the U.S. 
authorities resented the secular establishment, especially the military, for allowing this 
political landscape to emerge could easily be made.2 
During this period, the AK Party diversified Turkish foreign policy making, which 
had remained stagnant within those three issues, then gradually transitioned from following 
a passive, reactive and status quo-oriented foreign policy to pursuing a proactive and, in 
some instances, revisionist foreign policy. It would be safe to say that as of today, the AK 
Party follows the same pro-active position in most regional and, occasionally, international 
                                                
1 See, “Turkey snubs U.S., rejects troops,” Chicago Tribune, March 2, 2003, 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2003-03-02/news/0303020278_1_turkish-parliament-turkish-constitution-
prime-minister-abdullah-gul 
2 See “ABD’den Özkök’e şükran mektubu,” Sabah, June 28, 2003. 
http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2003/06/28/w/p06.html; “Hatanızı Kabul Edin,” Hürriyet, 7 May 2003. 
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problems. The diversification includes both region and issue area. Turkey has been very 
vocal in its criticism of the human rights abuses in Myanmar and China and also very 
critical to the overthrow of the democratically elected government in Egypt. It also 
included different foreign policy initiatives towards Latin America And Africa. This 
diversification and increased engagement with actors in the region as well as in the globe 
dramatically influenced the identity of the Turkish state.  
In the meantime, domestic democratic reforms in Turkey, which increased public 
leverage over foreign policy also contributed to the consolidation of Turkey’s new identity. 
This new identity was shaped by the AK Party’s vision, democratic domestic reforms and 
public opinion. It informed a new kind of foreign policy, which was more autonomous, 
engaging and proactive than mainstream Turkish foreign policy. However, what 
strengthened this new identity and helped it overcome the previous state identity was the 
interaction of the Turkish state with other actors in the region and the international system. 
The new foreign policy informed by this state identity demonstrated itself in different 
instances. In relation with the Middle Eastern countries, it showed that Turkey has 
gradually abandoned its non-intervention and non-interference policies and has started to 
engage with both state and non-state actors in the Middle East. This socialization with 
regional actors reaffirms Turkey’s new state identity and reinforces its new role in the 
Middle East. As it started to be considered a major actor in the region, Turkey further 
internalized this new identity. This domestic construction and external reinforcement of 
Turkey’s new identity allowed Ankara to stand firm against Western criticism and pressure 
to revert back to its traditional foreign policy line. Despite all the political and media 
campaigns, Turkey preferred to maintain its autonomous and pro-active foreign policy with 
a regional focus. In the previously mentioned cases, Turkey tried to assert this new identity 
through a gradual opening to the West and a reinforcement of its independence in foreign 
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policy. In all three instances, Turkey acted independently, without considering their actions 
as anti-Western.  
 
THE SEARCH FOR FOREIGN POLICY AUTONOMY AND THE SHIFT OF 
AXIS DEBATE  
By adopting a proactive foreign policy approach, the AK Party made it clear that it 
would not refrain from pursuing different policies than those of the West, which had 
previously constituted the main reference point for Turkish foreign and security policy. 
This did not stem from an anti-Western motive that lacked philosophical and political 
depth. On the contrary, the intellectual foundation of this new foreign policy reflected the 
historical conception of Turkey’s new political leaders, the meaning that they attributed to 
Turkey’s geographical location, and their multi-cultural understanding. This approach 
manifests itself most clearly in the concept “center country” developed by Ahmet 
Davutoğlu, the main intellectual architect of the AK Party’s foreign policy.3 
Many policies that resulted from Turkey’s vision of becoming a “center country” 
led to the emergence of a debate in the West on whether Turkey was shifting its axis. This 
new debate can only be understood if the logic on which Turkey’s pre-AK Party foreign 
policy rests is clearly interpreted. Reflecting the identity that it engrained within the new 
state through its nation-building process, the Kemalists understanding of foreign policy 
positioned its relations with almost all neighboring regions within a security and threat 
paradigm, while establishing passive, unilateral relations with the West. During this era, 
the Middle East was regarded as the geography of Islamist and Kurdish identities and 
ideologies, which were other-ized and thus seen as a threat to Turkey’s pro-Western 
                                                
3 For the concept of center county and a comprehensive analysis of the elements upon which it is 
based, see Şaban Kardaş, From Zero Problems to Leading the Change: Making Sense of Transformation in 
Turkey’s Regional Policy, TEPAV Turkey Policy Brief Series, 2012. 
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orientation.4 This approach is seen most clearly in the depiction of the Middle East by the 
Kemalist elites as a “swampland.”5 In addition, Central Asia and the Caucasus were seen 
as the natural backyard of Russia, an actor to be avoided, and despite a brief moment of 
activism exhibited after the end of the Cold War, superficial relations were developed that 
lacked a clear strategic vision. Thus, until the AK Party came to power, Turkey’s foreign 
policy elites read the geography in which Turkey was situated within a security framework 
and kept its relations with the region at the lowest possible level. 
On the other hand, the AK Party believed that the Afro-Eurasian area was the 
leading region in the world politically, economically, and in terms of energy resources, and 
that as Turkey was located at the crossroad of the three continents, it had the potential of a 
“center country” due to both its geographical location and its historical experience.6 Such 
an approach made it necessary to interpret the surrounding geographies not with a security 
perception but from a perspective of opportunity in order to develop improved, strategic 
and multi-dimensional relations with these geographies and become involved in regional 
developments with a more active, initiating role. The most important feature of this new 
policy was that the policymaking process was first filtered by Ankara and not by 
Washington, Brussels or NATO. The fact that the policymaking process gained a Turkey-
centered nature suggested that more divergence from the foreign policies pursued by the 
West was now possible. Every incidence of divergence in foreign policy priorities and 
practices between Turkey and Western countries contributed to a discourse about Turkey 
shifting its axis. Turkey’s attempts, as an autonomous and proactive actor, to establish 
                                                
4 For an assessment of the geographies, ideas, and identities securitized by the Kemalist nation-state 
ideology, see Galip Dalay, “Kurdish Peace Process: The latest phase of de-securitisation politics,” Al Jazeera 
Opinion, May 14, 2003, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/05/2013514154722778273.html 
5 For an assessment of the depiction of the Middle East as a “swampland” by Turkish foreign policy, 
see Taha Özhan, “Kemalizm’e Ricat!,” Star Açık Görüş, July 27, 2013, 
http://haber.stargazete.com/acikgorus/kemalizme-ricat/haber-776381 
6 Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik, introduction. 
 204 
 
closer and healthier relations with regional countries and to determine and implement a 
foreign policy approach in line with its own priorities, values, and strategic vision led to 
Western accusations of shifting its axis. In the last few years, we witnessed similar forms 
of shift of axis debates about Turkish foreign policy. Both during the civil war in Syria and 
the coup in Egypt, Turkey’s positions were criticized as turning away from the West and 
an example of shift of axis. However again the future studies in these two crises will 
demonstrate that it was another show of the autonomy of Turkish foreign policy. Although 
Turkey never gave up its positions in the Western world, these policy divergences always 
considered as a major shift from its Western orientation.  
The shift of axis debate did not simply occur with regard to a single incident or a 
limited period of time. Instead, whenever the AK Party displayed a deviation from the 
codes of “traditional” Turkish foreign policy, it became the target of “shift of axis” 
accusations. In other words, the “shift of axis” debate was the expression of the feeling of 
disturbance caused by the paradigm shift in Turkish foreign policy. A healthier approach to 
analyzing the paradigm shift in the AK Party’s foreign policy—rather than taking the easy 
route of reductionist analysis—would have required a closer examination of critical turning 
points. This study tried to contribute to the effort to understand Turkey’s new foreign 
policy and state identity.  
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